General Arbitration Treaties

It is undoubtedly desirable, in the interest of the arbitration of international controversies, that at the next Hague Conference a form of treaty should be presented which, while covering all differences between states, shall steer clear of the difficulties which in the past have wrecked important treaties of that character. It is a matter in which the United States may be expected to lead, having by precept and example so often distinguished itself as a pioneer in movements tending to do away with war between nations. Facts must be looked in the face, however, and it is apparent that the present position of the United States with reference to this subject is not so advantageous as could be wished. No two countries of the world are so favorably situated for the purposes of an arbitration treaty between them inclusive of all differences as are Great Britain and the United States. Through racial, social, and commercial ties ever knitting them closely together, war between them has become almost unthinkable. Yet two trials for such a comprehensive treaty have failed and the official position of the United States to-day seems to be that there is a class of questions which is necessarily to be excluded from any general arbitration treaty. The class covers controversies described as affecting “the vital interests, the independence, or the honor” of the parties. In the English-American treaty of 1897 such controversies were disposed of by sending them to arbitration but so constituting the arbitral court that an award must have the assent of the representatives of the losing party or of a majority of them. In the treaty of 1911 it was sought to meet the difficulty by a joint commission of inquiry empowered to investigate and decide whether a question was or was not arbitrable and should or should not be arbitrated. But neither plan proved to be acceptable to the United States acting under the treaty-making power vested jointly in the President and Senate.