Revisiting Section 81 of the Constitution: The Commencement Date of Legislation (Legislative Power) Distinguished from Promulgation (Legislative Process)

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 193-220
Author(s):  
Loammi Wolf
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty ◽  
Head Of State ◽  
Constitutional State

Section 81 of the Constitution regulates promulgation through publication as part of the legislative process (ie, a procedural norm). The provision further creates a presumption that unless the legislature explicitly determines a commencement date in an Act it enters into force upon promulgation. The commencement date of legislation is thus part of the contents of a statute (ie, a substantive norm), which must be determined by the legislature when adopting the legislation. In a number of judgments, however, the Constitutional Court espoused the idea that the commencement date is part of the legislative process instead of being part of the contents of a statute. Thus it allowed the legislature to delegate its power to determine a commencement date for legislation to the president as head of state in transgression of section 44(1)(a)(iii) of the Constitution: this provision only mandates a delegation of core legislative powers to another legislative body. The confusion is partly due to an initial tendency of the Constitutional Court to interpret constitutional provisions in isolation and partly to the unconsidered re-importation of Westminster constitutiona common law. In the Westminster system a delegation of the power to determine a later commencement date for legislation (ie, after promulgation) to the executive and/or head of state was justified in terms of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Parliamentary sovereignty, however, was abolished in 1994: such a delegation of power is no longer compromises legislative power and the separation of powers, but goes to the substance of the rule of law and legal certainty as foundational values of the constitutional state. Compatible with sections 44(1)(a)(iii), 55(2)(b)(i), 79 and 87 of the Constitution. Lately, the Constitutional Court even ruled that the power to determine a commencement date for legislation is an executive power, which is to be exercised in terms of sections 85 and 101 of the Constitution, although section 81 explicitly confers this power upon the legislature. A reconsideration of the Court’s interpretation of section 81 is therefore overdue: it not only compromises legislative power and the separation of powers, but goes to the substance of the rule of law and legal certainty as foundational values of the constitutional state.

scholarly journals The Responsibility of Courts in Maintaining the Rule of Law: Two Tales of Consequential Judicial Self-Restraint

2021 ◽  
pp. 155-181
Author(s):  
Pál Sonnevend
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Law

AbstractModern constitutionalism is based on the paradigm that courts are inherently entitled and obliged to enforce the constitution of the respective polity. This responsibility of courts also applies in the context of the European Union to both the CJEU and national constitutional courts. The present chapter argues that in the face of constitutional crises the CJEU and the Hungarian Constitutional Court shy away from applying the law as it is to the full. The reasons behind this unwarranted judicial self-restraint are most different: the CJEU aims to avoid conflicts with national constitutional courts whereas the Hungarian Constitutional Court has been facing a legislative power also acting as constitution making power willing to amend the constitution to achieve specific legislative purposes or to undo previous constitutional court decisions. Yet both courts respond to expediencies that do not follow from the law they are called upon to apply. It is argued that rule of law backsliding requires these courts to abandon the unnecessary self-restraint and exploit the means already available.

Part III The Relationship Between the Judiciary and the Political Branches, 7 Super-presidentialism in Angola and the Angolan Judiciary

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomashausen André
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional State ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Parliamentary Oversight ◽  
Supply Information

This chapter recounts the history of constitutional developments in Angola leading up to the 2010 constitution. It introduces the new Angolan Constitutional Court and discusses the first and thus far only substantive decision of this Court—the Parliamentary Oversight Judgment of 9 October 2013—a serious constitutional conflict between parliament and the president. The Court held that the 2010 constitution had reduced the powers of parliament as compared to the previous text and that parliament lacked the power to question the executive or to summon ministers to hearings before it. Since these are presidential powers, the Court held, parliament may not arrogate them, though it may request the president to supply information or order his ministers before it. Although the conservative leaning of the Court in this dispute disappointed the opposition and many commentators, the judgment strengthened the rule of law and of the constitutional state.

scholarly journals JUDICIAL REVIEW PASAL-PASAL MAKAR KUHP: PERSPEKTIF PENAFSIRAN HUKUM DAN HAM (JUDICIAL REVIEW ON TREACHERY ARTICLES OF THE CRIMINAL CODE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF LAW INTERPRETATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS)

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-253
Author(s):  
Prianter Jaya Hairi
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Criminal Code ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Legal Sanctions ◽  
Definition Of

In 2017, Constitutional Court has received three calls for judicial reviews regarding treachery (makar) article in the Criminal Code. These articles deemed to be contradicting with the principle of legal certainty and freedom of expression. This study analyzes the important issue that is being debate in those judicial reviews. One of those is about the argument which says that the absence of the definition of treachery in the Criminal Code has caused a violation of legal certainty. Besides, the rule of treachery in the Criminal Code has also considered to have caused a violation of freedom of expression which has been guaranteed by Constitution. Analysis shows that the absence of treachery definition in the Criminal Code is not something that instantly becomes a problem in its application that causing the loss of legal certainty. Law enforcer, especially judge, in enforcing the rule of law must always use the method of law interpretation which appropriate with legal norm. With systematic interpretation, treachery can be interpreted according to the sentence of the rule as a unity of the legal system. In this case, the term treachery as regulated in Article 87 of the Criminal Code can be systematically interpreted as the basis for Article 104-Article 108 of the Criminal Code, Article 130 of the Criminal Code, and Article 140 of the Criminal Code which regulates various types of treason and their respective legal sanctions for the perpetrators. Further, on the argument that the articles of treachery in the Criminal Code also can not necessarily be said to limit the freedom of expression, because every citizen’s freedom has limitation, including the limitation of law and human rights. AbstrakPada tahun 2017, Mahkamah Konstitusi telah menerima tiga kali judicial reviewterhadap pasalpasal tindak pidana makar dalam Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP). Pasal-pasal ini dipandang bertentangan dengan prinsip kepastian hukum dan kebebasan berekspresi. Tulisan ini menganalisis substansi yang menjadi perdebatan dalam perkara judicial review tersebut. Di antaranya perdebatan mengenai tidak adanya definisi istilah makar dalam KUHP yang menyebabkan persoalan kepastian hukum. Selain itu, pengaturan tindak pidana makar dalam KUHP juga dinilai melanggar kebebasan berekspresi yang telah dijamin oleh konstitusi. Analisis terhadap persoalanpersoalan tersebut menunjukkan bahwa ketiadaan definisi kata “makar” dalam KUHP bukanlah merupakan sesuatu yang serta merta langsung menjadi persoalan dalam penerapannya sehingga menyebabkan hilangnya kepastian hukum. Penegak hukum, terutama hakim, dalam menegakkan peraturan hukum selalu menggunakan metode penafsiran hukum yang sesuai dengan kaidah ilmu hukum. Dengan penafsiran sistematis, makar dapat dimaknai sesuai kalimat dari peraturan sebagai suatu kesatuan sistem hukum. Dalam hal ini, istilah makar yang diatur dalam Pasal 87 KUHP, secara sistematis dapat ditafsirkan sebagai dasar bagi Pasal 104-Pasal 108 KUHP, Pasal 130 KUHP, dan Pasal 140 KUHP yang mengatur tentang jenis makar beserta sanksi hukumnya masing-masing bagi para pelakunya. Selain itu, mengenai argumen bahwa pasal-pasal makar dalam KUHP berpotensi melanggar HAM dan dipandang bertentangan dengan konstitusi dapat dikatakan tidak beralasan. Sebab kebebasan HAM setiap orang tidak tanpa batas, di antaranya dibatasi nilai-nilai agama, keamanan, dan ketertiban umum.

scholarly journals THE INCONSISTENCY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE HYUNDAI-INSPIRED INTERPRETATION Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly (CCT86/15) [2016] ZACC 8

Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Themba Maseko
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Case Note ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The One ◽  
Do So

The Hyundai-inspired interpretation obliges the courts to interpret, where possible, legislation in conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. This process involves taking into account the objects and purports of an Act and interpreting its provisions in the manner that complies with the constitutional values. Essentially, it ensures that courts give preference to an interpretation of legislation that is within the parameters of the provisions of the Constitution over the one that is not. However, courts do not apply the Hyundai-inspired interpretation if it cannot be ascribed to the provision of the legislation in question or if it is not reasonably possible for them to do so. Such situations include the Hyundai-inspired interpretation that unduly strains the text, or that obliges the court to read-in too many qualifications. In these situations, the courts have to declare the legislative provision in question unconstitutional and resort to the remedy of reading- in or notional severance. The Hyundai-inspired interpretation is evidenced in quite a number of cases. However, this case note critically dissects the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied it in the case of Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly ((CCT86/15) [2016] ZACC 8).It concludes that the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied it, in this case, is inconsistent with the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied it in the case of Abahlali Basemjondolo six years earlier. When interpreting the word “disturbance” which section 1 of the Powers Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act (4 of 2004) defined as “any act which interferes with or disrupts or which is likely to interfere with or disrupt the proceedings of Parliament or a House or Committee” and which the High Court had found to be too broad that it had the effect of finding a robust and controversial debate unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court unexpectedly read in too many qualifications to the word “disturbance” in conformity with the Constitution. The reason being, the Constitutional Court, six years earlier, found the approach of reading- in too many qualifications in conformity with the Constitution to be straining the text and to be contrary to the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers in the case of Abahlali Basemjondolo.

scholarly journals KEPASTIAN HUKUM MENGENAI PERBEDAAN ANTARA PUTUSAN MAHKAMAH AGUNG DAN PUTUSAN MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI TERKAIT PENCALONAN PERSEORANGAN PESERTA PEMILU ANGGOTA DPD

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rasji . ◽  
Cinthia .
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Ruling ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Law And Justice

Indonesia is a country based on the law (rechstaat) whose basis is stated in Article 1 Paragraph (3) of the UUD NRI 1945. The essential principles of the rule of law based on Article 24 Paragraph (1) of the UUD NRI 1945 are the guarantee of the organizer of the power of an independent judicial institution without interference from other parties to hold a court to uphold law and justice. Ideally, the results of the two institutions' decisions do not cause problems in society. However, the results of the decisions of the two institutions are still found differently regarding the issue of nominating individual participants in the members of the Regional Representatives Council. Any other way, the results of the Constitutional Court ruling prohibited members of the Regional Representatives Council who were still in the position of administrators of political parties. Meanwhile, the decision of the Supreme Court allows candidates for members of the Regional Representatives Council who are still in the position of managing political parties. In this study, the researcher will examine the differences between the Supreme Court's decision and the Constitutional Court's decision regarding the nomination of individual participants in the Regional Representatives Council by using normative legal methods and conducting interviews as supporting data. The results of the study revealed that based on the legal basis and authority of the institution, the verdict that had legal certainty regarding the nomination of individual participants in the Regional Representatives Council election was the decision of the Constitutional Court.

Legislation and Legislative Process in Eastern Europe

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-108
Author(s):  
Zsolt Szabó ◽  
Herbert Küpper
Keyword(s):  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Structural Problems ◽  
The People ◽  
Apparent Homogeneity ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
The Eu

Abstract The study describes and systemises the constitutional requirements on legislation in Eastern Europe. The comparison reveals that the basic structures of the legislative process live up to the standards of the rule of law. The details, however, are quite frequently deficient or problematic. Laws requiring a qualified majority often cause structural problems, based on poor political culture, and the vague and contradictory regulatory framework. Other problems are a legacy of socialism, e.g. the instrumental perception of the law, or the immature separation of powers. However, the apparent homogeneity of the region and its structural problems that was typical of the socialist era, has given way to a stronger differentiation which often reflects differences that existed prior to the socialist dictatorship. This stronger differentiation concerns, i.a. the extent of executive law-making, the structure of parliament (mono- or bicameral), the majority requirement for the decisions in parliament, and the participation of the people in legislation. In the states that have joined the EU, the European criteria of the rule of law have had their effect, whereas the candidate states on the Wester Balkans are on the way of consolidating their legislative system. Further to the East, the rule of law becomes weaker and weaker.

scholarly journals UPAYA HUKUM PENINJAUAN KEMBALI DALAM PERKARA PIDANA PASCA PUTUSAN MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 198
Author(s):  
Ani Triwati ◽  
Subaidah Ratna Juita ◽  
Tri Mulyani
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Binding Force ◽  
Legal Remedy ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The One

<p>Dengan adanya Putusan MK No. 34/PUU-XI/2013, untuk upaya hukum luar biasa yaitu peninjauan kembali dapat dilakukan lebih dari satu kali. Putusan MK yang memperbolehkan upaya hukum luar biasa peninjauan kembali lebih dari satu kali tersebut, berkaitan dengan kepastian hukum dan keadilan. Apabila peninjauan kembali diperbolehkan lebih dari satu kali tetapi tidak ada pembatasan sampai berapa kali maka perkara tersebut tidak akan ada akhirnya, bahwa adanya asas litis finiri oportet (setiap perkara harus ada akhirnya) tidak akan terpenuhi. Beberapa permasalahan yang perlu dibahas adalah apakah dengan adanya Putusan MK No. 34/PUU-XI/2013 dapat memenuhi nilai keadilan dan kepastian hukum. Selanjutnya bagaimana pengaturan mengenai peninjauan kembali sebagai implementasi Putusan MK No. 34/PUU- XI/2013 agar asas kepastian hukum dan asas litis finiri oportet akan terpenuhi. Putusan MK No. 34/PUU- XI/2013, yang menyatakan bahwa Pasal 268 ayat (3) Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1981 tentang Hukum Acara Pidana bertentangan dengan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia tahun 1945 dan tidak mempunyai kekuatan mengikat, dapat memenuhi kepastian hukum tanpa mengabaikan nilai keadilan. Hal ini dapat dilihat dari pihak kepentingan terpidana yang mana dengan diperbolehkannya peninjauan kembali dalam perkara pidana lebih dari satu kali, memberikan kesempatan untuk memperoleh kebenaran materiil dan keadilan sehingga dapat diperoleh kepastian hukum yang berkeadilan bagi terpidana mengenai perkara yang dihadapi. Untuk memenuhi asas litis finiri oportet, perlu dilakukan pengaturan bahwa untuk upaya hukum peninjauan kembali dalam perkara pidana dapat dilakukan dua kali, hal ini dilakukan untuk mencapai kepastian hukum yang berkeadilan. Di satu pihak peninjauan kembali dapat dilakukan lebih dari satu kali untuk mencari kebenaran materiil dan memenuhi nilai keadilan. Di lain pihak adanya pembatasan permohonan peninjauan kembali yang boleh dilakukan dua kali adalah untuk menjamin kepastian hukum, sehingga nilai kemanfaatan, keadilan dan kepastian hukum dapat terpenuhi.</p><p>With the Constitutional Court No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013, for an extraordinary legal remedy which reconsideration can be done more than once. Constitutional Court ruling that allows an extraordinary legal remedy reconsideration more than once that, with regard to legal certainty and justice. If allowed to review more than one time but there are no restrictions on how many times it is the case there will be no end, that the principle of litis finiri oportet (every case there should be eventually) will not be met. Some issues that need to be addressed is whether the Constitutional Court No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013 can satisfy the value of justice and legal certainty. Furthermore, how the arrangements regarding the review of the implementation of the Constitutional Court as No. 34 / PUU-X / 2013 that the principle of legal certainty and the principle of litis finiri oportet will be met. Constitutional Court decision No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013, which states that Article 268 paragraph (3) of Law No. 8 of 1981 on Criminal Procedure is contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 and has no binding force, can meet the legal certainty without ignoring the value of justice. It can be seen from the interests of the convict which the permissibility of judicial review in criminal cases more than once, providing an opportunity to acquire the material truth and justice so as to obtain legal certainty to convict justice regarding the case at hand. To meet the principle of litis finiri oportet, it is necessary that the arrangements for legal remedy reconsideration in criminal cases can be done twice, this is done to achieve a just rule of law. On the one hand, the review can be performed more than once to search for the material truth and fulfill justice values. On the other hand the restrictions on the reconsideration request should be done twice is to ensure legal certainty, so that the value of expediency, justice and the rule of law can be fulfilled.</p>

3. The features and sources of the UK constitution

2021 ◽  
pp. 43-70
Author(s):  
Anne Dennett
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Common Law ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty ◽  
Constitutional Conventions ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Uk

This chapter examines the characteristics of the UK constitution. The main features of the UK constitution are that it is uncodified; flexible; traditionally unitary but now debatably a union state; monarchical; parliamentary; and based on a bedrock of important constitutional doctrines and principles: parliamentary sovereignty, the rule of law, separation of powers; the courts are also basing some decisions on bedrock principles of the common law. Meanwhile, the laws, rules, and practices of the UK constitution can be found in constitutional statutes; judicial decisions; constitutional conventions; international treaties; the royal prerogative; the law and custom of Parliament; and works of authoritative writers. The chapter then looks at the arguments for and against codifying the UK constitution.

Unelected does not Equate with Undemocratic: Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Role of the Judiciary

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Marilyn Warren
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty ◽  
The Common

<p>One feature of judicial life that strikes most appointees to judicial office early on is the silence of the Judiciary outside our judgments and statements in court. We are also struck, when we deliver our first judgment that raises controversy or higher public interest, by the vulnerability of the Judiciary to<br />criticism, sometimes vehement and trenchant. Judges do not answer back. With the exception of Chief Justices, judges are generally only heard in court, unless the speaking occasion involves an extra-curial or academic discussion on the law or judicial life. This is properly so. Yet, when the criticism comes, it is troubling. Judges understand the constitutional and<br />governmental conventions that operate and within which they work. The conventions are not complicated, in fact quite simple. The only regret is that they are forgotten or overlooked when the criticism is made. For this<br />evening’s purpose I would wish to reflect on the conventions that judges work within. I will set out the traditional and modern views on parliamentary sovereignty. I will address the doctrine of separation of powers and the role of judicial power. I will postulate that, in modern government, it is the rule of law that is sovereign. I will consider the judicial role and the development of the common law. I will address the topics of<br />judicial activism, the election of judges and judicial accountability. I will conclude with the view that the complaint of judicial activism is misplaced and involves a misapprehension of the judicial function. For some, the high<br />water mark of judicial activism was Mabo.1 For some, the nadir of judicial ‘inactivism’ was Al Kateb.2 These swings of the pendulum in the discussion of judges’ work are not new. In 1956, Boilermakers’3 was an unsatisfactory outcome for some. Similarly, in 1948, the Bank Nationalisation4 decision provoked criticism. When Chief Justice Dixon restrained the Victorian Government from carrying out the execution in Tait,5 criticism ensued. However, each time judicial power prevailed over parliamentary and executive power. Was that undemocratic? My discussion does not say anything new. It has been said before. But, it needs to be said again. I turn then to the topic for consideration.</p>

Part VI Constitutional Theory, D The Role of Constitutional Principles in Canadian Constitutional Law, Ch.48 The Rule of Law, the Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence in Canada

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Newman Warren J
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
First Principle ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty

This chapter considers the meaning, scope, and application of three constitutional principles of surpassing importance in Canada. The rule of law is foundational to Canada’s constitutional framework and may properly be characterized as the first principle of Canadian constitutional law. It is linked to, and in some respects, forms the underpinning for other fundamental principles, including constitutionalism, federalism, democracy, and parliamentary sovereignty. As the latter principles are the focus of chapters by other commentators in this Handbook, this chapter will examine the rule of law primarily in relation to the separation of powers and judicial independence. The principle of judicial independence is also essential to the functioning and structure of the Constitution, given the role the courts are called upon to play in policing the constitutional limits of legislative power and administrative action. The separation of powers is still an emerging principle in Canada, but also increasingly viewed as fundamental.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document