Corporate board, ownership structure and banking performance in the emergent market

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 403
Author(s):  
Wissem Daadaa
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Board Ownership

scholarly journals Related-party disclosures in the two-tier board system in China: Influences of ownership structure and board composition

2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuan George Shan ◽  
Dennis W. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
High Concentration ◽  
Corporate Context ◽  
Supervisory Boards ◽  
Board System

This study concerns related-party disclosures by listed companies in China, in a corporate context of a high concentration of government-linked ownership, a two-tier board system, and the engagement of directors, key managers and major shareholders in direct and indirect transactions and business relationships with their company. Using content analysis of annual reports of listed companies in China over 5-years from 2001 to 2005, results show that the comprehensiveness of related-party disclosures is positively affected by companies’ domestic ownership concentration and the proportion of independent directors on the corporate board. But the proportion of supervisory board members with professional knowledge and experience is, unexpectedly, found to have a significant inverse relationship with the extent of related-party disclosure. Reasons peculiar to the context in China are proffered, particularly the likelihood of internal censorship of the more professionally qualified members of supervisory boards.

The Effect of Board and Ownership Structure on the Possibility of Financial Distress

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 581-601
Author(s):  
Joanne Jovita Jodjana ◽  
Sherin Nathaniel ◽  
Rinaningsih Rinaningsih ◽  
Titin Pranoto
Keyword(s):  
Logistic Regression ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
The Other ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
Paired Data ◽  
Sensitivity Testing ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Board Ownership

Research aims: This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance, specifically relating to the ownership structure and board structure, on the possibility of financial distress.Design/Methodology/Approach: The sample used in this study are companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2015 to 2019, excluding the financial industry. Conditional logistic regression is used as the study uses paired data based on the total assets of the company.Research findings: The results of this study indicate that board ownership, independent commissioners, and the board of directors can increase the likelihood of financial distress. On the other hand, institutional ownership and concentrated ownership are proven to have no effect on the likelihood of financial distress. The results of sensitivity testing using logistic regression showed different results on the variable institutional ownership, which is that institutional ownership can increase the likelihood of financial distress. Meanwhile, the other variables showed the same outcome as the main regression used in this study.Theoretical contribution/Originality: This study contributes to the knowledge on the relationship of board ownership, institutional ownership, concentrated ownership, independent commissioners and board size and the possibility of financial distress. Also, this research found that the provision of incentives in the form of shares to the board may not be an effective way to overcome financial distress in Indonesian firms.

scholarly journals Corporate board, ownership structure and the involuntary delisted firms

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 370-381
Author(s):  
Chu-Yang Chien ◽  
Yuh-Jiuan Parng ◽  
Chen-Wei Lu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Probit Regression ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Examination System ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
Control Right ◽  
Lower Ratio

The Financial Supervisory Commission in Taiwan has advocated the importance of corporate governance for several years. The purpose of this study is to act in concern with the policy through the test of the relationship between the corporate governance mechanism, especially Board of Directors’ composition and ownership structure, and the involuntary delisted firms. The study extracts 58 involuntary delisted firms from Taiwan Securities Exchange (TSE) during 1997 to 2007 and matches with 112 similar control firms. The results from probit regression suggest that Board of Directors (BOD) with more number of outside independent directors, larger board size, lower ratio of shares pledged to the total shares, higher seats over control right, and lower control right over right for cash flow may reduce the likelihood of delisting. The study could become monitoring indices for internal examination system, the warning signals for investors, and the reference for the policy makers

CEO Tenure in Taiwanese Family and Nonfamily Firms: An Agency Theory Perspective

2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen-Hsien Tsai ◽  
Jung-Hua Hung ◽  
Yi-Chen Kuo ◽  
Lopin Kuo
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Board Ownership

This study investigated the tenure of CEOs in a sample of 304 listed companies in Taiwan; 63 firms were family controlled, 241 were not. The results show that CEO turnover is significantly lower in family firms and its relationship to corporate performance is negative. CEO ownership and board ownership are not significant in explaining the length of family CEO tenure. These findings imply that family boards can still effectively replace the CEO despite relatively low ownership. From the ownership structure perspective, this study suggested that the agency theory is applicable for nonfamily firms in Taiwan, but unsuitable for family firms.

scholarly journals Ownership structure, charaсteristic differences and the size of corporate board of commissioner: The case of Indonesia state-owned enterprises

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 52-64
Author(s):  
Emita W. Astami ◽  
Rusmin Rusmin ◽  
Bambang Hartadi
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
State Government ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Control Variable ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Control Variables ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Return On Equity ◽  
The Board Of Directors

This study scrutinises the association between ownership identity and board size in a unique institutional setting: state-owned enterprises in Indonesia, a country incorporating a two-tier management structure. It investigates whether the ownership identity explains the size of the board of commissioners by using the year 2006 data set from 155 SOEs in Indonesia consisting of 112 of fully SOEs and 43 of partially- privatised SOEs. This study hypothesizes that SOEs with a higher level of private sector ownership will have a greater incentive to monitor the performance of executive management through board of commissioners than those SOEs that are fully owned by the state government. It finds that compared to those fully SOEs, the partially-privatised SOEs are likely to have more board of commissioners. Even though this result is not statistically significant and, therefore, the proposed hypothesis is not statistically supported, the regression statistical analysis reveals that control variables assist in explaining the size of board of commissioners. The size of the board of directors as a control variable is significantly associated with the size of the board of commissioners. Other control variables including size of the SOE as well as the return on equity measure moderately explain the size of the board of commissioners. The findings give insight to stakeholders such as regulators or the private sector investors interested in making investment decisions in Indonesia considering the ownership structure and the effect on the effectiveness of the board of commissioners.

scholarly journals Ownership structure, political connection and firm performance: Evidence from Indonesia

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 434-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rusmin Rusmin ◽  
John Evans ◽  
Mahmud Hossain
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Foreign Ownership ◽  
Political Connection ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Board Monitoring ◽  
Corporate Ownership Structure ◽  
Study Support ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates whether ownership structure and high levels of political connection in Indonesian firm’s impacts on firm performance. Studying ownership structure in Indonesia is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, companies in Indonesia are owned by the families and corporate ownership structure is largely concentrated. Secondly, many companies in Indonesia have connections with politicians. Thirdly, little work has been done in Indonesia on the impact of foreign ownership on performance. Thus foreign ownership provides a unique setting for examining the monitoring role of foreign ownership as a substitute for corporate board monitoring. Using both accounting and market measures of firm performance we find that Indonesian firms with high political connections outperform Indonesian firms not politically aligned. Firms with significant foreign ownership performed better than domestic only owned firms. The results of the study support the findings that the governance of the largest government and foreign ownership firms not only acts to monitor management activities but also plays a representative role for monitoring shareholders.

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