It is undoubtedly desirable, in the interest of the arbitration of
international controversies, that at the next Hague Conference a form of
treaty should be presented which, while covering all differences between
states, shall steer clear of the difficulties which in the past have wrecked
important treaties of that character. It is a matter in which the United
States may be expected to lead, having by precept and example so often
distinguished itself as a pioneer in movements tending to do away with war
between nations. Facts must be looked in the face, however, and it is
apparent that the present position of the United States with reference to
this subject is not so advantageous as could be wished. No two countries of
the world are so favorably situated for the purposes of an arbitration
treaty between them inclusive of all differences as are Great Britain and
the United States. Through racial, social, and commercial ties ever knitting
them closely together, war between them has become almost unthinkable. Yet
two trials for such a comprehensive treaty have failed and the official
position of the United States to-day seems to be that there is a class of
questions which is necessarily to be excluded from any general arbitration
treaty. The class covers controversies described as affecting “the vital
interests, the independence, or the honor” of the parties. In the
English-American treaty of 1897 such controversies were disposed of by
sending them to arbitration but so constituting the arbitral court that an
award must have the assent of the representatives of the losing party or of
a majority of them. In the treaty of 1911 it was sought to meet the
difficulty by a joint commission of inquiry empowered to investigate and
decide whether a question was or was not arbitrable and should or should not
be arbitrated. But neither plan proved to be acceptable to the United States
acting under the treaty-making power vested jointly in the President and
Senate.
