Zur Bedeutung nationalsozialistischer Statistiken und Statistiker nach dem Krieg

Author(s):  
Rainer Fremdling

AbstractAfter the war, NS-statistics were put to manifold uses. Indeed, the industrial census of 1936 served both as a benchmark for the restrictions on German production imposed by the allied powers and as an indispensable input for the introduction of the planned economy in East Germany. In addition the NS-statisticians involved were also considered indispensable for interpreting and implementing these statistics.In order to assess the economic effects of allied bombing during the war, John Kenneth Galbraith oversaw the Overall Economic Effects Division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Wagenführ and other German statisticians were interrogated in order to elucidate the statistical files of Speer’s Planning Office (Planungsamt), the command centre of the German war economy. As the chief statistician in Speer’s Ministry for Armaments, Wagenführ had been in charge of the statistical information system for running the war economy.The article focuses on a recently detected file on the kidnapping of Rolf Wagenführ by US-officers from Berlin to Bad Homburg in the summer of 1945. At that time, Wagenführ was working for the central command of the Soviet military administration of Germany. I found the report on the kidnapping and the ensuing interrogation which Wagenführ wrote for his Soviet command officer. It is part of the archival files of the German Democratic Republic hosted by the German Federal Archive (Bundesarchiv) in Berlin-Lichterfelde.The article here concludes with both a brief presentation of those German production statistics (Statistische Schnellberichte) which had been compiled on a monthly basis for the inner political circle around Hitler during the war, and with some results from the USSBS.

Author(s):  
Andrew Schmitz ◽  
Charles B. Moss ◽  
Troy G. Schmitz

AbstractThe COVID-19 crisis created large economic losses for corn, ethanol, gasoline, and oil producers and refineries both in the United States and worldwide. We extend the theory used by Schmitz, A., C. B. Moss, and T. G. Schmitz. 2007. “Ethanol: No Free Lunch.” Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization 5 (2): 1–28 as a basis for empirical estimation of the effect of COVID-19. We estimate, within a welfare economic cost-benefit framework that, at a minimum, the producer cost in the United States for these four sectors totals $176.8 billion for 2020. For U.S. oil producers alone, the cost was $151 billion. When world oil is added, the costs are much higher, at $1055.8 billion. The total oil producer cost is $1.03 trillion, which is roughly 40 times the effect on U.S. corn, ethanol, and gasoline producers, and refineries. If the assumed unemployment effects from COVID-19 are taken into account, the total effect, including both producers and unemployed workers, is $212.2 billion, bringing the world total to $1266.9 billion.


2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-191
Author(s):  
Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

Abstract:While Africans are generally satisfied that a person of African descent was reelected to the White House following a campaign in which vicious and racist attacks were made against him, the U.S. Africa policy under President Barack Obama will continue to be guided by the strategic interests of the United States, which are not necessarily compatible with the popular aspirations for democracy, peace, and prosperity in Africa. Obama’s policy in the Great Lakes region provides an excellent illustration of this point. Since Rwanda and Uganda are Washington’s allies in the “war against terror” in Darfur and Somalia, respectively, the Obama administration has done little to stop Kigali and Kampala from destabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and looting its natural resources, either directly or through proxies. Rwanda and Uganda have even been included in an international oversight mechanism that is supposed to guide governance and security sector reforms in the DRC, but whose real objective is to facilitate Western access to the enormous natural wealth of the Congo and the Great Lakes region.


1947 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Paul A. Baran ◽  
J. K. Galbraith

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Danuta Pohl-Michałek

The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) was adopted in order to provide uniform rules governing the international sale of goods. It has already been ratified by an impressive number of 92 Contracting States, with the major trading countries taking the lead. The CISG applies to contracts for the sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States, where the States are CISG Contracting States (Article 1(1)(a)). Moreover, it applies to contracts for the sale of goods when the contracting parties have their places of business in different States and when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a CISG Contracting State (Article 1(1)(b)). However, at the time of ratification, the prospective Contracting States are given the possibility of making additional reservations, including one set out in Article 95 CISG, which limits the application of Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention. Although there are some CISG Contracting States that initially applied the reservation but have since withdrawn it, there are still a few Contracting States where the reservation remains[1], including the two largest trading countries – China and the United States. The paper presents various approaches regarding the interpretation of the effects of the reservation set out in Article 95 CISG, which in fact challenge the principle of the uniform interpretation and application of the Convention’s provisions. The author argues that the Article 95 CISG reservation leads to increased confusion and problematic conflict of law issues that bring more chaos than benefits.   [1] The remaining Article 95 CISG Reservatory States are: Armenia, China, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, Slovakia and the United States of America. Information is based on the official website: https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X-10&chapter=10 (accessed: 9.12.2019).


2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Grace Lordan ◽  
John Quiggin

The idea of using 'fat taxes’ to curb obesity rates has been raised by many. In particular, the idea of taxing sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) has received considerable attention in the United States and has recently been discussed by President Obama. Rather less attention has been given to the alternative of 'thin subsidies’, that is, subsidies for the consumption of foods or beverages likely to be associated with reduced incidence of obesity. This commentary examines the case for a subsidy for artificially sweetened beverages (ASBs) or 'diet soft drinks’. In this commentary, we outline the evidence on the relationship between health outcomes, most notably obesity, and the consumption of SSBs and ASBs. In the light of the evidence we consider the economic effects of taxing SSBs, and the way in which those effects would be modified by the adoption of the alternative 'thin subsidy’ based on subsidising ASBs.


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