scholarly journals Banking System Adjustment to Regulatory Capital Requirements

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-96
Author(s):  
Ivica Klinac ◽  
Roberto Ercegovac
Keyword(s):  
Banking System ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Regulatory Capital

scholarly journals The Application of Macroprudential Capital Requirements in Managing Systemic Risk

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Hong Fan ◽  
Chirongo Moses Keregero ◽  
Qianqian Gao
Keyword(s):  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Risk Allocation ◽  
Regulatory Capital ◽  
Allocation Mechanism ◽  
Bank Equity ◽  
Almost All

When setting banks regulatory capital requirement based on their contribution to the overall risk of the banking system we need to consider that the risk of the banking system as well as each banks risk contribution changes once bank equity capital gets redistributed. Therefore the present paper provides a theoretical framework to manage the systemic risk of the banking system in Nigeria based on macroprudential capital requirements, which requires banks to hold capital that is proportional to their contribution to systemic risk. Using a sample of 10 Nigerian banks, we reallocate capital in the system based on two scenarios; firstly in the situation where the system shocks do not exist in the system, we find that almost all banks appear to hold more capital; secondly, we also consider the situation where the system shocks exist in the system; we find that almost all banks tend to hold little capital on four risk allocation mechanisms. We further find that despite the heterogeneity in macroprudential capital requirements, all risk allocation mechanisms bring a substantial decrease in the systemic risk. The risk allocation mechanism based on ΔCoVaR decreases the average default probability the most. Our results suggest that financial stability can be substantially improved by implementing macroprudential regulations for the banking system.

Bank Capital Requirements after the Financial Crisis

2019 ◽  
pp. 706-735
Author(s):  
Mark E. Van Der Weide ◽  
Jeffrey Y. Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Structural Changes ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Regulatory Capital ◽  
Stress Tests ◽  
Global Banking

Regulators responded with an array of strategies to shore up weaknesses exposed by the 2008 financial crisis. This chapter focuses on reforms to bank capital regulation. We first discuss the ways in which the post-crisis Basel III reforms recalibrated the existing framework by improving the quality of capital, increasing the quantity of capital, and improving the calculation of risk weights. We then shift to the major structural changes in the regulatory capital framework—capital buffers on top of the minimum requirements; a leverage ratio that explicitly accounts for off-balance-sheet exposures; risk-based and leverage capital surcharges on the largest banks; bail-in debt to facilitate orderly resolution; and forward-looking stress tests. We conclude with a quantitative assessment of the evolution of capital in the global banking system and in the US banking sector.

scholarly journals Un-used Bank Capital Buffers and Credit Supply Shocks at SMEs during the Pandemic

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (041) ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Jose M. Berrospide ◽  
◽  
Arun Gupta ◽  
Matthew P. Seay ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Regulatory Capital ◽  
Lending Relationships ◽  
Minimum Capital ◽  
Buffer Region ◽  
Capital Ratios

Did banks curb lending to creditworthy small and mid-sized enterprises (SME) during the COVID-19 pandemic? Sitting on top of minimum capital requirements, regulatory capital buffers introduced after the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) are costly regions of "rainy day" equity capital designed to absorb losses and provide lending capacity in a downturn. Using a novel set of confidential loan level data that includes private SME firms, we show that "buffer-constrained" banks (those entering the pandemic with capital ratios close to this regulatory buffer region) reduced loan commitments to SME firms by an average of 1.4 percent more (quarterly) and were 4 percent more likely to end pre-existing lending relationships during the pandemic as compared to "buffer-unconstrained" banks (those entering the pandemic with capital ratios far from the regulatory capital buffer region). We further find heterogenous effects across firms, as buffer-constrained banks disproportionately curtailed credit to three types of borrowers: (1) private, bank-dependent SME firms, (2) firms whose lending relationships were relatively young, and (3) firms whose pre-pandemic credit lines contractually matured at the start of the pandemic (and thus were up for renegotiation). While the post-2008 period saw the rise of banking system capital to historically high levels, these capital buffers went effectively unused during the pandemic. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to: (1) empirically test the usability of these Basel III regulatory buffers in a downturn, and (2) contribute a bank capital-based transmission channel to the literature studying how the pandemic transmitted shocks to SME firms.

Fair Value Accounting and Regulatory Capital Requirements

CFA Digest ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 10-11
Author(s):  
S. Brooks Marshall
Keyword(s):  
Fair Value ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Regulatory Capital ◽  
Fair Value Accounting

scholarly journals Credit Risk Management of Property Investments through Multi-Criteria Indicators

Risks ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 106
Author(s):  
Marco Locurcio ◽  
Francesco Tajani ◽  
Pierluigi Morano ◽  
Debora Anelli ◽  
Benedetto Manganelli
Keyword(s):  
Real Estate ◽  
Credit Risk ◽  
Risk Index ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Basel Iii ◽  
Participatory Process ◽  
Regulatory Capital ◽  
The Real Estate ◽  
Financial Variables ◽  
Synthetic Index

The economic crisis of 2008 has highlighted the ineffectiveness of the banks in their disbursement of mortgages which caused the spread of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) with underlying real estate. With the methods stated by the Basel III agreements, aimed at improving the capital requirements of banks and determining an adequate regulatory capital, the banks without the skills required have difficulties in applying the rigid weighting coefficients structures. The aim of the work is to identify a synthetic risk index through the participatory process, in order to support the restructuring debt operations to benefit smaller banks and small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), by analyzing the real estate credit risk. The proposed synthetic risk index aims at overcoming the complexity of Basel III methodologies through the implementation of three different multi-criteria techniques. In particular, the integration of objective financial variables with subjective expert judgments into a participatory process is not that common in the reference literature and brings its benefits for reaching more approved and shared results in the debt restructuring operations procedure. Moreover, the main findings derived by the application to a real case study have demonstrated how important it is for the credit manager to have an adequate synthetic index that could lead to the avoidance of risky scenarios where several modalities to repair the credit debt occur.

Benchmarking and crosschecking international banking economic and regulatory capital

2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
John L. Simpson ◽  
John Evans
Keyword(s):  
Banking System ◽  
Performance Model ◽  
Capital Adequacy ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Informational Efficiency ◽  
International Banking ◽  
Regulatory Capital ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Banking Systems ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions

The purpose of this paper is to provide banking regulators with another tool to crosscheck the appropriateness and consistency of levels of capital adequacy for banks. The process begins by examining banking systems and focuses on market risks and the systemic risks associated with growing global economic integration and associated systemic interdependence. The model provides benchmarks for economic and regulatory capital for international banking systems using country, regional and global stock‐market generated price index returns data. The benchmarks can then be translated to crosschecking capital levels for banks within those systems. For analytical purposes systems are assumed to possess a degree of informational efficiency and credit, liquidity and operational risks are held constant or at least assumed to be covered in loan loss provisions. An empirical study is included that demonstrates how market risk and systemic risk can be accounted for in a benchmark banking system performance model. Full testing of the model is left for future research. The paper merely proposes that such an approach is feasible and useful and it is in no way intended to be a replacement for the current Basel Accord.

Shareholder risk-taking incentives in the presence of contingent capital

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahmoud Fatouh ◽  
Ayowande A. McCunn
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Basic Model ◽  
Conversion Rates ◽  
A Minor ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose This paper aims to present a model of shareholders’ willingness to exert effort to reduce the likelihood of bank distress and the implications of the presence of contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds in the liabilities structure of a bank. Design/methodology/approach This study presents a basic model about the moral hazard surrounding shareholders willingness to exert effort that increases the likelihood of a bank’s success. This study uses a one-shot game and so do not capture the effects of repeated interactions. Findings Consistent with the existing literature, this study shows that the direction of the wealth transfer at the conversion of CoCo bonds determines their impact on shareholder risk-taking incentives. This study also finds that “anytime” CoCos (CoCo bonds trigger-able anytime at the discretion of managers) have a minor advantage over regular CoCo bonds, and that quality of capital requirements can reduce the risk-taking incentives of shareholders. Practical implications This study argues that shareholders can also use manager-specific CoCo bonds to reduce the riskiness of the bank activities. The issuance of such bonds can increase the resilience of individual banks and the whole banking system. Regulators can use restrictions on conversion rates and/or requirements on the quality of capital to address the impact of CoCo bonds issuance on risk-taking incentives. Originality/value To model the risk-taking incentives, authors generally modify the asset processes to introduce components that reflect asymmetric information between CoCo holders and shareholders and/or managers. This paper follows a simpler method similar to that of Holmström and Tirole (1998).

scholarly journals Does Banking Management Affect Credit Risk? Evidence from the Indian Banking System

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laxmi Koju ◽  
Ram Koju ◽  
Shouyang Wang
Keyword(s):  
Credit Risk ◽  
Default Risk ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Operating Efficiency ◽  
Investment Strategies ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Bank Managers ◽  
Credit Standards ◽  
The Impact

This study investigated the impact of banking management on credit risk using a sample of Indian commercial banks. The study employed dynamic panel estimations to evaluate the link between banking management variables and credit risk. The empirical results show that an increase in loan portion over total assets does not necessarily increase problem loans. The findings suggest that high capital requirements and large bank size do not reduce default risk, whereas high profitability and strong income diversification policies lower the likelihood of default risk. The overall empirical results supported the “operating efficiency”, “diversification” and “too big to fail” hypotheses, confirming that credit quality in the banking industry is mainly driven by profitability, banking supervision, high credit standards and strong investment strategies. The findings are relevant to bank managers, investors and bank regulators, in formulating effective credit policies and investment strategies.

Are SME Loans Less Risky than Regulatory Capital Requirements Suggest?

2014 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 89-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Düllmann ◽  
Philipp Koziol
Keyword(s):  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Regulatory Capital

scholarly journals Does the intensity of prudential regulation affect banks? Evidence from the 2007-2009 crises.

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 14-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabel Argimon ◽  
Gerard Arqué Castells ◽  
Francesc Rodríguez Tous
Keyword(s):  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Capital Regulation ◽  
Risk Sensitivity ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Regulatory Capital ◽  
European Banks ◽  
Observed Behaviour ◽  
The Right ◽  
Yearly Data ◽  
Do So

The main objective of this research is to gather empirical evidence on the effects of more or less stringency and more or less risk sensitivity in regulatory capital requirements on the observed behaviour of European banks during the initial years of the financial crisis. To do so, we use the indices built in Argimón and Ruiz (2010), which capture such characteristics of capital regulation. We test their incidence using changes in yearly data for individual banks for 25 countries of the European Union covering the period 2007-2009. Our results show that more stringency and risk sensitivity in capital regulation resulted in higher capital increases, with limited effect on risk taking. However, for well capitalized banks, higher risk sensitivity resulted in higher capital and higher risk, thus requiring striking the right balance, so as to lead to increased stability.

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