scholarly journals On the Formal Approach to Describing Natural Language. Notes on the Margin of Leśniewski’s Ontology

2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-78
Author(s):  
Halina Święczkowska

Abstract This article is an attempt to recreate the intuitions which accompanied Leśniewski when he was creating his calculus of names called Ontology. Although every reconstruction is to some extent an interpretation, and as such may be defective, still, there are reasons justifying such reconstruction. The most important justification is the fact that both Leśniewski and his commentators stressed that ontology originated from reflections about ordinary language, in which sentences such as A is B appear in one of the meanings associated with them in Ontology, and that the users of the Polish language use such sentences accordingly and properly identify them. Assumed it is so, let us try, based on Leśniewski’s guidelines as well as comments and elaborations on Ontology (Leśniewski 1992: 364-382, 608-609; Kotarbiński 1929: 227-229; Rickey 1977: 414-229; Simons 1992: 244; Lejewski 1960: 14-29), to evaluate the accuracy of this approach, referring also to certain knowledge of the Polish language. To make it clear, this article is not about Ontology as a formal theory of language. It is solely an attempt to assess whether some syntactical constructs of the Polish language and this language’s properties are significant conditions of a proper understanding of Ontology, and whether Ontology is, in fact, in a relationship with the ethnic language of its author.

2001 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
John E Joseph

AbstractFrom ancient through modern times there have persisted various versions of a dichotomy between ‘natural’ and other, implicitly ‘unnatural’ forms of language. One version is a split between natural language and an ‘artificial’ literary or standard language. This paper examines several key moments in the development of this particular dichotomy, starting with Varro's belief that the language of poets should not be subject to the same rules of analogy as ordinary language is. Dante sets the pattern for modern considerations of the literary and standard language, which he would create by instituting a reversal of history. The concept is subsequently politicized by, for example, Nebrixa and Du Bellay. Saussure's views on literary language have parallels with Dante's ‘elimination of history’, and resonance for other aspects of Saussure's theory of language. The implications for contemporary views of what is and is not ‘natural’ in language are also considered.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-548
Author(s):  
Robert Nicolaï

This paper is a linguistic, anthropological and philosophical exploration of language, with particular focus on language contact. The goal is not to address linguistic phenomena from a descriptive perspective, in the classical sense of the term, nor as if they were a “given”, and nothing further. Nor is the goal to craft a model. Instead it is an attempt to account for all relevant elements which (empirically) come into play in ordinary language use, considering them both in terms of language dynamics and in terms of language usage; this necessarily entails taking into consideration our own practices, as actors of communication and as builders of knowledge. We are ever stakeholders in this play (and its plays) because we are the ones who identify and/or attribute relevance. In other words, this text is a reflection on the (our) frameworks established through communication practices (frameworks which naturally have an impact on the form of our tools, including languages!) It highlights that the objectivization of phenomena which underlies our practices (whether academic or not) is closely dependent on the means by which we grasp the phenomena—this is nothing new but is worth noting afresh. Methodologically speaking, observing this point is an essential element in the elaboration of a theory to account for how phenomena are empirically grasped, and more particularly what it entails in the field of ‘language contact’.


2015 ◽  
pp. 25-55
Author(s):  
Maciej Piasecki

Self-organising Logic of Structures as a Basis for a Dependency-based Dynamic Semantics ModelWe present Self-organising Logic of Structures (SLS), a semantic representation language of high expressive power, which was designed for a fully compositional representation of discourse anaphora following the Dynamic Semantics paradigm. The application of SLS to the description of possible meanings of Polish multiple quantifier sentences is discussed. Special attention is paid to the phenomena of: cardinality dependency/independency of Noun Phrase quantifiers and variety of quantification. Semantic representation based on several formal operators is proposed. They can be combined in many different ways, if one takes a purely theoretical perspective. However, in the paper we show that this huge number is practically reduced in the language use and is governed by several constraints motivated by the analysis of Polish language data. The Hypothesis of Local Range of Cardinality Dependency is formulated as an alternative to representations based on quantifier rising technique. SLS provides a multi-layered language description of inter-linked representation of sever antification, reference, presupposition and anaphora.


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-63
Author(s):  
Gilberto Gomes

External negation of conditionals occurs in sentences beginning with ‘It is not true that if’ or similar phrases, and it is not rare in natural language. A conditional may also be denied by another with the same antecedent and opposite consequent. Most often, when the denied conditional is implicative, the denying one is concessive, and vice versa. Here I argue that, in natural language pragmatics, ‘If $A$, $\sim B$’ entails ‘$\sim$(if $A, B$)’, but ‘$\sim$(if $A, B$)’ does not entail ‘If $A$, $\sim B$’. ‘If $A, B$’ and ‘If $A$, $\sim B$’ deny each other, but are contraries, not contradictories. Truth conditions that are relevant in human reasoning and discourse often depend not only on semantic but also on pragmatic factors. Examples are provided showing that sentences having the forms ‘$\sim$(if $A, B$)’ and ‘If $A$, $\sim B$’ may have different pragmatic truth conditions. The principle of Conditional Excluded Middle, therefore, does not apply to natural language use of conditionals. Three squares of opposition provide a representation the aforementioned relations.


Author(s):  
Oskari Kuusela

In the Introduction I made the bold claim that Wittgenstein transforms Frege’s and Russell’s logical and methodological ideas in a way that ‘can be justifiably described as a second revolution in philosophical methodology and the philosophy of logic, following Frege’s and Russell’s first revolution’. This claim was meant in a specific sense relating to the use of logical methods in philosophy, a discipline where we are often dealing with complex and messy concepts and phenomena, and having to clarify highly complicated and fluid uses of natural language. The situation is not quite the same in metamathematics, for example, and my claim was not intended to concern the employment of logical methods there, i.e. that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of logic would constitute a revolution in this area too. For, while his later philosophy of logic has no difficulty explaining the possibility of the employment of calculi to clarify other calculi, in metamathematics there is perhaps no similarly pressing need for idealization as in philosophy, when we clarify complex concepts originating in ordinary language, since the targets of clarification in metamathematics are systems governed by strict rules themselves. Thus, this area of the employment of logical methods seems not as significantly affected. But I hope that my claim concerning the use of logical methods in philosophy can now be recognized as justified, or at least worth considering seriously, on the basis of what I have said about 1) the later Wittgenstein’s account of the status of logical clarificatory models, and how this explains the possibility of simple and exact logical descriptions, thus safeguarding the rigour of logic, 2) how his account of the function of logical models makes possible the recognition of the relevance of natural history for logic without compromising the non-empirical character of the discipline of logic, and 3) in the light of Wittgenstein’s introduction of new non-calculus-based logical methods for the purpose of philosophical clarification, such as his methods of grammatical rules, the method of language-games, and quasi-ethnology....


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