In Search of the Context of a Question

SATS ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-213
Author(s):  
Hugo Strandberg
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Small Contribution ◽  
Moral Question ◽  
Moral Questions

AbstractHow is the role of context in moral philosophy to be understood? Why is the consideration of context important here? This paper is a small contribution to answering these questions. The kind of context that is in focus does not help us answer moral questions but is essential for understanding what kind of moral question arises – indeed, if any question arises at all. For whom does the question arise? What form does the question have for him or her? What relation does the person for whom it arises have to the events in the example as described by the philosopher? In considering such issues, the importance of thinking from an existentially and morally engaged perspective becomes evident.

scholarly journals El papel de la educación en la filosofía moral de David Hume / The role of education in Hume's moral philosophy

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (30) ◽  
pp. 17-37
Author(s):  
Santiago Álvarez García
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
General Point

El presente artículo muestra cómo la crítica humeana a los fundamentos del racionalismo moral y a sus consecuencias en el terreno de las ideas educativas propició un cambio significativo en la comprensión de los objetivos de la educación moral que pasaron de buscar el perfeccionamiento de la agencia, a perseguir la perfección y el refinamiento de las capacidades del individuo como espectador y evaluador moral imparcial. Esta trasformación de la finalidad y del currículo de la educación moral será la solución que Hume ofrezca a los problemas de parcialidad derivados de la historicidad y la caducidad del general point of view como criterio último para el juicio moral. La exposición constante del educando a todas las formas históricas de la belleza, junto con la poesía, la literatura, el estudio de la historia y la filosofía, constituirán para Hume la base de esta revolución pedagógica.

Can't We All Just Respect One Another a Little Less?

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 463-484
Author(s):  
Michael Neumann
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Thomas Nagel ◽  
Moral Claims

Contemporary moral philosophy and much contemporary moralizing almost radiate respect for persons. Thomas Nagel is one of many who take its primacy for granted. In a review of Scanion he says:Scanlon's theory addresses a number of its central questions: first, the question of the objectivity or truth of moral Claims, their relation to reason, and whether or not they should be regarded as in some sense relative or subjective; second, the question of the kind of concern or respect for persons that is at the foundation of morality…Many others take the centrality and foundational role of such respect as a given. This is a big change from the days when moralists held that all human beings deserved a certain basic and equal disrespect.

The role of examples in moral philosophy

Argumentation ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Brinton
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy

Confession, conscience, and selfhood on trial

2018 ◽  
pp. 124-177
Author(s):  
Laura Kounine
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
The Self ◽  
Change Over Time ◽  
Linear Pattern ◽  
Moral Question ◽  
Modern Self ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Individual Self ◽  
Over Time

This chapter deals with the role of the self and conscience in defending oneself against the charge of witchcraft. To add depth to intellectual concepts—and teleologies—of the self, we must understand how the individual self was understood, felt, and experienced. Particularly for the crime of witchcraft, the crux of the trial was premised on the moral question of what kind of person would commit such a crime. Those on trial for witchcraft in the Lutheran duchy of Württemberg invoked the idioms of ‘mind’, ‘conscience’, ‘heart’, or ‘self’ in constructing their defence. Through four case studies, ranging from 1565 to 1678, this chapter examines the different ways in which people could conceptualize their person, and shows that change over time in the ‘development’ of the modern self was not a uniform or directly linear pattern.

The Relation between Political and Moral Philosophy

2020 ◽  
pp. 18-67
Author(s):  
Charles Larmore
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Common Experience ◽  
The World ◽  
Freedom Of Thought ◽  
Just Society ◽  
Moral Questions

This chapter talks about the pervasive conflict on what should count as the terms of social cooperation, such as the need for authoritative, enforceable rules that constitute the elementary facts of political life. It discusses the disagreement about the nature of right and good, specific moral questions, and features of the good or just society as the most enduring and polarizing sources of social discord. It also characterizes one of the roles of a conception of justice that shows how to adjudicate conflicts among the members of society. The chapter also explains disagreements that often consist of one person merely holding different views. It illustrates a common experience in some parts of the world in which people enjoy freedom of thought and expression and reasoning about ethical matters that goes beyond platitudes.

Friendship

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neera K. Badhwar
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
Moral Self ◽  
Unconditional Love ◽  
Instrumental Value ◽  
A Value ◽  
Personal Relations ◽  
Self Sufficiency

Philosophical interest in friendship has revived after a long eclipse. This is due largely to a renewed interest in ancient moral philosophy, in the role of emotion in morality, and in the ethical dimensions of personal relations in general. Questions about friendship are concerned with issues such as whether it is only an instrumental value (a means to other values), or also an intrinsic value – a value in its own right; whether it is a mark of psychological and moral self-sufficiency, or rather of deficiency; and how friendship-love differs from the unconditional love of agapē. Other issues at stake include how – if at all – friendship is related to justice; whether the particularist, partialist perspective of friendship can be reconciled with the universalist, impartialist perspective of morality; and whether friendship is morally neutral.

Moral expertise

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad Hooker
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Expertise ◽  
High Degree ◽  
Moral Questions

Moral experts are best defined as those who have studied moral questions carefully, know the main theories developed in response to such questions, and (where possible) know and are able to offer arguments that would convince reasonable people. In scientific and technical areas, one important feature of a successful answer is that it works, in the sense that it makes accurate predictions. We can say that successful answers to moral questions take the form of arguments which, if examined carefully, would persuade reasonable people and lead to convergence in their moral views. The moral responsibility of individuals for themselves does not preclude the role of moral advisor. Many self-pronounced moral experts might be interfering, condescending and hypocritical, but such characteristics need not accompany moral expertise. Probably no one could claim a high degree of expertise in all areas of ethics.

scholarly journals The role of values in analyzing energy systems: Insights from moral philosophy, institutional economics, and sociology

2019 ◽  
Vol 158 ◽  
pp. 3741-3747
Author(s):  
Christine Milchram ◽  
Carolin Märker ◽  
Jürgen-Friedrich Hake
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Energy Systems

Virtue, Rule-Following, and Absolute Prohibitions

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-97
Author(s):  
JEREMY REID
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Moral Rules ◽  
Seminal Article ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy ◽  
Taking Responsibility

AbstractIn her seminal article ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) Elizabeth Anscombe argued that we need a new ethics, one that uses virtue terms to generate absolute prohibitions against certain act-types. Leading contemporary virtue ethicists have not taken up Anscombe's challenge in justifying absolute prohibitions and have generally downplayed the role of rule-following in their normative theories. That they have not done so is primarily because contemporary virtue ethicists have focused on what is sufficient for characterizing the deliberation and action of the fully virtuous person, and rule-following is inadequate for this task. In this article, I take up Anscombe's challenge by showing that rule-following is necessary for virtuous agency, and that virtue ethics can justify absolute prohibitions. First, I offer a possibility proof by showing how virtue ethics can generate absolute prohibitions in three ways: by considering actions that directly manifest vice or that cannot be performed virtuously; actions that are prohibited by one's institutional roles and practical identities; and actions that are prohibited by the prescriptions of the wise. I then seek to show why virtue ethicists should incorporate rule-following and absolute prohibitions into their theories. I emphasize the central role that rules have in the development of virtue, then motivate the stronger view that fully virtuous agents follow moral rules by considering the importance of hope, uncertainty about consequences, and taking responsibility for what eventuates. Finally, I provide an account of what Anscombe called a ‘corrupt mind’, explaining how our understanding of virtue is corrupted if we think that virtue may require us to do vicious actions.

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