“A Notion of the True System of the World”: Berkeley and his Use of Plato inSiris

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter D. Larsen
Keyword(s):  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
The World ◽  
True System

AbstractThis paper considers Berkeley’s use of Plato in Siris. Berkeley’s engagement with ancient thinkers in Siris has been a source of puzzlement for many readers. In this paper I focus on Siris § 266. In particular, I consider why Berkeley says of the Platonists that they “distinguished the primary qualities in bodies from the secondary” and why, given his own well-known misgivings about the distinction, he characterizes this as part of a “notion of the true system of the world.” I argue that in Siris Berkeley accepts a distinctive form of corpuscularianism, and that he thinks a distinction between primary and secondary qualities follows from this. I further argue that in § 266, and elsewhere in Siris, Berkeley engages in a careful reading of Plato’s Timaeus, which he uses to bolster his defense of the compatibility between corpuscularianism and his immaterialist idealism.

Secondary qualities

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin McGinn
Keyword(s):  
Electric Charge ◽  
Atomic Structure ◽  
Material Object ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Secondary Quality ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
The World ◽  
Sensory Responses ◽  
The One ◽  
Subjective States

Primary qualities are generally defined as those properties that objects have independently of being perceived. Standard examples would include properties of shape, weight, position, electric charge, atomic structure. These properties characterize the way the world is in itself, separately from mind. Secondary qualities, by contrast, are defined as those properties that incorporate sensory responses in their conditions of application, so that the idea of a perceiver is built into their nature. It is more controversial which properties, if any, belong to this category, since not all philosophers agree that the standard alleged examples of secondary qualities – colours, sounds, tastes, smells, feels – are really correctly so classified. Some thinkers hold that objects have only primary qualities. Let us note the significance of the question, concentrating on the case of colour, which is the one most frequently discussed. Objects appear to have both shape and colour in equal measure, but is this really how things are? Depending upon how we answer this question, we get very different pictures of the relation between appearance and reality. If both sorts of property are equally out there, equally objective, then what appears to us in perception is reality itself. When we see a material object we see something that exists independently of our seeing it, and we see the object as it is whether or not there are (or even could be) any perceivers. But if the colour of the object is inherently dependent upon our sensory responses, then the question arises as to whether what we see is really in some way itself mental. If colour is a secondary quality, in other words, do we see things as they really are? What is it that bears colour if colours are in some way mentally constituted? Do we indeed see anything at all, as distinct from introspecting the features of our own subjective states?

Berkeley v. Locke on Primary Qualities

Philosophy ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 55 (212) ◽  
pp. 149-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Standard Interpretation ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Made In

Locke was once supposed to have argued that since the colours, sounds, odours, and other ‘secondary’ qualities things appear to have can vary greatly according to the state and position of the observer, it follows that our ideas of the ‘secondary’ qualities of things do not ‘resemble’ anything existing in the objects themselves. And Berkeley has been credited with the obvious objection that similar facts about the ‘relativity’ of our perception of ‘primary’ qualities show that they do not ‘resemble’ anything existing in the objects either, so that both ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities exist only ‘in the mind’. The falsity of this view of Locke has been amply demonstrated in recent years, but no corresponding revision has been made in what remains the standard interpretation of Berkeley's criticisms of Locke. His objections therefore appear to be based on misunderstanding and to be irrelevant to what is now seen to be Locke's actual view and his reasons for holding it. I think this account of Berkeley, like the old view of Locke, is a purely fictional chapter in the history of philosophy, and in this paper I try to show that Berkeley's criticisms involve no misunderstanding and amount to a direct denial of the view Locke actually held.

The Origin and Classification of Ideas

2019 ◽  
pp. 31-41
Author(s):  
Georges Dicker
Keyword(s):  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Primary Qualities

This chapter (1) expounds Locke’s empiricist principle that all of our ideas are derived from experience, and (2) offers a clarification of the structure of Book II of the Essay. Regarding (1), it explains his twofold use of the term “idea” to mean both any sensory or introspectible state and any concept, his distinctions between ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection and between simple and complex ideas, and his classification of simple ideas. It identifies some noteworthy points about the idea of solidity. Regarding (2), it provides a clarification of the organization of Book II, in light of the facts that Locke (a) digresses into the theory of primary qualities and secondary qualities in Book II Chapter viii before continuing his aetiology of ideas, and (b) discusses several complex ideas of reflection, in Book II Chapters x and xi, before officially turning to complex ideas in Chapter xii.

Reply to Bernard Williams' ‘Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline’

Philosophy ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilary Putnam
Keyword(s):  
Central Issue ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
Absolute Conception ◽  
The World ◽  
The Absolute

In ‘Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline,’ Williams is mistaken in thinking that I accused him of thinking that that we can describe the world ‘as it is anyway’ without using concepts. Our real disagreement is over whether it makes sense to think that the concepts of physics do this. The central issue is this: the notion of ‘absoluteness’ is defined using at least one semantical notion (‘convergence’). If Williams' view is to work, I argue, at least one semantical notion needs to be absolute. But Williams himself concedes that semantical notions cannot be reduced to physical ones, and the ‘absolute conception’ is supposed to be given in terms of primary qualities alone.

Form in Coleridge, and in Perception and Art More Generally

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Reid
Keyword(s):  
Binary Code ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
Organic Form ◽  
Spatial Sense ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
Aesthetic Form ◽  
The World ◽  
Formal Relation ◽  
Spatial Shape ◽  
Representative Theory

AbstractWe should not think of aesthetic form in terms of shape, but rather, as Susanne Langer argues, as a reflection of "orderliness" or relation. When thinking of form, we should not think of Keats's Grecian urn (embodying in its shape the beauty of the eternal)--not, at least, if this leads us to think of the urn's reified shape as somehow fundamental and therefore a kind of language. Rather, we should think of therelationbetween binary code and the image it produces on a computer screen, as prototypically "formal." Such images certainly do have shape, but those shapes are the product of underlying acts (here a set of computer instructions), which accordingly are more fundamental.This allows us to understand Coleridge's mature insistence on the reciprocal formality of the Father and the Son (for in any case the Son cannot have "shape" in any spatial sense). It also allows us to rehabilitate Coleridge's problematic concept of organic form. Building on Louis Arnaud Reid's arguments against the representative theory of perception, I argue that the qualitative dimensions of everyday sensory perceptions cannot in themselves be characterized by primary qualities like spatial shape, for it is absurd to think that we have anything like Polaroid snapshots floating around within our synapses. Rather, the qualitative dimensions of sensory perception (colour, perceived shape, and so forth) are "presentations" of the relevant aspects of the world--presentations which bear a formal relation rather than immediate likeness to the world. Sense-perception is thus "formal." And we can thus also claim that an art work formally embodies its meanings; that the concept of "form" has work to do; and that form is implicitly qualitative, being characterized by texture, sound qualities, shapeliness, etc..

scholarly journals Secondary Qualities as Dispositions

Locke Studies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Nathan Rockwood
Keyword(s):  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
Dispositional Properties

In this paper I will defend the view that, according to Locke, secondary qualities are dispositions to produce sensations in us. Although this view is widely attributed to Locke, this interpretation needs defending for two reasons. First, commentators often assume that secondary qualities are dispositional properties because Locke calls them “powers” to produce sensations. However, primary qualities are also powers, so the powers locution is insufficient grounds for justifying the dispositionalist interpretation. Second, if secondary qualities are dispositional properties, then objects would retain secondary qualities while not being observed, but Locke says that colors “vanish” in the dark. Some commentators use this as evidence that Locke rejects the dispositionalist view of secondary qualities, and even those that are sympathetic to the traditional interpretation find these comments to be problematic. By contrast, I argue that even in these supposedly damning passages Locke shows an unwavering commitment to the view that the powers to produce sensations in us, i.e., the secondary qualities, remain in objects even when they are not being perceived. Thus, the arguments against the traditional interpretation are unpersuasive, and we should conclude that Locke does indeed hold that secondary qualities are dispositions to cause sensations in us.

Qualities, Powers, and Bare Powers in Locke

2021 ◽  
pp. 186-205
Author(s):  
Lisa Downing
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
New Science ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
Matter Theory

Lisa Downing focuses on the important issue of the metaphysics of Locke’s primary–secondary qualities distinction. In recent years this has returned as a topic of scholarly contention. Downing is concerned by the anti-realist trends in recent work on the metaphysics of Locke primary–secondary qualities distinction, and she is keen to defend the claims that Locke was ‘putting forward a kind of realism about secondary qualities’ and that his realism does not readily appear to be a reductive form of realism. Downing begins with the traditional claim that Locke’s distinction was driven by his understanding of matter theory within the new science, like many others in the seventeenth century. From this perspective, she criticizes recent work on the nature and priority of primary qualities, which fail to root the primary in a metaphysical base or connect them to the metaphysical base in the wrong way. Next, she turns toward explaining her own understanding of the subordinate status of the secondary qualities, which brings Downing to Locke’s claim that secondary qualities are ‘mere powers’ and what this meant metaphysically to him.

Realism, Essentialism, and Intrinsic Properties: The Case of Molecular Shape

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffry L. Ramsey
Keyword(s):  
Molecular Structure ◽  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Molecular Shape ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Fundamental Properties ◽  
Spatial Properties ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
Physical Features ◽  
Sensible Qualities

Figure, or shape, has long been ensconced in modern philosophy as a primary or essential quality of matter. Descartes, Malebranche, Hobbes, and Boyle all apparently endorsed the Lockean claim that shape is “in Bodies whether we perceive them or no” (Locke, [1700] 1975, p. 140). In addition, most seventeenth-century philosophers endorsed the inference that because shape is primary, it is one of the “ultimate, irreducible explanatory principles” (Dijksterhuis, 1961, p. 433; cf. Ihde, 1964, p. 28). Locke has often been read in this way, and in Origins of Forms and Qualities, Boyle claims the “sensible qualities . . . are but the effects or consequents of the . . . primary affections of matter,” one of which is figure (quoted in Harré, 1964, p. 80). Little appears to have changed. Most analytic philosophers and realist-minded philosophers of science “would endorse a distinction between primary and secondary qualities” (Smith, 1990, p. 221). Campbell (1972, p. 219) endorses the claim that “shape, size and solidity are generally held to be primary,” even though he argues that “the philosophy of primary and secondary qualities” is confused. Mackie (1976, p. 18) discounts solidity but endorses spatial properties and motion as “basic” physical features of matter. Most philosophers also endorse the inference to the explanatory character of the primary qualities. Mackie (1976, p. 25) asserts spatial properties are “starting points of explanation.” Boyd (1989, pp. 10-11) claims “realists agree” that “the factors which govern the behavior . . . of substances are the fundamental properties of the insensible corpuscles of which they are composed.” As befits our current situation, explanation purportedly flows from spatial microstructure. A body “possesses a certain potential only because it actually possesses a certain property (e.g., its molecular structure)” (Lange, 1994, pp. 109-110). Even Putnam, who argues all properties are Lockean secondaries, claims powers “have an explanation . . . in the particular microstructure” of matter (Putnam, 1981, p. 58).

Berkeley's Ideas and the Primary/Secondary Distinction

1990 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
Steven Nadler
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
External Objects ◽  
The Mind

Part of Berkeley's strategy in his attack on materialism in the Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous is to argue that the epistemological distinction between ideas of so-called primary qualities and ideas of secondary qualities, especially as this distinction is found in Locke, is untenable. Both kinds of ideas-those presenting to the mind the quantifiable properties of bodies (shape, size, extension, motion) and those which are just sensations (color, odor, taste, heat)-are equally perceptions in the mind, and there is no reason to believe that one kind (the ideas of primary qualities) represents true properties of independently existing external objects while the other kind does not.

Primary and Secondary Qualities

1972 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Special Relationship ◽  
Preliminary Step ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
Large Numbers ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of

The philosophy of primary and secondary qualities is in a state of some confusion. There is no agreement as to the basis upon which the two classes of quality may be distinguished—a host of features, as diverse as perceptible by more than one sense and belonging to the definition of matter, are offered as the mark of the primary. There is not even agreement on which qualities belong to which group. Shape, size and solidity are generally held to be primary, while colours, smells, and the like (I) are favoured secondary candidates. But for large numbers of qualities, for example being acidic, malleable, rust-proof—or, among perceptible qualities, glistening and vibrating—we are offered no effective guidance.Inevitably, in such a situation, we are without clear answers to the questions; Why should any distinction be made between primaries and secondaries? Must all qualities be the one or the other? To the solution of which problems does the distinction serve as a preliminary step? What special relationship is there between primary qualities and scientific theory, or between secondary qualities and peculiarities in perception?

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