scholarly journals Some Remarks on the Relationship between the Jus ad Bellum Regulations under the UN Charter and Customary International Law – Why Does It Matter so Much?

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 112-126
Author(s):  
Michał Kowalski
2015 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
James A. Green ◽  
Christopher P.M. Waters

For self-defence actions to be lawful, they must be directed at military targets. The absolute prohibition on non-military targeting under the jus in bello is well known, but the jus ad bellum also limits the target selection of states conducting defensive operations. Restrictions on targeting form a key aspect of the customary international law criteria of necessity and proportionality. In most situations, the jus in bello will be the starting point for the definition of a military targeting rule. Yet it has been argued that there may be circumstances when the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello do not temporally or substantively overlap in situations of self-defence. In order to address any possible gaps in civilian protection, and to bring conceptual clarity to one particular dimension of the relationship between the two regimes, this article explores the independent sources of a military targeting rule. The aim is not to displace the jus in bello as the ‘lead’ regime on how targeting decisions must be made, or to undermine the traditional separation between the two ‘war law’ regimes. Rather, conceptual light is shed on a sometimes assumed but generally neglected dimension of the jus ad bellum’s necessity and proportionality criteria that may, in limited circumstances, have significance for our understanding of human protection during war.


Author(s):  
Isabel V. Hull

Isabel V. Hull uses the German declarations of war in 1914 to examine three issues: 1) the role of customary international law (CIL) in statesmen’s decision to go to war (using Germany as an example); 2) the assumptions that state actors held a jus ad bellum; and, especially, 3) how they distinguished self-defence, prevention, pre-emption, and aggression. Hull uses not the claims of jurists, but the arguments and actions of civilian and military leaders, i.e. those who actually made the decisions for war. With this, she continues Anuschka Tischer’s and Hendrik Simon’s examination of the question whether there was a transformation of war discourses in (early) modernity that led to overcoming the need to justify war. The chapter confirms that, even as Germany began a ‘preventive war’, the European state consensus held that, on the continent, preventive war was illegal, pre-emptive war was severely restrained, and genuine self-defence – meaning both fending off armed attack against one’s territory, independence, or sovereignty, and defending the treaty-structure that guaranteed the inter-state order – was the only justification for war acceptable to the community of states.


Author(s):  
Brölmann Catherine

The 1980 WHO Advisory Opinion elaborates on the general legal obligations (grounded in the duty of co-operation and good faith) that are part of the relationship between an international organization and its host state. In this opinion the ICJ possibly for the first time articulated this relationship as a set of mutual obligations between legal equals. The opinion moreover enunciates the sources of international legal obligations binding upon international organizations (IOs): the treaties they conclude (uncontroversial); I customary international law; their constitutions. The Court uses the proverbial reassurance of UN member states in saying that the WHO is not a ‘super-state’. Finally, in accepting jurisdiction the Court explicitly separated the legal character of the question from the political considerations motivated by that question.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 741-757
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Schweiger

AbstractOver the last decade, the concept targeted killing has received much attention in debates on the customary interpretation of the right to self-defence, particularly in the context of practices such as US armed drone attacks. In these debates, government silence has often been invoked as acquiescence to the jus ad bellum aspects of targeted killing. Focusing on the question of state silence on targeted killing practices by the Israeli and US governments in recent years, this article investigates over 900 UN Security Council and Human Rights Council debates and argues that there has been no tacit consent to targeted killing. The analysis firstly shows that the majority of states have condemned Israeli targeted killing practices and have raised concerns about armed drone attacks, while falling short of directly protesting against US practices. The article, secondly, applies the customary international law requirements for acquiescence and challenges the idea that silence on US armed drone attacks can be understood as a legal stance towards targeted killing. The article, finally, investigates the political context and engages with alternative interpretations of silence. Contextualizing acts of protest and lack of protest within an asymmetrical political context, the article posits that the invocation of silence as acquiescence in the case of targeted killing is problematic and risks complicity of legal knowledge production with the violence of hegemonic actors.


2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (3) ◽  
pp. 498-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathias Forteau

Public international law and comparative law have so far been regarded as largely distinct fields, with little to no overlap between them. The degree of separation between the two disciplines is rendered in particularly stark relief by the absence in practice or scholarship of any real inquiry into the relationship between comparative law on the one hand and customary international law and general principles of international law on the other. Some eminent international lawyers go so far as to claim that it would be both unnecessary and unrealistic to have recourse to comparative law in the context of the identification of customary international law and general principles of law, pointing to the case law of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice, which, according to them, “show[s] a clear disinclination towards the use of the comparative method.”


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marija Đorđeska

Abstract Article 38, para.1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) defines customary international law as evidence of general practice accepted as law, understood as State practice and opinio juris. However, by identifying certain norms as an international custom without referring to the traditional evidence of State practice and opinio juris, international courts and tribunals are contributing to the formation of customary international law. This paper presents an analysis of how the International Court of Justice contributes to the formation of customary international law by relying on the draft articles of the International Law Commission (ILC). Th e International Court of Justice, in “deciding in accordance with international law”, also authoritatively declares what the current international law is, while the International Law Commission, although constituted of highly qualified publicists from various States, is drafting only non-binding international instruments. By relying on the ILC draft articles and declaring them to be reflecting customary international law-although the draft articles may not be necessary the expression of the States’ practice and their opinio juris, the ICJ creates and generates the creation of customary international law. Interestingly, the ICJ tends to rely mostly on ILC draft articles that refer to the jurisprudence of either the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) or the ICJ itself. Th e paper presents research of approximately 70 ICJ decisions and individual opinions that cite to the work of the ILC. The author notes the evolution of the relationship between the ICJ and the ILC through three different time periods, and presents the findings on how, when and why the ICJ relies on the ILC draft articles. In addition, the author gives examples in which the ICJ rejected the reliance on the ILC’s work, mainly due to the divergent interpretation on the specific area of international law. The ICJ, by relying on the ILC draft articles that in turn refer to the jurisprudence of the ICJ or PCIJ, is not only generating norms of customary international law, but is also reaffirming the importance of its (and PCIJ’s) jurisprudence for the future of international law. Although ICJ decisions are binding only between the parties to the dispute (Art.59 ICJ Statute), the clarification of whether a norm is customary or not, affects the international community of States. Noting the present reluctance of States to adopt treaties, and- hence their potentially decreasing role in international law-making, this research offers an insight into an alternative venue of international law-making. As the international community, and the ILC itself, is regaining interest in the sources of international law, this paper aims to identify the mechanisms of international law-making, the understanding of which will contribute to international law’s needed predictability and a more uniform and reliable interpretation of international law.


Author(s):  
John H. Currie

SummaryThe majority Supreme Court of Canada judgment inHape— a case concerning extraterritorial applicability of theCanadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms— is premised on three aspects of the relationship between international and Canadian law: (1) the interaction of customary international law and Canadian common law; (2) the role of Canada’s international legal obligations inCharterinterpretation; and (3) the potential role of customary international law as a source of unwritten principles of the Canadian Constitution. This article reviews pre-existing law in all three of these areas and analyzes a number of innovations apparently introduced thereto, with little or no explanation, by the majority inHape. It concludes thatHapeseriously exacerbates an already uncertain relationship between international and Canadian law, with fundamental consequences for the rule of law in Canada.


1997 ◽  
Vol 66 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 211-239 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractFew concepts in international law have attracted as much attention or created as much controversy as jus cogens and erga omnes rules. This article attempts to show that jus cogens rules are rules of customary international law, and then to elucidate the relationship between these customary rules and the concept of erga omnes. This article explains that: in contrast to jus cogens rules, erga omnes rules may arise either as customary rules or through treaties; a jus cogens or erga omnes rule could apply to only a limited number of States; although jus cogens rules are necessarily erga omnes rules, erga omnes rules could exist which were not of a jus cogens character.


Author(s):  
Pierre-Hugues Verdier ◽  
Mila Versteeg

International legal scholars have long recognized the importance of the relationship between international law and domestic legal systems. This chapter draws upon a new data set, which covers 101 countries for the period 1815–2013 and records specific features of national approaches to international law, including treaty-making procedures, the status of treaties in domestic law, and the reception of customary international law. The chapter finds that national legal systems have become more likely to give treaties direct effect and hierarchical superiority over domestic law, but at the same time have steadily expanded the categories of treaties whose ratification requires prior legislative approval. With respect to CIL, the chapter finds that the vast majority of national legal systems now recognize custom as directly applicable, at least in principle, but generally consider it to be hierarchically inferior to domestic law. The chapter discusses the implications of these findings for comparative international law.


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