scholarly journals JUDICIAL REVIEW PASAL-PASAL MAKAR KUHP: PERSPEKTIF PENAFSIRAN HUKUM DAN HAM (JUDICIAL REVIEW ON TREACHERY ARTICLES OF THE CRIMINAL CODE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF LAW INTERPRETATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS)

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-253
Author(s):  
Prianter Jaya Hairi

In 2017, Constitutional Court has received three calls for judicial reviews regarding treachery (makar) article in the Criminal Code. These articles deemed to be contradicting with the principle of legal certainty and freedom of expression. This study analyzes the important issue that is being debate in those judicial reviews. One of those is about the argument which says that the absence of the definition of treachery in the Criminal Code has caused a violation of legal certainty. Besides, the rule of treachery in the Criminal Code has also considered to have caused a violation of freedom of expression which has been guaranteed by Constitution. Analysis shows that the absence of treachery definition in the Criminal Code is not something that instantly becomes a problem in its application that causing the loss of legal certainty. Law enforcer, especially judge, in enforcing the rule of law must always use the method of law interpretation which appropriate with legal norm. With systematic interpretation, treachery can be interpreted according to the sentence of the rule as a unity of the legal system. In this case, the term treachery as regulated in Article 87 of the Criminal Code can be systematically interpreted as the basis for Article 104-Article 108 of the Criminal Code, Article 130 of the Criminal Code, and Article 140 of the Criminal Code which regulates various types of treason and their respective legal sanctions for the perpetrators. Further, on the argument that the articles of treachery in the Criminal Code also can not necessarily be said to limit the freedom of expression, because every citizen’s freedom has limitation, including the limitation of law and human rights. AbstrakPada tahun 2017, Mahkamah Konstitusi telah menerima tiga kali judicial reviewterhadap pasalpasal tindak pidana makar dalam Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP). Pasal-pasal ini dipandang bertentangan dengan prinsip kepastian hukum dan kebebasan berekspresi. Tulisan ini menganalisis substansi yang menjadi perdebatan dalam perkara judicial review tersebut. Di antaranya perdebatan mengenai tidak adanya definisi istilah makar dalam KUHP yang menyebabkan persoalan kepastian hukum. Selain itu, pengaturan tindak pidana makar dalam KUHP juga dinilai melanggar kebebasan berekspresi yang telah dijamin oleh konstitusi. Analisis terhadap persoalanpersoalan tersebut menunjukkan bahwa ketiadaan definisi kata “makar” dalam KUHP bukanlah merupakan sesuatu yang serta merta langsung menjadi persoalan dalam penerapannya sehingga menyebabkan hilangnya kepastian hukum. Penegak hukum, terutama hakim, dalam menegakkan peraturan hukum selalu menggunakan metode penafsiran hukum yang sesuai dengan kaidah ilmu hukum. Dengan penafsiran sistematis, makar dapat dimaknai sesuai kalimat dari peraturan sebagai suatu kesatuan sistem hukum. Dalam hal ini, istilah makar yang diatur dalam Pasal 87 KUHP, secara sistematis dapat ditafsirkan sebagai dasar bagi Pasal 104-Pasal 108 KUHP, Pasal 130 KUHP, dan Pasal 140 KUHP yang mengatur tentang jenis makar beserta sanksi hukumnya masing-masing bagi para pelakunya. Selain itu, mengenai argumen bahwa pasal-pasal makar dalam KUHP berpotensi melanggar HAM dan dipandang bertentangan dengan konstitusi dapat dikatakan tidak beralasan. Sebab kebebasan HAM setiap orang tidak tanpa batas, di antaranya dibatasi nilai-nilai agama, keamanan, dan ketertiban umum.

2020 ◽  
pp. 127-134
Author(s):  
Yu.A. Shevchenko ◽  
O.V. Kharytonova

This article is devoted to the analysis of the current legislation of Ukraine, as well as judicial practice in the context of the need to enter information in the declaration of a person authorized to perform the functions of the state or local government, namely the column "Financial Liabilities", in the form of surety, and the problem of providing a criminal legal assessment in the context of the possibility of the acts qualification under Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (hereinafter - the Criminal Code of Ukraine). These issues nowadays acquire the status of an exceptional legal problem due to the lack of a single law enforcement practice, and therefore require theoretical and practical consideration. In this regard, the article focuses on the analysis of certain provisions of the Law of Ukraine "On Prevention of Corruption", consideration of the crime under Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, as well as consideration of the judicial practice of the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court Ukraine, courts of appeal and local courts. Much of the author's attention is focused on the concept of legal nature and the institution of bail in general. In doing so, the author explored the above issues through the lens of human rights protection, based on the understanding of the essence of the principle of legal certainty, which is part of the concept of the rule of law. The conclusions suggested proposals as for improving the question that author discussed by amending national anti-corruption legislation in order to enable it to qualify the act provided for in Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine in the form of failure to enter information in the declaration column "Financial liabilities" of the persons authorized to perform the functions of state or local government in the presence of surety. In particular, the author emphasized that formulation of the norm, which defines the concept of "financial liabilities", makes it impossible to apply it in the context of qualifying a crime under Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine due to lack of legal certainty, which makes it impossible to maintain the principle the rule of law, and therefore a priori, human rights and freedoms will be violated.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 198
Author(s):  
Ani Triwati ◽  
Subaidah Ratna Juita ◽  
Tri Mulyani

<p>Dengan adanya Putusan MK No. 34/PUU-XI/2013, untuk upaya hukum luar biasa yaitu peninjauan kembali dapat dilakukan lebih dari satu kali. Putusan MK yang memperbolehkan upaya hukum luar biasa peninjauan kembali lebih dari satu kali tersebut, berkaitan dengan kepastian hukum dan keadilan. Apabila peninjauan kembali diperbolehkan lebih dari satu kali tetapi tidak ada pembatasan sampai berapa kali maka perkara tersebut tidak akan ada akhirnya, bahwa adanya asas litis finiri oportet (setiap perkara harus ada akhirnya) tidak akan terpenuhi. Beberapa permasalahan yang perlu dibahas adalah apakah dengan adanya Putusan MK No. 34/PUU-XI/2013 dapat memenuhi nilai keadilan dan kepastian hukum. Selanjutnya bagaimana pengaturan mengenai peninjauan kembali sebagai implementasi Putusan MK No. 34/PUU- XI/2013 agar asas kepastian hukum dan asas litis finiri oportet akan terpenuhi. Putusan MK No. 34/PUU- XI/2013, yang menyatakan bahwa Pasal 268 ayat (3) Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1981 tentang Hukum Acara Pidana bertentangan dengan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia tahun 1945 dan tidak mempunyai kekuatan mengikat, dapat memenuhi kepastian hukum tanpa mengabaikan nilai keadilan. Hal ini dapat dilihat dari pihak kepentingan terpidana yang mana dengan diperbolehkannya peninjauan kembali dalam perkara pidana lebih dari satu kali, memberikan kesempatan untuk memperoleh kebenaran materiil dan keadilan sehingga dapat diperoleh kepastian hukum yang berkeadilan bagi terpidana mengenai perkara yang dihadapi. Untuk memenuhi asas litis finiri oportet, perlu dilakukan pengaturan bahwa untuk upaya hukum peninjauan kembali dalam perkara pidana dapat dilakukan dua kali, hal ini dilakukan untuk mencapai kepastian hukum yang berkeadilan. Di satu pihak peninjauan kembali dapat dilakukan lebih dari satu kali untuk mencari kebenaran materiil dan memenuhi nilai keadilan. Di lain pihak adanya pembatasan permohonan peninjauan kembali yang boleh dilakukan dua kali adalah untuk menjamin kepastian hukum, sehingga nilai kemanfaatan, keadilan dan kepastian hukum dapat terpenuhi.</p><p>With the Constitutional Court No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013, for an extraordinary legal remedy which reconsideration can be done more than once. Constitutional Court ruling that allows an extraordinary legal remedy reconsideration more than once that, with regard to legal certainty and justice. If allowed to review more than one time but there are no restrictions on how many times it is the case there will be no end, that the principle of litis finiri oportet (every case there should be eventually) will not be met. Some issues that need to be addressed is whether the Constitutional Court No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013 can satisfy the value of justice and legal certainty. Furthermore, how the arrangements regarding the review of the implementation of the Constitutional Court as No. 34 / PUU-X / 2013 that the principle of legal certainty and the principle of litis finiri oportet will be met. Constitutional Court decision No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013, which states that Article 268 paragraph (3) of Law No. 8 of 1981 on Criminal Procedure is contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 and has no binding force, can meet the legal certainty without ignoring the value of justice. It can be seen from the interests of the convict which the permissibility of judicial review in criminal cases more than once, providing an opportunity to acquire the material truth and justice so as to obtain legal certainty to convict justice regarding the case at hand. To meet the principle of litis finiri oportet, it is necessary that the arrangements for legal remedy reconsideration in criminal cases can be done twice, this is done to achieve a just rule of law. On the one hand, the review can be performed more than once to search for the material truth and fulfill justice values. On the other hand the restrictions on the reconsideration request should be done twice is to ensure legal certainty, so that the value of expediency, justice and the rule of law can be fulfilled.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 44-51
Author(s):  
Artem Nikitin

The concept of criminal influence, which was introduced into the Criminal Code of Ukraine in June 2020, has been highly criticized by the scientific community and practitioners, among other things, for violation of the principle of legal certainty and the rule of law. This article defines the main disadvantages of the provisions that establish criminal liability for acts related to criminal influence and analyzes the feasibility of preservation of these provisions in their original form in the Criminal Code of Ukraine and the possibility of their transfer to the draft of the new Criminal Code of Ukraine. It is concluded that the mentioned norms should be at least substantially revised, with taking into account comments of the Ukrainian scientists, and cannot be transferred into the new criminal law as they are currently defined. Moreover, introduction of specific amendments to other laws is also required in this regard.The Working Group on the development of criminal law, as the author of the draft of the new Criminal Code, reasonably refused from the existing concept of the criminal influence. At the same time, they defined criminally punishable acts, which can be considered as a certain equivalent of the criminal influence (socalled “criminal leadership”). Provisions developed by the Working Group differ from the current by the more precise definition of specific actions, which constitute corpus delicti of criminal leadership, avoidance of jargon formulations, decrease of the terms of imprisonment for committing the relevant crimes, and diversification of criminal legal measures that can be applied to offender besides the punishment. In general, it appears that the Working Group avoided the main mistakes which are present in the current legislation. However, it is too early to draw conclusions regarding the acceptability of the proposed article of the new criminal law. Only after the draft of the new Criminal Code of Ukraine has been finished and its provisions can be analyzed altogether, final conclusions regarding the mentioned norms can be drawn.


ICL Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-69
Author(s):  
Eszter Polgári

AbstractThe present article maps the explicit references to the rule of law in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR by examining the judgments of the Grand Chamber and the Plenary Court. On the basis of the structured analysis it seeks to identify the constitutive elements of the Court’s rule of law concept and contrast it with the author’s working definition and the position of other Council of Europe organs. The review of the case-law indicates that the Court primarily associates the rule of law with access to court, judicial safeguards, legality and democracy, and it follows a moderately thick definition of the concept including formal, procedural and some substantive elements. The rule of law references are predominantly ancillary arguments giving weight to other Convention-based considerations and it is not applied as a self-standing standard.


Author(s):  
Valsamis Mitsilegas

The article will examine the challenges that the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office poses for the rule of law – a question which has been underexplored in the policy and academic debate on the establishment of the EPPO, which focused largely on questions of structure and powers of the EPPO and the battle between intergovernmental and supranational visions of European prosecution. The implications of the finally adopted legal framework on the EPPO on the rule of law will be analysed primarily from the perspective of the rule of law as related to EPPO investigations and prosecutions and their consequences for affected individuals – in terms of legal certainty and foreseeability, protection from executive arbitrariness, effective judicial protection and defence rights. The article will undertake a rule of law audit of the EPPO by focusing on three key elements of its legal architecture – the competence of the EPPO, applicable law and judicial review – and the interaction between EU and national levels of investigation and prosecution that the EPPO Regulation envisages. The analysis will aim to cast light on the current rule of law deficit in a hybrid system of European prosecution located somewhere between co-operation and integration.


Author(s):  
Lyudmyla Bogachova ◽  

The article defines the concept of the principle of the rule of law both in the narrow and broad sense. In the narrow sense, the principle of the rule of law is understood as the rule of law over legislation, and in the broad sense - as the rule of law over the state, state arbitrariness. Different approaches to disclosing the content of the principle of the rule of law in national and European legal doctrines are systematized. The lack of a single generally accepted concept of the principle of "rule of law" is emphasized. The decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are analyzed; attention is focused on their interpretation of the rule of law. The realization of the principle of the rule of law, primarily presupposes the domination of inalienable and inviolable human rights and freedoms over the political power of the state, and also requires quality laws and observance of the principle of legal certainty. The interpretation of the principle of the rule of law in the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine is considered. The CCU emphasizes that the rule of law is first and foremost the "rule of law in society"; characterizes the principle, linking it to the ideas of social justice, freedom and equality, without which it is impossible to imagine true human development and existence. The Constitutional Court calls justice as one of the basic principles of law, which is crucial in defining it as a regulator of social relations, one of the universal dimensions of law. Examples of application of the rule of law in the practice of the Supreme Court of Ukraine are given. Judges not only make a formal reference to the rule of law, but also try to analyze and disclose the content of its constituent elements (requirements) within a specific legal case. The main problems that hinder the effective implementation and realization of the rule of law in judicial practice are identified, namely - the lack of proper regulation and official interpretation; low quality of laws and legislative process; excessive number of conflicting laws; low level of legal awareness and legal culture of Ukrainian society, and early stage of civil society development in Ukraine. It is concluded that the rule of law is a principle whose main content is expressed in the following aspects: ensuring the rule of law over political power; subordination of state institutions to the needs of human rights protection and ensuring their implementation; priority of these rights over all other values of democratic, social, and legal state; preventing the manifestation of arbitrariness of state power, as well as ensuring compliance with the requirements of justice.


Author(s):  
Egidijus Küris

Western legal tradition gave the birth to the concept of the rule of law. Legal theory and constitutional justice significantly contributed to the crystallisation of its standards and to moving into the direction of the common concept of the rule of law. The European Court of Human Rights uses this concept as an interpretative tool, the extension of which is the quality of the law doctrine, which encompasses concrete requirements for the law under examination in this Court, such as prospectivity of law, its foreseeability, clarity etc. The author of the article, former judge of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court and currently the judge of the European Court of Human Rights, examines how the latter court has gradually intensified (not always consistently) its reliance on the rule of law as a general principle, inherent in all the Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, to the extent that in some of its judgments it concentrates not anymore on the factual situation of an individual applicant, but, first and foremost, on the examination of the quality of the law. The trend is that, having found the quality of the applicable law to be insufficient, the Court considers that the mere existence of contested legislation amounts to an unjustifiable interference into a respective right and finds a violation of respective provisions of the Convention. This is an indication of the Court’s progressing self-approximation to constitutional courts, which are called to exercise abstract norm-control.La tradición occidental alumbró la noción del Estado de Derecho. La teoría del Derecho y la Justicia Constitucional han contribuido decisivamente a la cristalización de sus estándares, ayudando a conformar un acervo común en torno al mismo. El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos emplea la noción de Estado de Derecho como una herramienta interpretativa, fundamentalmente centrada en la doctrina de la calidad de la ley, que implica requisitos concretos que exige el Tribunal tales como la claridad, la previsibilidad, y la certeza en la redacción y aplicación de la norma. El autor, en la actualidad Juez del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y anterior Magistrado del Tribunal Constitucional de Lituania, examina cómo el primero ha intensificado gradualmente (no siempre de forma igual de consistente) su confianza en el Estado de Derecho como principio general, inherente a todos los preceptos que forman el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, hasta el punto de que en algunas de sus resoluciones se concentra no tanto en la situación de hecho del demandante individual sino, sobre todo y ante todo, en el examen de esa calidad de la ley. La tendencia del Tribunal es a considerar que, si observa que la ley no goza de calidad suficiente, la mera existencia de la legislación discutida supone una interferencia injustificable dentro del derecho en cuestión y declara la violación del precepto correspondiente del Convenio. Esto implica el acercamiento progresivo del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos a los Tribunales Constitucionales, quienes tienen encargado el control en abstracto de la norma legal.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 167-171
Author(s):  
Mohammad Fadel

This work grew out of a series of lectures that were delivered over atwo-year period between 1996 and 1998 at the Centre of Islamic andMiddle Eastern Law (CIMEL) at the School of Oriental and AfricanStudies (SOAS), University of London, on the genera] subject of the rule oflaw in the Middle East and Islamic countries. Subsequently, materials wereadded dealing particularly with issues relating to human rights law. Thecontributors to this work are a combination of legal academics, human rights activists, lawyers and judges, who hale from various countries in theArab world, Iran, the United States, Great Britain and Germany.There are a total of fourteen separate chapters, of varying length andquality. The book is not lengthy - including notes and authors’ biographies,it is 180 pages long. The average length of each chapter is between ten andfifteen pages. Despite the diversity of countries surveyed, all the essays areconcerned with generic questions regarding the rule of law, whether in atheoretical sense, viz., whether the notion that legitimate governmentalaction is limited to those acts that are deemed lawful by a pre-existing setor rules, or in a practical sense, viz., assuming that the formal legal regimeof a given state recognizes the rule of law in a theoretical sense, whetherthe coercive apparatus of the state in fact recognizes legal limitations onits conduct.Perhaps the most interesting (it is certainly the most lengthy, at 35 pages),and most important, essay in this work is the very fiit one, authored byAdel Omar Sherif, an Egyptian judge, wherein the author provides a digestof the landmark decisions of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court.While the work can be criticized for taking on the appearance of a meresurvey of decisions, without taking a critical perspective to the Court’sprecedents, it is nonetheless a very valuable contribution for those lawyersand scholars who cannot read Arabic but nonetheless wish to gain insightinto Egypt’s legal culture. The modest task of relating the decisions ofEgypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court is especially important given thecliches regarding the absence of effective judicial institutions in the Arabworld. Sherifs contribution effectively dispels that myth. His article revealsthe Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court to be a vibrant institution thattakes its constitutional duties seriously, and discharges those duties withintegrity, and when it finds that the government has acted unlawfully, it willstrike down the offensive legislation, or rule against the government ...


2021 ◽  

Περιμένοντας τους Bαρβάρους. Law in a Time of Constitutional Crisis is not a typical celebratory book offered to the dedicatee for an academic jubilee. The studies offered to Professor Mirosław Wyrzykowski present the readers with essays analysing the most pressing problems of modern constitutionalism in its European dimension. The primary themes of the book are topics dear to Wyrzykowski: the rule of law, human rights, the crooked paths of European constitutionalism, and last, but not least, one that binds them all: judicial independence and judicial review, as well as the role of the courts in upkeeping the rule of law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
Yayan Sopyan

Abstract: Questioning the Religious Freedom and blasphemy in Indonesia. The presence of the Constitutional Court in the reform era is the strengthening of the foundations of constitutionalism in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945. The Court in this case a role to enforce and the protector of the citizen's constitutional rights and the protector of the human rights. Including in this case, the right to religion and religious practices and teachings of their respective religions, in accordance with the constitutional mandate. However, on the other hand there is the discourse of freedom of expression and freedom of speech includes freedom to broadcast religious beliefs and understanding of the "deviant" and against the "mainstream" religious beliefs and understanding in general, as in the case of Ahmadiyah. The Court in this case is required to provide the best attitude when faced judicial review in this case still required in addition to guarding the constitution in order to run properly.   Abstrak: Menyoal Kebebasan Beragama dan Penodaan Agama di Indonesia. Kehadiran lembaga Mahkamah Konstitusi di era reformasi merupakan upaya penguatan terhadap dasar-dasar konstitusionalisme pada Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945. MK dalam hal ini berperan menegakkan dan melindungi hak-hak konstitusional warga negara (the protector of the citizen’s constitutional rights) dan pelindung HAM (the protector of the human rights). Termasuk dalam hal ini, hak untuk memeluk agama dan menjalankan ibadah serta ajaran agamanya masing-masing, sesuai dengan amanat konstitusi. Namun, disisi lain ada wacana kebebasan berekspresi dan kebebasan berpendapat termasuk didalamnya kebebasan untuk menyiarkan keyakinan dan pemahaman keagamaan yang “menyimpang” dan bertentangan dengan “mainstream” keyakinan dan pemahaman keagamaan pada umumnya, seperti dalam kasus Ahmadiyah. MK dalam hal ini dituntut untuk mampu memberikan sikap terbaik saat dihadapkan judicial review dalam kasus ini selain tetap dituntut untuk mengawal konstitusi agar dapat berjalan sebagaimana mestinya. DOI: 10.15408/jch.v2i2.2314


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