Transcendental Apperception and Temporalization

2020 ◽  
pp. 127-142
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Apperception

The New Philosophy

Anxiety ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 36-76
Author(s):  
Bettina Bergo
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Unity Of Consciousness ◽  
Inner Sense ◽  
The World ◽  
Logical Condition ◽  
Human Practice ◽  
Transcendental Apperception

Kant’s transcendental revolution temporarily cut through debates between Humian skeptics and rationalists of a Leibniz-Wolffian stripe. It established reason as an immanent tribunal, judging its possibilities and errors. Through an analysis of the structure of intuition and the deduction of the categories intrinsic to judgement, largely scientific, the edifice of the first Critique raised epistemology out of metaphysics and psychologism. Together, the Antimonies and Paralogisms of pure reason indicated the contradictions and misuse of concepts into which rational speculation had hitherto fallen. The paralogisms of the erstwhile rational psychology had argued in favor of the simplicity, substantiality, and the personality of the soul, thereby following a logic of substance and accidents where passions and affects were the latter, attaching to that soul. By showing the errors of the paralogisms, Kant effectively “dispatched” virtually all affects to his “science of man and the world,” the anthropology of human practice. However, the solution to Kant’s Paralogisms of the soul opened a new circle, such that our inner sense and its logical condition, transcendental apperception preceded, but could only be thought thanks to, the categories of understanding. At stake was the intrinsic unity of consciousness within the transcendental project. Although the Critique of Practical Reason retained a crucial intellectual affect, Achtung (attention and respect), Kant’s epistemology required clear distinctions between understanding, reason, and affects. In a sense, ontology and epistemology bifurcate into the domains of a transcendental approach to experience as representation and what lays outside it (including pre-reflective sensibility and affects).

Apperception and Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness in Kant

2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 431-447
Author(s):  
Luca Forgione ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Form ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Inner Sense ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Transcendental Apperception

Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense (empirical apperception) grounded in a sensory form of self-awareness and transcendental apperception. The aim of this paper is to show that a sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness, which contains a pre-reflective self-consciousness as its first level, is provided by the notion of transcendental apperception. The necessity for a pre-reflective self-consciousness has been pointed out in phenomenological literature. According to this account, every self-ascription of any property implies a more fundamental form of self-consciousness, i.e., a kind of immediate familiarity with oneself. This pre-reflective self-consciousness is a non-relational and non-identificational form of self-consciousness and concerns an immediate acquaintance of the subject with itself. In the specific terms of transcendentalism every thought contains an implicit reference to a first-personal “givenness” or a sense of “mineness” that articulates a non-relational and non-identificational form of a pre-reflective model of self-consciousness.

scholarly journals An important moment in understanding of transcendental apperception or why proof of an external world of G.E. Moore could not be correct

2016 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 159-171
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Stevanovic
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
External World ◽  
Transcendental Apperception ◽  
Paper Author

In this paper author tried to show an important and frequently undetected element of function of transcendental apperception in philosophy of Immanuel Kant, and, considering this, to give arguments, why Proof of an external world of G. E. Moore is incorrect. Explaining the transcendental apperception as ?feeling of existence? in Prolegomena, Kant has given the element to interpret the synthesis of transcendental apperception, not only as fundamental synthesis of knowledge, but also as synthesis of existence given by power of feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Explaining the interaction of power of knowledge and power of feeling of existence in the empirical consciousness, the author gave the arguments for wider interpretation of function of transcendental apperception. After that, explaining the Proof of an external world of G. E. Moore, author tried to show, that Moore in establishing his argument used unacceptable metaphysical and transcendental presuppositions and ended in situation where he ?know things which he cannot prove?. The paper ends with conclusion that the things that stay out of domain of knowledge could not be proved by any means, even when they are presented with undeniable certainty.

scholarly journals PAMATYTI LAIKĄ

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 7-24
Author(s):  
Kristupas Sabolius
Keyword(s):  
Essential Role ◽  
Fundamental Property ◽  
Empty Space ◽  
Time Space ◽  
Prolonged Observation ◽  
Transcendental Apperception ◽  
Empty Time

Šiame straipsnyje ne tik analizuojant Immanuelio Kanto ir Martino Heideggerio tekstus, bet ir gretinant juos su konkrečiomis „tuščios erdvės“ ir „laiko be įvykių“ pratybomis (pvz., Kazimiro Malevičiaus „Juodojo kvadrato“ stebėjimu), siekiama atskleisti paslėptą, bet esminį vaizduotės vaidmenį transcendentalinėse suvokimo struktūrose. Tokiame kontekste vaizduotė ne tik neturėtų būti suvokiama kaip subjektyvus sugebėjimas, kuris aktyvuoja vidinius regėjimus ir tokiu būdu realizuoja antraeilį, t. y. reproduktyvų, kūrybingumą. Priešingai – įgydama exibitio originaria vaidmenį ir būdama ontologiškai pirmapradė, t. y. jėga, kuri užtikrina regėjimą ir schematizuoja suvokimą, ji laisvai konstruoja universalų laiko horizontą. Ir būtent todėl, kad vaizduotė iš esmės siejasi su kaita ir tėkme, ji atveria transcendentalinį solipsizmą tikrovei – tokiai, kurią suprantame kaip judėjimą patį savaime.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: vaizduotė, laikas, erdvė, transcendentalinis schemiškumas, transcendentalinė apercepcija.SEEING TIMEKristupas Sabolius SummaryBy analyzing the texts of Kant and Heidegger and juxtaposing them with the concrete practices of exercising “empty space” and “empty time without things or events” (such as the prolonged observation of Malevich’s ‘Black Square’), this paper aims to reveal the suppressed but essential role of imagination in the transcendental structures of perception. Imagination is not to be considered a subjective faculty, activating inner visions and secondary, i. e. reproductive creativity. On the contrary, being ontologically primary as exibitio originaria, the force enabling seeing and schematizing the perception, it freely constructs the universal horizon of time. And namely due to the fundamental property of imagination to be linked with change and flux, one can find an opening of transcendental solipsism to the reality which is the movement itself.Keywords: time, space, imagination, transcendental schematism, transcendental apperception.

The ‘I think’. What it is all about

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 101-139
Author(s):  
Gerhard Seel ◽  
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Time Consciousness ◽  
Inner Sense ◽  
De Se ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Transcendental Apperception

Kant distinguishes two kinds of knowledge of one-self: empirical self-knowledge due to inner sense and a priori self-knowledge achieved by transcendental apperception. This conception encounters a host of problems. I try to solve these problems from the perspective of today’s phenomenology and analytical philosophy. I first introduce a new conception of inner sense and time-consciousness and argue that empirical self-knowledge must be based on the category of person, a category Kant did not list in his table of categories. I explain how the schematism of this category works. Then I introduce the a priori notion of the subject which corresponds to Kant’s ‘I think’. However, unlike Kant I hold that the notion of the subject is the notion of a being which has certain a priori capacities. Kant did not see that the term ‘I’ must be conceived of as an indexical. I argue that this indexical refers to both, the subject who does the thinking and the person who is thought. On this basis I give an answer to the question how genuine de-se knowledge is possible. I further defend—against Wittgenstein and others—the use of a private thought language. Finally, I show that what I have developed is—notwithstanding the refutation of important elements of Kant’s theory—still essentially a Kantian approach.

scholarly journals THE PROBLEM OF SOCIALITY IN GERMAN CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY: BETWEEN FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (46) ◽  
pp. 57
Author(s):  
O. Yatsenko
Keyword(s):  
Historical Memory ◽  
Philosophical Concept ◽  
Social Nature ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Face ◽  
Individual Consciousness ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Classical Philosophy ◽  
Transcendental Apperception ◽  
Communicative Space

The article argues that the contradiction between mathematical necessity and the philosophical concept of freedom becomes a real road stone of idealist philosophy. Based on the inherent German classical philosophy of the absolutization of the subject, extends to the internalization of universal concepts of culture as the social nature of reason and rationality. It is proved the understanding of culture as an explication of activity, which based on ethical and axiological norms, and is consolidated in a single human community. The author argues that in the dialectic of the abstract and the concrete, the essence and the existing beginning of life is completed in the forms of thinking, and this is specifically the human, cultural way of being. That is, the personification of culture in the face of the subject is a process of forming a culture of personal thinking, and universal heritage (historical memory) in the communicative space of society is extrapolated to individual consciousness, which in turn becomes the driving force of the cultural process.Key words: culture, sociality, freedom, necessity, subjectivity, thinking, transcendental apperception.

scholarly journals Kant, the transcendental designation of I, and the direct reference theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 31
Author(s):  
Luca Forgione
Keyword(s):  
Direct Reference ◽  
The Self ◽  
Simple Representation ◽  
Reference Theory ◽  
Referential Function ◽  
Transcendental Apperception

The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental apperception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. To begin with, what exactly does Kant mean when he states that I is a simple and empty representation? Secondly, can the features of the representation I and the correlative transcendental designation explain the indexical nature of the I? Thirdly, do the Kantian considerations on indexicality anticipate any of the semantic elements or, if nothing else, the spirit of the direct reference theory?

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document