scholarly journals Joint Improvisation, Minimalism and Pluralism about Joint action

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre Saint-Germier ◽  
Cédric Paternotte ◽  
Clément Canonne

Abstract This paper introduces freely improvised joint actions, a class of joint actions characterized by (i) highly unspecific goals and (ii) the unavailability of shared plans. For example, walking together just for the sake of walking together with no specific destination or path in mind provides an ordinary example of FIJAs, along with examples in the arts, e.g., collective free improvisation in music, improv theater, or contact improvisation in dance. We argue that classic philosophical accounts of joint action such as Bratman’s rule them out because the latter require a capacity for planning that is idle in the case of FIJAs. This argument is structurally similar to arguments for minimalist accounts of joint action (e.g., based on joint actions performed by children before they develop a full-fledged theory of mind), and this invites a parallel minimalist account, which we provide in terms of a specific kind of shared intentions that do not require plan states. We further argue that the resulting minimalist account is different in kind from the sort of minimalism suggested by developmental considerations and conclude in favor of a pluralistic minimalism, according to which there are several ways for an account of joint action to be minimal.

SATS ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nivedita Gangopadhyay ◽  
Alois Pichler

Abstract Our linguistic communication often takes the form of creating texts. In this paper, we propose that creating texts or ‘texting’ is a form of joint action. We examine the nature and evolution of this joint action. We argue that creating texts ushers in a special type of joint action, which, while lacking some central features of normal, everyday joint actions such as spatio-temporal collocation of agency and embodiment, nonetheless results in an authentic, strong, and unique type of joint action agency. This special type of agency is already present in creating texts in general and is further augmented in creating texts through digital media. We propose that such a unique type of joint action agency has a transformative effect on the experience of our sense of agency and subjectivity. We conclude with the implications of the proposal for social cognition and social agency. The paper combines research in philosophy of mind with the emerging fields of digital humanities and text technology.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke McEllin ◽  
Günther Knoblich ◽  
Natalie Sebanz

Abstract In joint performances spanning from jazz improvisation to soccer, expert performers synchronize their movements in ways that novices cannot. Particularly, experts can align the velocity profiles of their movements in order to achieve synchrony on a fine-grained time scale, compared to novices who can only synchronize the duration of their movement intervals. This study investigated how experts’ ability to engage in velocity-based synchrony affects observers’ perception of coordination and their aesthetic experience of joint performances. Participants observed two moving dots on a screen and were told that these reflect the hand movements of two performers engaging in joint improvisation. The dots were animated to reflect the velocity-based synchrony characteristic of expert performance (in terms of jitter of the velocity profile: Experiment 1, or through aligning sharpness of the velocity profile: Experiment 2) or contained only interval-based synchrony. Performances containing velocity-based synchrony were judged as more coordinated with performers rated as liking each other more, and were rated as more beautiful, providing observers with a stronger aesthetic experience. These findings demonstrate that subtle timing cues fundamentally shape the experience of watching joint actions, directly influencing how beautiful and enjoyable we find these interactions, as well as our perception of the relationship between co-actors.


Sociology ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 685-700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reza Azarian

Despite its centrality in Blumer’s conceptual framework, the notion of joint action remains theoretically underdeveloped and empirically underutilised. To fill this void, the present article focuses on the dynamics inherent to the formation of joint action, and highlights actors’ deployment of available symbolic rules and resources for constructing the legitimising accounts that normally accompany their lines of action. The construction of such accounts, or stories, is viewed here as the prime means of reducing the intrinsic contingency of joint action and determining its content and terms as well as its direction and prospects. The article concludes by underscoring the importance of the suggested theoretical input for tapping some of the potential of Blumer’s approach, especially the one regarding its capacity to address subtle forms of power.


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 338-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Pezzulo ◽  
Pierpaolo Iodice ◽  
Francesco Donnarumma ◽  
Haris Dindo ◽  
Günther Knoblich

Using a lifting and balancing task, we contrasted two alternative views of planning joint actions: one postulating that joint action involves distinct predictions for self and other, the other postulating that joint action involves coordinated plans between the coactors and reuse of bimanual models. We compared compensatory movements required to keep a tray balanced when 2 participants lifted glasses from each other’s trays at the same time (simultaneous joint action) and when they took turns lifting (sequential joint action). Compared with sequential joint action, simultaneous joint action made it easier to keep the tray balanced. Thus, in keeping with the view that bimanual models are reused for joint action, predicting the timing of their own lifting action helped participants compensate for another person’s lifting action. These results raise the possibility that simultaneous joint actions do not necessarily require distinguishing between one’s own and the coactor’s contributions to the action plan and may afford an agent-neutral stance.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Michael ◽  
Elisabeth Pacherie

AbstractIn this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightforward. Second, there are many other ways in which uncertainty is commonly reduced within joint actions, which raises the possibility that commitments may be superfluous. Nevertheless, we argue that the existence of these alternative uncertainty reduction processes does not make commitments superfluous after all but, rather, helps to explain how commitments may contribute in various ways to uncertainty reduction.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikko Salmela ◽  
Michiru Nagatsu

AbstractIn contemporary philosophy of collective intentionality, emotions, feelings, moods, and sentiments do not figure prominently in debates on the explanation and justification of joint action. Received philosophical theories analyze joint action in terms of common knowledge of cognitively complex, interconnected structures of intentions and action plans of the participants. These theories admit that collective emotions sometimes give rise to joint action or more typically, unplanned and uncoordinated collective behavior that falls short of full-fledged jointly intentional action. In contrast, minimalist theorists pay some attention to affective elements in joint action without much concern about their collective intentionality. They refer to an association between low-level synchrony in perceptual, motor, and behavioral processes, and increased interpersonal liking, feelings of solidarity, and cooperativeness. In this paper, we outline an account of collective emotions that can bridge this theoretical divide, linking the intentional structure of joint actions and the underlying cognitive and affective mechanisms. Collective emotions can function as both motivating and justifying reasons for jointly intentional actions, in some cases even without prior joint intentions of the participants. Moreover, they facilitate coordination in joint action.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (51) ◽  
pp. eabd1306
Author(s):  
Raphaela Heesen ◽  
Adrian Bangerter ◽  
Klaus Zuberbühler ◽  
Federico Rossano ◽  
Katia Iglesias ◽  
...  

Joint action is central to human nature, enabling collectives to achieve goals otherwise unreachable by individuals. It is enabled by humans’ capacity to understand and engage in joint commitments. Joint commitments are evidenced when partners in interrupted joint actions reengage one another. To date, there is no clear evidence whether nonhuman animals understand joint commitment, suggesting that only humans experience it. Here, we revisit this claim by interrupting bonobos engaged in social activities. Bonobos reliably resumed the activity, and the likelihood of resumption was higher for social compared to solitary activities. Furthermore, communicative efforts deployed to suspend and resume social activities varied depending on partners’ social relationships and interactive roles. Our results suggest that bonobos, like humans, engage in joint commitment and have some awareness of the social consequences of breaking it.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maciej Haman

Abstract Twenty-five years ago, a book “Z badań nad kompetencją komunikacyjną dziecka”, edited by Barbara Bokus and Maciej Haman, was issued containing, among else, the first Polish review of the studies on the development of Theory of Mind. During these 25 years, the area developed extensively and a new “state-of-the-arts” paper is necessary. The current paper does not pretend to the role of a complete review, instead it focusses on two live issues in the Theory of Mind (ToM) research progress: early (before the age of four years) competences in false-belief understanding, which leads to the question of continuity versus discontinuity (e.g., “Two-system theory”) between early and later ToM abilities, and neuroimaging studies of Theory-of-Mind, which may also contribute to the continuity debate.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Clarke ◽  
Luke McEllin ◽  
Anna Francová ◽  
Marcell Székely ◽  
Stephen A. Butterfill ◽  
...  

Abstract Joint actions often require agents to track others’ actions while planning and executing physically incongruent actions of their own. Previous research has indicated that this can lead to visuomotor interference effects when it occurs outside of joint action. How is this avoided or overcome in joint actions? We hypothesized that when joint action partners represent their actions as interrelated components of a plan to bring about a joint action goal, each partner’s movements need not be represented in relation to distinct, incongruent proximal goals. Instead they can be represented in relation to a single proximal goal – especially if the movements are, or appear to be, mechanically linked to a more distal joint action goal. To test this, we implemented a paradigm in which participants produced finger movements that were either congruent or incongruent with those of a virtual partner, and either with or without a joint action goal (the joint flipping of a switch, which turned on two light bulbs). Our findings provide partial support for the hypothesis that visuomotor interference effects can be reduced when two physically incongruent actions are represented as mechanically interdependent contributions to a joint action goal.


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