scholarly journals Interview with Guido Rings: “We need intercultural solidarity if we want to survive and prosper in a world hit by ultranationalism”

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Stephen Trinder

As a master’s and Ph.D. student at Anglia Ruskin University in 2011, I recall the central message in lectures given by my eventual Ph.D. supervisor Professor Guido Rings was that we cannot underestimate the enduring strength of the legacy of colonialism in Europe and its influence on shaping contemporary attitudes towards immigration. Indeed, as I was completing my studies, I became increasingly aware of the negative rhetoric towards migrants in politics and right-wing press. In an attempt to placate the far-right of his party and address a growing threat from the UK Independence Party (UKIP), a discourse of ‘othernising’ migrants on the basis of their supposed rejection of ‘Britishness’ from former UK Prime Minister David Cameron in particular caught my attention. The result of this was tightening of immigration regulations, which culminated of course in the now-infamous Brexit vote of 2016. Almost a decade after my graduation, Professor Rings is currently Vice Chair for the Research Executive Agency of the European Commission and continues to work at Anglia Ruskin University at the level of Ph.D. supervisor. He still publishes widely in the field of Migration Studies and his recent high-profile book The Other in Contemporary Migrant Cinema (Routledge, 2016) and editorships in the fields of culture and identity (iMex Interdisciplinario Mexico) argue for increased intercultural solidarity in Europe as well as a strengthening of supranational organizations like the EU and the UN to offset growing nationalism. I got in touch with Professor Rings to find out where he feels Europe stands today with regard to migration and get his comments on the continued rise of nationalism on the continent.

Subject The package of reforms on a new EU-UK relationship. Significance The agreement between the United Kingdom and its EU partners sets the stage for the UK referendum on EU membership, which Prime Minister David Cameron has set for June 23. Cameron said he had negotiated new terms that would allow the United Kingdom to remain in the EU. Impacts The deal bolsters the campaign to remain in the EU, but the referendum outcome is still highly uncertain. The deal will only come into effect if the outcome is for remaining, forestalling a second referendum for better terms. If the outcome is for leaving, a new relationship with the EU would have to be negotiated during a two-year transition period. It would also probably lead to a second Scottish independence referendum and UK break-up.


Significance One of the front-runners to replace Mattarella is Prime Minister Mario Draghi, who recently gave a strong indication that he intends to run. However, if Draghi is elected president, there does not appear to be an alternative government which could guarantee political stability and make progress on Italy’s crucial reform agenda. Impacts A situation where there is no strong alternative to Draghi’s leadership may boost the electoral appeal of the far-right Brothers of Italy. The return of political instability would diminish Italy’s leverage in the EU regarding important issues such as foreign and fiscal policy. Unless the right-wing parties perform poorly, it is unlikely that Draghi would be elected as prime minister after the next election.


Author(s):  
David Denver ◽  
Mark Garnett

The years immediately after the 2015 general election were dominated by another vote, held in 2016. In 2013, the electoral challenge from UKIP had forced David Cameron to promise an in–out referendum on the EU should his party win the next general election. Cameron fulfilled his promise, after negotiations with the EU which only partially addressed the grievances of Eurosceptics in UKIP and within his own party. The chapter discusses the narrow victory for ‘Leave’ in the 2016 referendum, arising from divisions within the UK which cut across previous party allegiances and introduced a new element of volatility in an electorate which was already barely recognizable from that of 1964. The situation was complicated further by the election of the radical left-wing MP Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader after his party’s 2015 defeat. By contrast, when David Cameron resigned as Conservative leader and Prime Minister after the referendum he was succeeded by Theresa May, who was regarded as a pragmatic centre-right politician who could negotiate a compromise ‘Brexit’ deal with the EU. The chapter examines May’s failure to carry out this promise, marked in particular by her inept attempt to secure a convincing parliamentary majority in the 2017 general election. When May was forced from office in 2019 she was succeeded by Boris Johnson, a far more controversial and divisive character who nevertheless was able to lead the Conservatives to a comfortable electoral victory, not least because their pro-European opponents were hopelessly divided. However, the victorious Conservatives had no reason to feel complacent; even if Johnson’s government could deliver the favourable Brexit deal which it had promised, over the years since 1964 the British electorate had become far more fickle and parties were increasingly vulnerable to events outside their control. Within a few months of the 2019 election, party competition in Britain, which had seemed so stable back in 1964, was exposed to a new and deadly source of disturbance—the outbreak in China of the Covid-19 virus—which presented the most serious challenge faced by any UK government since 1945.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 624-651
Author(s):  
Leon Gooberman

John Redwood was appointed Secretary of State for Wales in 1993. He pursued a radical right- wing agenda for two turbulent years before resigning to unsuccessfully challenge John Major for the premiership. This article examines this period to make two arguments. One is that Redwood's imposition of a morally-charged Thatcherite agenda challenged and inadvertently discredited the Conservatives and the institutions through which they governed. This loss of credibility then enabled his opponents to magnify pre-existing discontent and secure a narrow victory in the 1997 devolution referendum. The other argument is that Redwood's period in Wales demonstrates the counterproductive potential of ideological dedication. His plan to overthrow the prime minister failed, he damaged his party and he helped facilitate devolution, outcomes that were the opposite of his intentions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (24) ◽  
pp. 11-45
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Izak

Kryzys imigracyjny w 2015 r. stał się motorem dla ruchów i partii negujących dotychczasowy porządek polityczny, także tych, które nie ukrywają swoich ksenofobicznych haseł i idei. Z perspektywy czasu jest coraz więcej oznak, że decyzja o niekontrolowanym przyjęciu uchodźców była bardziej wyrazem myślenia życzeniowego niż racjonalnym rozstrzygnięciem uwzględniającym rzeczywistą sytuację polityczną. Tym samym Europa znalazła się w niebezpiecznej sytuacji, kiedy to z jednej strony rosną w siłę ruchy skrajnie prawicowe, a z drugiej – radykalny islam. Każda z tych formacji legitymizuje swoje istnienie i metody działania istnieniem drugiej strony, a także próbuje doprowadzić do polaryzacji społeczeństwa i stworzenia takiej sytuacji, która niejako wymusi na obywatelach opowiedzenie się po stronie którejś z tych formacji. Paradoksalnie, decyzja kanclerz Merkel znacznie zwiększyła ryzyko wystąpienia takiego scenariusza, dlatego też niemieckie władze postrzegają i islamski, i prawicowy ekstremizm jako stwarzające jednakowe zagrożenie bezpieczeństwa państwa. Jednak dopiero ostatnie zamachy terrorystyczne w październiku i listopadzie 2020 r. we Francji i Niemczech przyczyniły się do zmiany politycznej narracji. Changes in the perception of immigration, integration, multiculturalism and threats of Islamic radicalism in certain EU member states The 2015 immigration crisis became a driving force for movements and parties that negate the current political order, including those that do not conceal their xenophobic slogans and ideas. In retrospect, there are more and more signs that the decision to accept the uncontrolled refugee influx was more an expression of wishful thinking than a rational decision, taking into account the actual political situation. Thus, Europe finds itself in a dangerous situation with far-right movements on the one hand, and radical Islam on the other. Each of these formations legitimizes its existence and methods of operation by the existence of the other side, trying to polarize society and create a situation that will somehow force citizens to opt for one of the two options. Paradoxically, Chancellor Merkel’s decision significantly increased the risk of such a scenario, hence the perception of Islamic and right-wing extremism by the German authorities as posing an equal threat to state security. However, it was only the recent terrorist attacks in October and November 2020 in France and Germany that changed the political narrative.


Significance Government formation should have been relatively straightforward but a series of political controversies have damaged VVD leader and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s credibility with the CU and some opposition parties. Impacts The collective rise of the far-right vote means the far right will continue to worry centrist parties and thus influence government policy. Investment in nuclear energy to meet climate targets is unlikely to be a priority for the new government. Dutch influence in the EU could grow with the departure of Merkel in September, and Macron’s focus on the 2022 election.


2019 ◽  
pp. 89-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quinn Slobodian ◽  
Dieter Plehwe

Since the advent of the European debt crisis in 2009, it has become common to hear descriptions of the European Union as a neoliberal machine hardwired to enforce austerity and to block projects of redistribution or solidarity. Yet by adopting an explanatory framework associating neoliberalism with supranational organizations like the EU, NAFTA, and the WTO against the so-called populism of its right-wing opponents, many observers have painted themselves into a corner. The problems with a straightforward compound of “neoliberal Europe” became starkly evident with the success of the “leave” vote in the Brexit referendum in 2016. If the EU was neoliberal, were those who called to abandon it the opponents of neoliberalism? If the EU is indeed the “neoliberalism express,” then to disembark was by definition a gesture of refusal against neoliberalism. To make sense of the resurgent phenomenon of the far right in European politics, then, our chapter tracks such continuities over time and avoids misleading dichotomies that pit neoliberal globalism—and neoliberal Europeanism—against an atavistic national populism. The closed-borders libertarianism of nationalist neoliberals like the German AfD is not a rejection of globalism but is a variety of it.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 678-690
Author(s):  
Peter Lunt

How do citizens respond to and engage with the performance of political power in the context of mainstream media? Through an analysis of two television programmes aired during the UK Brexit referendum campaign of 2016, a picture emerges of citizenship as the performative disruption of the performance of power. In the programmes the then UK prime minister, David Cameron, met members of the public for a mediated discussion of key issues in the Brexit referendum. Their interactions are analysed here as a confrontation between the performance of citizenship and power reflecting activist modalities of disruptive citizenship played out in the television studio. The article ends with reflections on questions about political agency as individualistic forms of disruptive political autonomy.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Tierney

Abstract This article assesses the United Kingdom’s rapidly evolving territorial constitution through the register of federal theory. While not arguing that the UK is federal or ought to be described as federal, the article contends that federalism is a useful prism through which to assess how well the UK’s constitution accommodates autonomy on the one hand and the efficacy of union, which is the essential complement of pluralism, on the other. It then proceeds to assess the Brexit process in light of existing imbalances in the UK’s territorial arrangements. The way in which Parliament has paved the way for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU is widely considered to be deeply unpropitious for devolution. However, upon further analysis of the legal changes and internal political commitments that have been designed to facilitate Brexit, it would appear that a more balanced set of constitutional arrangements may be emerging which could in fact bolster and further embed the United Kingdom’s territorial constitutional commitments.


The Lancet ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 383 (9929) ◽  
pp. 1631 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R Ashton ◽  
John Middleton ◽  
Tim Lang

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