The Rhetoric and Reality of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: A View from China

2016 ◽  
Vol 68 (7) ◽  
pp. 24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tsui Sit ◽  
Wong Erebus ◽  
Chi Lau Kin ◽  
Tiejun Wen

Since announcing its foreign policy "pivot to Asia" shortly after the election of Barack Obama, the United States has made extensive use of its institutional and discursive power to encourage denationalization among developing countries whose economies chiefly rely on manufacturing and trade—part of its global strategic goal of expanding the hegemony of finance capital at the lowest possible cost. The development of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) is a case in point. This article analyzes the TPP's strategy in targeting China, pointing out that the TPP is a battle for the terms of economic development and discourse in the twenty-first century, as well as an illustration of the ideology of technocracy and soft power. Lastly, we criticize the TPP's erosion of economic sovereignty, which would effectively relegate the economies of developing countries to a form of semi-colonial extraterritoriality.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

Author(s):  
Mohammed Nuruzzaman

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a major actor in Middle Eastern as well as global politics. Founded in 1932 by King Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, commonly known as Ibn Saud, the kingdom rests on an alliance between the Al Saud royal family and the followers of 18th-century Islamic revivalist Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The strategic and geo-economic significance of the kingdom originates from its location and possession of huge oil resources. It borders the world’s two immensely significant strategic sea trade routes—the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, boasts of being the world’s largest oil exporter, and is home to Islam’s two holiest sites—Mecca and Medina. Though not a militarily significant power, the kingdom’s vast oil wealth has gradually and greatly elevated its status as an influential global economic and financial power. Currently, it is the world’s seventeenth largest economy ($1.774 trillion, 2017 estimate based on purchasing power parity, or PPP) and a member of the elite G20 club of world economic powers. The economic good fortune notwithstanding, the Saudis have traditionally depended on the United States, especially after World War II, for security guarantees and pursued a foreign policy of restraint guided by preferences for soft power tools like mediation in regional conflicts, financial aid and investments, and diplomatic influence. Relations with the United States, mostly smooth but occasionally rocky (for example, the 1973 Saudi-led oil embargo on the West and the 9/11 attacks), has remained the cornerstone of Saudi foreign policy. A series of recent developments, most notably the rise of regional rival Iran following the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, the contagious effects of Arab pro-democracy movements, and the proclamation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the summer of 2014 forced a major overhaul in Saudi foreign policy. A fundamental shift from the traditional policy of restraint to a proactive foreign policy took root from the early 2010s. King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz sent troops to Bahrain in March 2011 to stifle the Shiʿa -led pro-democracy movements; incumbent King Salman bin Abd al-Aziz, soon after ascending the throne in January 2015, launched a massive air attack on Yemen to punish the allegedly pro-Iran Houthi rebels, and doubled down financial and military support for the pro-Saudi rebel groups fighting against the Iran- and Russia-backed Bashar Al-Assad government in Syria. The kingdom has justified this proactive foreign policy approach as a necessary response to force Shiʿa powerhouse Iran to scale back its presence in Arab countries and to keep Iranian power under check. Lately, the kingdom is pursuing policies to court Israel to jointly square off with their common enemy Iran and weaken pro-Iran Lebanese militia group Hezbollah’s military capabilities.


1982 ◽  
Vol 12 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 2-2
Author(s):  
Edmond J. Keller

Africanists generally agree that the United States, in the formulation and execution of its foreign policy, has historically relegated Africa to a low priority. To the extent that there has been an Africa policy at all, it has been described by scholars with such terms as a “policy of indifference,” a “non-policy,” a “policy of benign neglect.”The election of John F. Kennedy as President of the United States coincided with the “Age of Nationalism” in Africa, an era which saw the majority of Black Africa freed from the yoke of colonialism. Kennedy made a conscious attempt to demonstrate that the United States was sympathetic to the ideals cherished most by African nationalists: national independence and self-determination; territorial integrity and security; and economic development. It was as a result of his administration’s initiative that various economic development programs (i.e., the Peace Corps, USAID) took root in Africa. However, under President Johnson, U.S.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Syeda Menebhi

<p>The United States became deeply involved in Vietnam during the 1960s largely due to America’s desire to assure that developing countries modernize as capitalist and democratic. Thus, American involvement began with economic and social support in South Vietnam. Yet slowly, throughout the presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, the goal of modernizing South Vietnamese society and containing communism became increasingly implemented by military means. Further, it seems clear that, regardless of how much effort the United States geared towards Vietnam, American defeat was inevitable. By Richard Nixon’s presidency, the initial modernization goals in Vietnam mattered only in so far as they could preserve American credibility. Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all failed to realize that while U.S. time was limited in Vietnam, the North Vietnamese had all the time they needed to fight for the independence of their country. The South Vietnamese forces could not defend themselves and the United States had to withdraw eventually.</p>


Author(s):  
Nancy Snow

Public diplomacy is a subfield of political science and international relations that involves study of the process and practice by which nation-states and other international actors engage global publics to serve their interests. It developed during the Cold War as an outgrowth of the rise of mass media and public opinion drivers in foreign policy management. The United States, in a bipolar ideological struggle with the Soviet Union, recognized that gaining public support for policy goals among foreign populations worked better at times through direct engagement than traditional, often closed-door, government-to-government contact. Public diplomacy is still not a defined academic field with an underlying theory, although its proximity to the originator of soft power, Joseph Nye, places it closer to the neoliberal school that emphasizes multilateral pluralistic approaches in international relations. The term is a normative replacement for the more pejorative-laden propaganda, centralizes the role of the civilian in international relations to elevate public engagement above the level of manipulation associated with government or corporate propaganda. Building mutual understanding among the actors involved is the value commonly associated with public diplomacy outcomes of an exchange or cultural nature, along with information activities that prioritize the foreign policy goals and national interests of a particular state. In the mid-20th century, public diplomacy’s emphasis was less scholarly and more practical—to influence foreign opinion in competition with nation-state rivals. In the post-Cold War period, the United States in particular pursued market democracy expansion in the newly industrializing countries of the East. Soft power, the negative and positive attraction that flows from an international actor’s culture and behavior, became the favored term associated with public diplomacy. After 9/11, messaging and making a case for one’s agenda to win the hearts and minds of a Muslim-majority public became predominant against the backdrop of a U.S.-led global war on terrorism and two active interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Public diplomacy was utilized in one-way communication campaigns such as the Shared Values Initiative of the U.S. Department of State, which backfired when its target-country audiences rejected the embedded messages as self-serving propaganda. In the 21st century, global civil society and its enemies are on the level of any diplomat or culture minister in matters of public diplomacy. Narrative competition in a digital and networked era is much deeper, broader, and adversarial while the mainstream news media, which formerly set how and what we think about, no longer holds dominance over national and international narratives. Interstate competition has shifted to competition from nonstate actors who use social media as a form of information and influence warfare in international relations. As disparate scholars and practitioners continue to acknowledge public diplomacy approaches, the research agenda will remain case-driven, corporate-centric (with the infusion of public relations), less theoretical, and more global than its Anglo-American roots.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong-Shik Lee

Abstract Economic development is the term that has been associated with less developed countries in the Third World (“developing countries”), not the economically advanced countries (“developed countries”), such as the United States. However, the changing economic conditions in recent decades, such as the widening income gaps among individual citizens and regions within developed countries, stagnant economic growth deepening economic polarization, and an institutional incapacity to deal with these issues, render the concept of economic development relevant to the assessment of the economic problems in developed countries. In the United States, these economic problems caused a significant political consequence such as the unexpected outcome of the presidential election in 2016. This article examines the applicability of the legal and institutional approaches, which were originally adopted to stimulate economic development in successful developing countries, to the economic problems in the United States.


2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 64-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew L. Johns

This article explores a key period in the relationship between the United States and Iran in the shadow of the Vietnam conflict and the overarching Cold War. It shows how U.S.-Iranian relations shifted considerably from early 1965—when the shah of Iran stepped up his efforts to reduce his dependence on the United States—to November 1967, when U.S. economic development assistance to Iran formally ended. The Johnson administration's overwhelming concern with the Vietnam conflict led to the neglect of potentially critical foreign policy issues and allies, but the lack of success in Vietnam simultaneously accentuated the importance of maintaining key alliance relationships, especially with Iran. The article underscores the centrality of domestic political considerations in forming and understanding foreign policy, both in the United States and in other countries. It also suggests that Third World leaders understood the nature of the Cold War and used the superpower conflict to their advantage to a much greater degree than previously recognized.


2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 235-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Wiseman

My central claim is that the United States has conducted a distinctive form of ‘anti-diplomacy’, accepting in practice many diplomatic norms and practices while remaining reluctant to acknowledge the fact. To support this claim, this article argues that since its rise as a world power, the United States has participated in international society’s diplomatic culture in a distinctive way and that this distinctiveness stems from seven interconnected characteristics of American diplomacy: (1) America’s long-held distrust and negative view of diplomats and diplomacy, which has contributed to the historical neglect and sidelining of the US Department of State in the United States’ policy-making process; (2) a high degree of domestic influence over foreign policy and diplomacy; (3) a tendency to privilege hard power over soft power in foreign policy; (4) a preference for bilateral over multilateral diplomacy; (5) an ideological tradition of diplomatically isolating states that are considered adversarial and of refusing to engage them until they meet preconditions; (6) a tradition of appointing a relatively high proportion of political rather than career ambassadors; and (7) a demonstrably strong cultural disposition towards a direct, low-context negotiating style. A consequence of these distinguishing characteristics is that American diplomacy tends to be less effective than it might otherwise be, not only in advancing the United States’ own interests, but also in advancing wider international cooperation. A goal here is to provide a working framework with which to evaluate any US administration’s relationship to diplomacy as the country’s interests and identity evolve.


2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 13-25
Author(s):  
Isaac Caro

The 9/11 attack and the war on terrorism declared by the United States produced a new dynamic with regard to the struggle against intolerance and, in particular, Islamophobia. The increase in Islamophobia is related to the clash-of-civilizations discourse that has served to justify a foreign policy adopted by Republican administrations in the United States, in which Islam is the principal enemy to be fought and defeated. El ataque del 11-S y la guerra contra el terrorismo declarada por los Estados Unidos produjeron una nueva dinámica con respecto a la lucha contra la intolerancia y, en particular, la islamofobia. El aumento de la islamofobia está relacionado con el discurso de choque de civilizaciones que ha servido para justificar una política exterior adoptada por las administraciones republicanas en los Estados Unidos, en la que el Islam es el principal enemigo que hay que combatir y derrotar.


2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 33-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pak Nung Wong ◽  
Wai Kay Ricky Yue

AbstractIn 2011, the United States of America (u.s.) adopted the “pivot to Asia” (also known as “return to Asia”) foreign policy. In order to provide a critique of this apparent policy change, this paper has two aims. First, we will contextualize such policy agenda against the Anglo-American strategic culture of “containment” as a strand of geopolitical realism and a foreign policy practice against communism. Second, by providing a case study on the changing relations between the Union of Myanmar (Burma), the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America, we will characterizeu.s.containment and China’s counter-containment strategies through the lens of Suntzu’sArt of War.


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