scholarly journals PROBLEM JASNOŚCI W JĘZYKU PRAWNYM – ASPEKTY LINGWISTYCZNE I TEORETYCZNOPRAWNE

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 7-25
Author(s):  
Marta ANDRUSZKIEWICZ

The aim of this article is to present the notion of clarity as considered from the linguistic and theoretical-legal perspectives. Clarity, similarly to communicativeness and adequacy, constitutes a desirable feature of any legal text. The necessity of considering the three features has been formulated in normative regulations regarding the tenets of a legislative technique. Furthermore, the requirement is part of a constitutional principle of proper legislation. Clarity characterizes legal texts; it is required due to the editorial correctness which should be achieved in the process of the writing of a legal text. It arises from the rules for making laws according to the principles of state under the rule of law. The requirement for the consideration of the desirable features of a legal text by a legislator has both formal and ethical dimensions, because the clarity of a legal text not only constitutes a structural property but also guarantees that values such as legal certainty, legal security of citizens as well as trust in both state and law are recognised. The point is, however, that it is not always possible to achieve such clarity. The objective of this analysis is to investigate the causes which confirm that the requirement for the clarity of any legal text is complicated and not easy to meet. It is due to the fact that the requirement is conditioned not only by strictly legal factors but also linguistic, contextual as well as ethical ones.

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Inayatul Anisah

Studi hukum tidak akan lepas dari sebuah kondi?kasi teks yang memiliki tujuan tertentu. Agar tujuan yang terkandung dalam makna teks secara hakiki dapat tercapai, diperlukan adanya dekonstruksi hukum. Melalui  dekonstruksi, upaya pembangunan hukum di Indonesia yang selama ini dikenal hanya sebatas hukum yang berlaku secara yuridis formal, perlu dimaknai kembali sehingga mencakup nilai-nilai kemaslahatan yang berlaku secara universal. Meskipun perlu diakui, bahwa nilai-nilai kemaslahatan tetap tidak akan mampu menciptakan kepastian hukum, kecuali melalui upaya supremasi hukum yang berupa teks-teks itu sendiri. Untuk menciptakan kepastian hukum (legal certainty), ajaran itu hampir pasti mutlak diperlukan, namun dalam  realitas empirisnya ajaran hukum modern tersebut tidak begitu saja dapat diterapkan begitu saja menjadi rule of law tanpa melihat sebagai rule of morality.<br /><br />The study of law coincides with the codi?cation of texts, and the deconstruction of law is considered necessary to understand the true meaning of the legal texts. Through the process of deconstruction, the legal development of the country which is merely focused on formal and juridical aspect of law needs to include new nuance of universal public bene?t, despite any doubt on its legal uncertainty. In order to achieve legal certainty, reference to the legal text is a necessity, even though in reality modern legal theory cannot operate as rule of law without implementing rule of  morality.<br /><br />Kata kunci: Teks, Dekonstruksi, Kemaslahatan, Kepastian hukum<br /><br /><br /><br />


Author(s):  
Valsamis Mitsilegas

The article will examine the challenges that the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office poses for the rule of law – a question which has been underexplored in the policy and academic debate on the establishment of the EPPO, which focused largely on questions of structure and powers of the EPPO and the battle between intergovernmental and supranational visions of European prosecution. The implications of the finally adopted legal framework on the EPPO on the rule of law will be analysed primarily from the perspective of the rule of law as related to EPPO investigations and prosecutions and their consequences for affected individuals – in terms of legal certainty and foreseeability, protection from executive arbitrariness, effective judicial protection and defence rights. The article will undertake a rule of law audit of the EPPO by focusing on three key elements of its legal architecture – the competence of the EPPO, applicable law and judicial review – and the interaction between EU and national levels of investigation and prosecution that the EPPO Regulation envisages. The analysis will aim to cast light on the current rule of law deficit in a hybrid system of European prosecution located somewhere between co-operation and integration.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Opačić ◽  
◽  
Vladimir Vrhovšek ◽  
◽  

We, as the authors of this text, have found it important to point out the close connection between law and justice, theory and practice, because citizens go to court for justice. The judge says what justice is. However, when the legal norm is available and well known to the persons, to whom it refers, and when it is predictable and the case law is uniform, the persons to whom the legal norm refers, can know their rights and obligations concretely, and thus know how to treat them. In order to that they must behave and anticipate the consequences of their behavior. When all the above has been fulfilled, it can be said that the requirements of the rule of law and legal security have been met, so it can be freely said that law and justice are at the "service of the people", through theory and practice. It should be reminded that the precision of the legal norm is one of the basic elements of the rule of law and is a key factor for the emergence and maintenance of the legitimacy of the legal order, which applies to all branches of law, and that court decisions are binding on all.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-253
Author(s):  
Prianter Jaya Hairi

In 2017, Constitutional Court has received three calls for judicial reviews regarding treachery (makar) article in the Criminal Code. These articles deemed to be contradicting with the principle of legal certainty and freedom of expression. This study analyzes the important issue that is being debate in those judicial reviews. One of those is about the argument which says that the absence of the definition of treachery in the Criminal Code has caused a violation of legal certainty. Besides, the rule of treachery in the Criminal Code has also considered to have caused a violation of freedom of expression which has been guaranteed by Constitution. Analysis shows that the absence of treachery definition in the Criminal Code is not something that instantly becomes a problem in its application that causing the loss of legal certainty. Law enforcer, especially judge, in enforcing the rule of law must always use the method of law interpretation which appropriate with legal norm. With systematic interpretation, treachery can be interpreted according to the sentence of the rule as a unity of the legal system. In this case, the term treachery as regulated in Article 87 of the Criminal Code can be systematically interpreted as the basis for Article 104-Article 108 of the Criminal Code, Article 130 of the Criminal Code, and Article 140 of the Criminal Code which regulates various types of treason and their respective legal sanctions for the perpetrators. Further, on the argument that the articles of treachery in the Criminal Code also can not necessarily be said to limit the freedom of expression, because every citizen’s freedom has limitation, including the limitation of law and human rights. AbstrakPada tahun 2017, Mahkamah Konstitusi telah menerima tiga kali judicial reviewterhadap pasalpasal tindak pidana makar dalam Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP). Pasal-pasal ini dipandang bertentangan dengan prinsip kepastian hukum dan kebebasan berekspresi. Tulisan ini menganalisis substansi yang menjadi perdebatan dalam perkara judicial review tersebut. Di antaranya perdebatan mengenai tidak adanya definisi istilah makar dalam KUHP yang menyebabkan persoalan kepastian hukum. Selain itu, pengaturan tindak pidana makar dalam KUHP juga dinilai melanggar kebebasan berekspresi yang telah dijamin oleh konstitusi. Analisis terhadap persoalanpersoalan tersebut menunjukkan bahwa ketiadaan definisi kata “makar” dalam KUHP bukanlah merupakan sesuatu yang serta merta langsung menjadi persoalan dalam penerapannya sehingga menyebabkan hilangnya kepastian hukum. Penegak hukum, terutama hakim, dalam menegakkan peraturan hukum selalu menggunakan metode penafsiran hukum yang sesuai dengan kaidah ilmu hukum. Dengan penafsiran sistematis, makar dapat dimaknai sesuai kalimat dari peraturan sebagai suatu kesatuan sistem hukum. Dalam hal ini, istilah makar yang diatur dalam Pasal 87 KUHP, secara sistematis dapat ditafsirkan sebagai dasar bagi Pasal 104-Pasal 108 KUHP, Pasal 130 KUHP, dan Pasal 140 KUHP yang mengatur tentang jenis makar beserta sanksi hukumnya masing-masing bagi para pelakunya. Selain itu, mengenai argumen bahwa pasal-pasal makar dalam KUHP berpotensi melanggar HAM dan dipandang bertentangan dengan konstitusi dapat dikatakan tidak beralasan. Sebab kebebasan HAM setiap orang tidak tanpa batas, di antaranya dibatasi nilai-nilai agama, keamanan, dan ketertiban umum.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 184
Author(s):  
Ismail Tafani ◽  
Darjel Sina

Popular sovereignty is the foundation of the principle of democracy for the existence and functioning of the rule of law. In the Parliamentary Republic of Albania based on political pluralism for nearly three decades, this essential element of the democratic principle seems to be as fragile as the principle itself. The basic concept of the functionality of the rule of law in Albania under the Constitution is the separation and balancing of powers. Although the constitutional provision for the separation and balancing of powers is clear and based on Montesquieu’s conception of the development of the principle of democracy and the prohibition of abuse that each of the powers could inflict on each other, the separation and balancing of powers in Albania seems to be impossible. Albania as a country with a culture of not very long political pluralism, instead it comes from a rather long-term mono-party system where the development of the electoral process was more of a holiday than a race. However, the sovereignty of the people enshrined in today's constitution and yesterday's constitution seems more like a slogan than a fundamental principle of constitutional order. In these years of political pluralism between the test of many electoral systems coupled with constitutional and legal changes, the implementation of the principle of popular sovereignty to consolidate the democratic principle remains clearly a utopia for Albanian society. After each election process debates reopen the need for reforming the electoral system in general and managing the process in particular. The purpose of this paper through a comparative analysis is to identify the elements that impede the observance of the fundamental constitutional principle of popular sovereignty either directly or indirectly through elected representatives to consolidate the rule oflaw in Albania.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rasji . ◽  
Cinthia .

Indonesia is a country based on the law (rechstaat) whose basis is stated in Article 1 Paragraph (3) of the UUD NRI 1945. The essential principles of the rule of law based on Article 24 Paragraph (1) of the UUD NRI 1945 are the guarantee of the organizer of the power of an independent judicial institution without interference from other parties to hold a court to uphold law and justice. Ideally, the results of the two institutions' decisions do not cause problems in society. However, the results of the decisions of the two institutions are still found differently regarding the issue of nominating individual participants in the members of the Regional Representatives Council. Any other way, the results of the Constitutional Court ruling prohibited members of the Regional Representatives Council who were still in the position of administrators of political parties. Meanwhile, the decision of the Supreme Court allows candidates for members of the Regional Representatives Council who are still in the position of managing political parties. In this study, the researcher will examine the differences between the Supreme Court's decision and the Constitutional Court's decision regarding the nomination of individual participants in the Regional Representatives Council by using normative legal methods and conducting interviews as supporting data. The results of the study revealed that based on the legal basis and authority of the institution, the verdict that had legal certainty regarding the nomination of individual participants in the Regional Representatives Council election was the decision of the Constitutional Court.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 193-220
Author(s):  
Loammi Wolf

Section 81 of the Constitution regulates promulgation through publication as part of the legislative process (ie, a procedural norm). The provision further creates a presumption that unless the legislature explicitly determines a commencement date in an Act it enters into force upon promulgation. The commencement date of legislation is thus part of the contents of a statute (ie, a substantive norm), which must be determined by the legislature when adopting the legislation. In a number of judgments, however, the Constitutional Court espoused the idea that the commencement date is part of the legislative process instead of being part of the contents of a statute. Thus it allowed the legislature to delegate its power to determine a commencement date for legislation to the president as head of state in transgression of section 44(1)(a)(iii) of the Constitution: this provision only mandates a delegation of core legislative powers to another legislative body. The confusion is partly due to an initial tendency of the Constitutional Court to interpret constitutional provisions in isolation and partly to the unconsidered re-importation of Westminster constitutiona common law. In the Westminster system a delegation of the power to determine a later commencement date for legislation (ie, after promulgation) to the executive and/or head of state was justified in terms of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Parliamentary sovereignty, however, was abolished in 1994: such a delegation of power is no longer compromises legislative power and the separation of powers, but goes to the substance of the rule of law and legal certainty as foundational values of the constitutional state. Compatible with sections 44(1)(a)(iii), 55(2)(b)(i), 79 and 87 of the Constitution. Lately, the Constitutional Court even ruled that the power to determine a commencement date for legislation is an executive power, which is to be exercised in terms of sections 85 and 101 of the Constitution, although section 81 explicitly confers this power upon the legislature. A reconsideration of the Court’s interpretation of section 81 is therefore overdue: it not only compromises legislative power and the separation of powers, but goes to the substance of the rule of law and legal certainty as foundational values of the constitutional state.


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