scholarly journals Social Objectivity and the Problem of Local Epistemologies

2010 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anke Büter
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Alternative Conception ◽  
Theory Choice ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Cognitive Values ◽  
Normative Requirement ◽  
Epistemological Pluralism

AbstractThe value-freedom of scientific knowledge is commonly hold to be a necessary condition for objectivity. Helen Longino’s contextual empiricism aims to overcome this connection. She questions the suitability of the normative ideal of value-freedom and develops an alternative conception of objectivity, which integrates social and epistemic aspects of scientific enquiry. The function of this notion of ‘social objectivity’ is to make value-laden assumptions assessable through a process of criticism, even if there cannot be any guarantee of their elimination. This assessability requires common standards of evaluation, which are threatened by Longino’s rejection of the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive values guiding theory choice. I will argue that in order to resolve this inherent tension, social objectivity has to be understood as based on a procedural epistemology and, differing from Longino’s own approach, must include the normative requirement to strive for consensus instead of allowing for epistemological pluralism.

scholarly journals Librarianship as Knowledge and Science

2011 ◽  
pp. 22-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larisa A. Kozhevnikova
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Cognitive Structure ◽  
Library Science ◽  
Cognitive Values

The paper deals with cognitive structure of library science. A cognitive determination of various types of library knowledge is analyzed. Knowledge of institutional character and scientific knowledge are determined. The author examines essential characteristics of scientific knowledge, its objective, and stages of cognition and cognitive values of library science.

Are There Things Which We Should Not Know?

1998 ◽  
pp. 133-138
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
Scientific Methodology ◽  
Research Topics ◽  
Good Science ◽  
Moral Relevance ◽  
Moral Permissibility ◽  
Cognitive Values

It has been claimed that decisions concerning scientific research topics and the publication of research results are purely methodological, and that any moral considerations refer only to research methods and uses of acquired knowledge. The arguments advanced in favor of this view appeal to the moral neutrality of scientific knowledge and the intrinsic value of truth. I argue that neither is valid. Moreover, I show three cases where a scientist’s decision to begin research clearly bears moral relevance: (1) when starting an inquiry would create circumstances threatening some non-cognitive values; (2) when achieving a certain piece of knowledge would threaten the existence of the individual’s private sphere; and (3) when there are reasons to think that humankind is not prepared to accumulate some knowledge. These cases do not prove the existence of some intrinsically ‘morally forbidden topics,’ but show that the moral permissibility of any given inquiry is not a priori guaranteed but needs to be judged in the same way that its methodological soundness is judged. Judgments concerning research topics have both methodological and moral aspects and these two cannot be separated under the threat of distorting science. Making such judgments requires knowledge not only of scientific methodology, but also of its social and philosophical implications. Philosophy is necessary in order to do good science.

Seeming, Observing and Observance

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Llewelyn
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Human Science ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Strategic Design ◽  
Poetic Prose ◽  
Made In ◽  
As If

Literature is a treasury of likenesses and unlikenesses. Much is to be learned about the various ways ‘like’ and ‘as’ function from a comparison of how the kestrel is ‘worded’ by Hopkins and how the peregrine is addressed by John Alec Baker. Hopkins writes predominantly as a poet preoccupied with peculiarities or what I call ‘quaints’. Although much of the log of Baker’s observations of the peregrine is written in poetic prose out of love for the bird, much of it is driven by a concern for the increase of scientific knowledge. This difference is marked by the distinction between ‘as if’ and ‘if then’. That is to say, the appeal to Baker in this chapter facilitates an overview of the strategic design of the book as a whole. Located at the beginning of the book’s second part, this chapter heralds a turn toward the application to natural and human science of the logical and ontological lessons learned in the book’s first part. This emphasis on the scientific leads Baker’s readers to notice that allusions to the Creator are almost totally absent from The Peregrine, whereas Hopkins’ ‘The Windhover’ is dedicated ‘To Christ our Lord’. Hopkins’ observations are made in praise of the Creator. Baker’s are made in service to science. Together they announce the hope that adherence to an institutional religion is not a necessary condition of anyone’s finding the reading of Hopkins and (may I say?) this study a rewarding experience. But the field of institutional religions is not the same as that of the religious.

Conclusion

2021 ◽  
pp. 297-304
Author(s):  
Guy Elgat
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Conception ◽  
The Other ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

The concluding chapter addresses an apparent aporia: on the one hand, we have the Nietzschean argument that one must be causa sui for guilt to be justified, but on the other hand, we have the Heideggerian argument that not being causa sui is a necessary condition for guilt to be possible. The conclusion explains why this is only an apparent aporia. An alternative conception of guilt is sketched, one that rejects Nietzsche’s view of guilt as a form of self-punishment but retains Heidegger’s view that guilt expresses our normative commitments. This conception shows how guilt might nevertheless be justified.

Science as a Value of Risk Society

2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (5) ◽  
pp. 93-111
Author(s):  
Anatoly I. Zelenkov
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Values ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Social Institution ◽  
Risk Society ◽  
Reflexive Modernization ◽  
Cognitive Values ◽  
Value Determination ◽  
The Relationship

In the article, the issue of the relationship between science and the sphere of cultural values is considered in two mutually correlated aspects. First, it reveals the ambivalent status of science as the most important social institution in a modern dynamically transforming society, which, in accordance with the very popular metaphor of U. Beck, is increasingly called the “risk society.” Secondly, the problem of sociocultural determination of scientific knowledge is interpreted as a problem of the axiology of science. At the same time, the relationship between social and intrascientific (cognitive) values is examined through the prism of possible forms and mechanisms of their philosophical and methodological representation. The author examines the specificity of pre-requisite knowledge, especially in the form as the metatheoretical foundations of scientific research is revealed. The article reveals the ambivalent nature of the value status of science in the context of changing socio-cultural priorities of the industrial civilization, against the background of a brief reconstruction of the main ideas of U. Beck’s concept of reflexive modernization, the theory of risk-generating development of science and high technologies by G. Bechmann, Z. Bauman’s idea about sociocultural imbalance as an essential characteristic of “individualized society.” The specificity of the value determination of scientific knowledge is considered in the context of substantiating the sociocognitive approach as the most important result of the philosophical and methodological research in the 20th century. Within the framework of this approach, two alternative strategies are distinguished, for using social and cognitive values as specific forms of prerequisite knowledge. One of the strategies is focused on development of conceptual foundations of science and rationally grounded metatheoretical structures (V.S. Stepin). The second strategy gives preference to non-conceptual (pre-conceptual) forms of background knowledge as productive metaphors that perform the functions of methodological heuristics and the integration of scientific knowledge into culture (M. Foucault, L. Laudan, et al.). The article concludes that there is the peculiar bifunctionality of the cultural valuein relation to science. On the one hand, science itself is a fundamental value in modern culture, although its impact on social life is ambivalent. On the other hand, the dominant values of risk society influence the formation of a new image of science and its methodological tools.

Reconceptualizing the Organism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Nicholson
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Conception ◽  
Living Systems ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Equilibrium Thermodynamics ◽  
The Third ◽  
Biological Ontology ◽  
Flowing Stream ◽  
Non Equilibrium

This chapter draws on insights from non-equilibrium thermodynamics to demonstrate the ontological inadequacy of the machine conception of the organism. The thermodynamic character of living systems underlies the importance of metabolism and calls for the adoption of a processual view, exemplified by the Heraclitean metaphor of the stream of life. This alternative conception is explored in its various historical formulations, and the extent to which it captures the nature of living systems is examined. Next, the chapter considers the metaphysical implications of reconceptualizing the organism from complex machine to flowing stream. What do we learn when we reject the mechanical and embrace the processual? Three key lessons for biological ontology are identified. The first is that activity is a necessary condition for existence. The second is that persistence is grounded in the continuous self-maintenance of form. And the third is that order does not entail design.

scholarly journals MOKSLAS IR VERTYBĖS: ISTORINĖS MOKSLO FILOSOFIJOS MOKYKLOS METODOLOGINIS PROBLEMIŠKUMAS

Problemos ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albinas Plėšnys
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Logical Analysis ◽  
Scientific Development ◽  
Historical Period ◽  
Historical School ◽  
Cognitive Values ◽  
Research Programmes

Istorinė mokslo filosofijos mokykla siūlo naują, palyginti su nonormatyvine mokykla, mokslo filosofijos tikslų bei uždavinių interpretaciją. Pagrindiniu jos uždaviniu tampa ne loginė mokslo žinių analizė, o tyrimas tų įsitikinimų bei įvaizdžių, kurių tam tikru metu laikėsi mokslo visuomenė. Tačiau istorinė mokykla nenurodo principų, kriterijų arba pagrindų, kuriais remdamasi ji apibrėžtų savąją tyrimo sritį, nepagrindžia, kodėl, tarkime, turime analizuoti vien mokslo teorijų, t. y. pasaulėvaizdinį, o ne platesnį pasaulėžiūrinį kontekstą. Svarbiausias naujojo požiūrio trūkumas yra mokslo žinių autonomiškumo prielaida, tai, kad mokslo žinios nepriklauso nuo pasaulėžiūrinio ar filosofinio konteksto, ir prielaida, kad mokslui svarbios yra tik santykinės kognityvinės vertybės. Kaip rodo mokslo istorija, abi šios prielaidos yra klaidingos. Mūsų nuomone, mokslo žinių istorinė analizė turėtų atsižvelgti ir į metafizinių sistemų kontekstą. Mokslo raidą apibūdina ne tiek paradigmų ar mokslinio tyrimo programų, kiek bendresnių mokslo metafizinių tyrimo programų kaita. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: normatyvinė mokslo filosofija, istorinė mokslo filosofijos mokykla, paradigma, mokslinio tyrimo programa, kognityvinės vertybės, loginė analizė, mokslo metafizinė tyrimo programa. SCIENCE AND VALUES: THE PROBLEM OF METHODOLOGY IN THE HISTORICAL SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCEAlbinas Plėšnys SummaryAdherents of the historical school of philosophy of science propose a new conception of the aims and task of philosophy of science in comparison with the followers of normative philosophy of science. Investigation of those convictions and images that were accepted in a certain historical period, but not the logical analysis of knowledge becomes the main problem in the historical school of philosophy of science. This approach overturns the old methodological status of philosophy of science. But the new point of view isn’t ftawless, either. The main fault of the new position is the presumption that the scientific knowledge functions as an autonomous system irrespective of the philosophical or theological context and the conception that cognitive values only are significant in scientific research. From our point of view, analysis of scientific knowledge without consideration of the metaphysical context is invalid, because science is subordinate to this context. Change of metaphysicalscientific research programmes but not the shift of paradigms or scientific research programmes probably take place in the process of scientific development. Keywords: normative philosophy of science, historical school of philosophy of science, paradigm, scientific research programmes, cognitive values, logical analysis, metaphysical-scientific research programmes.

The Utility of Futility: the construction of bioethical problems

1998 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
pp. 509-517 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franco A Carnevale
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Scientific Community ◽  
Medical Futility ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Clinical Context ◽  
Medical Authority ◽  
Truth Claims ◽  
Constructivist Perspective ◽  
Dominant Paradigm

The aim of this article is to analyse the contemporary ‘futility discourse’ from a constructivist perspective. I will argue that bioethics discourse typically disregards the con text from which controversies emerge and the processes that inform and constrain such discourse. Constructivists have argued that scientific knowledge is expressive of the dominant paradigm within which a scientific community is working. I will outline an analysis of ‘medical futility’ as a construction of biomedical and bioethical communities (and their respective paradigms). I will trace the emergence and utilization of futility in the literature. My analysis of the context (i.e. the historical circumstances, the particular actors involved) within which the futility discourse emerged suggests that medical futility was constructed, in part, as a means of enhancing physician domination of a context wherein medical authority was threatened. The actors in this debate express widely divergent frameworks of ‘the good’, arguing from distinctive representations of moral agency. At times, this controversy has been argued from incommensurate moral horizons wherein the discussants debate incomparable problems. This discussion is related to a study of the ‘practice’ of futility in the clinical context. Further studies on the construction of bioethical problems are a necessary condition for supporting the truth claims of bioethical arguments.

25 Years of Feminist Empiricism and Standpoint Theory: Where Are We Now?

Hypatia ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 778-796 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristen Intemann
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Standpoint Theory ◽  
Theory Choice ◽  
Scientific Communities ◽  
Feminist Standpoint ◽  
Political Values ◽  
Scientific Objectivity ◽  
The Past ◽  
Socially Situated

Over the past twenty-five years, numerous articles in Hypatia have clarified, revised, and defended increasingly more nuanced views of both feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism. Feminist empiricists have argued that scientific knowledge is contextual and socially situated (Longino 1990; Nelson 1990; Anderson 1995), and standpoint feminists have begun to endorse virtues of theory choice that have been traditionally empiricist (Wylie 2003). In fact, it is unclear whether substantive differences remain. I demonstrate that current versions of feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism now have much in common but that key differences remain. Specifically, they make competing claims about what is required for increasing scientific objectivity. They disagree about 1) the kind of diversity within scientific communities that is epistemically beneficial and 2) the role that ethical and political values can play. In these two respects, feminist empiricists have much to gain from the resources provided by standpoint theory. As a result, the views would be best merged into “feminist standpoint empiricism.”

scholarly journals Paratekstowe strategie zachęcania czytelnika do lektury tekstów popularnonaukowych

2020 ◽  
pp. 7-20
Author(s):  
Dorota Piekarczyk
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Cognitive Values ◽  
Special Place ◽  
Marketing Tool

The author of this paper begins with showing the role played by covers today (a cover as a marketing tool used by a publisher, as a paratext presenting a publication and encouraging people to read it, and as a “commercial interpretation” of a text) and demonstrates that they are a special place where the intentions of the author of a text, the needs of its publisher, and the expectations of readers clash. She chooses the following specific issue as the object of her investigation: book metaphors used in paratexts of popular scientific studies. It has not been examined from this angle before. By analysing the metaphors used by publishers, she shows that they are strategies of attracting readers. The author focuses on the aspects of metaphors that allow publishers to achieve the objectives of not only typical covers but also ones imposed on popularisation of science. Analyses indicate that metaphors are applied mainly to stimulate the readers’ minds, to engage them emotionally, and to open them to the cognitive values brought by scientific knowledge.

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