: Strategic Interaction . Erving Goffman.

1972 ◽  
Vol 74 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 8-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edwin Lemert
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Erving Goffman

scholarly journals STUDI DRAMATURGI: KOMUNIKASI PEMASARAN PEDAGANG ASONG DI BIS

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-58
Author(s):  
Siswantin Siswantin
Keyword(s):  
Impression Management ◽  
Time Allocation ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Street Vendors ◽  
Erving Goffman ◽  
Made In

The phenomenan of street vendors, especially those on the bus, has its own characteristics in affering merchandise. This little research aims to explore the experience and management of persuasion of street verndors while on the bus. The results of the study show that bidding attraction is a medium of persuasion that allows them to make a bid with a certain duration. Each trader has a different time allocation in doing his attractions, depending on the type of goods being sold. Attraction offers made in line with the concept of impression management, role distance and strategic interaction proposed by Erving Goffma. Fenomena pedagang asong, khususnya yang berada di atas bis memiliki ciri khas tersendiri dalam menawarkan daganganya. Penelitian kecil ini bertujuan untuk menggali pengalaman dan pengelolaan persuasi para pedagang asong selama berada di atas bis. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan atraksi penawaran merupakan media persuasi yang memungkinkan mereka melakukan penawaran dengan durasi waktu tertentu. Setiap pedagang asong memiliki alokasi waktu yang berbeda dalam melakukan atraksinya , sangat tergantung pada jenis barang yang dijajakan. Atraksi penawaran yang dilakukan sejalan dengan konsep impression management, role distance dan interaction strategic yang dikemukakan oleh Erving Goffman.

Self-Presentation – A Precondition for Social Interactio (Theoretical Aspects)

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolay Zhilkov
Keyword(s):  
Self Presentation ◽  
Erving Goffman ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Edward Jones ◽  
Current Article ◽  
Points Of View

The current article presents some of the theoretical aspects of self-presentation describing different points of view on the issue. The ideas of Erving Goffman, Edward Jones, Barry Schlenker, Roy Baumeister and others are being explored. Concepts related to to self-presentation are presented. Different types and functions of self-expression are identified.

Intimation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. R. F. Ferrari
Keyword(s):  
Social Life ◽  
Relevance Theory ◽  
Self Presentation ◽  
Erving Goffman ◽  
Strongly Connected ◽  
Dan Sperber ◽  
Paul Grice

The communicative scale is introduced. What is fundamental to communication is the intention of the communicator rather than the codes that languages employ. Following the model first proposed by Paul Grice and developed in Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson’s ‘relevance theory’, the structure of communicative intentionality is understood to be recursive: its underlying form is ‘I want you to know that I want you to know’. This leaves room for a simpler kind of transmission, to be called ‘intimation’, whose underlying form would be ‘I want you to know’. If communication is a transmission at the ‘full-on’ position of the scale, and if the switch is off when no communication is intended, then intimation would be at the intermediate, ‘half-on’ position. Intimation is particularly useful in contexts where discretion, suggestiveness, or plausible deniability are needed. It is strongly connected to self-presentation in social life (as studied by Erving Goffman).

Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design

2019 ◽  
pp. 93-113
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Model ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Executive Veto

A “separation of powers” system provides for an executive and legislature with independent powers. While only the legislature can pass bills, executive approval is commonly required for them to become law. The executive exercises veto power by withholding approval. Executive veto power is simple if the executive can only approve a bill or reject it in its entirety; it is constructive if he can amend a bill in certain ways. It is qualified if the legislature can override a veto; it is unqualified otherwise. Any such system creates a gamelike strategic interaction between the legislature and executive. The chapter provides an expository sketch of a variety of such veto games. The analysis is based on a one-dimensional spatial model given three different behavioral assumptions: sincere behavior by both the legislature and executive, strategic behavior by both, and strategic behavior coupled with the possibility of a credible veto threat by the executive. Several extensions and qualifications are briefly noted.

scholarly journals Reformulating Jan Tinbergen’s normative vision on welfare and security

2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332096977
Author(s):  
S Mansoob Murshed
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Individual Behaviour ◽  
World Government ◽  
Identity Based ◽  
Intellectual Legacy

This article builds on the intellectual legacy of Jan Tinbergen by extending his analysis on welfare and security into a framework involving strategic interaction. I first incorporate welfare and security in terms of interstate tensions into a single utility or payoff function. An uncertain world is characterized by states that are more peaceful, and others where nations are more hostile to each other. Both conflictual and peaceful outcomes lie along a spectrum of hostility short of war. The strategies adopted by the two countries, which promote peace, can be complements or substitutes. This means that they can go up or down in response to increases in the strategies of its rival. I demonstrate that non-cooperative behaviour between nations is Pareto inferior to cooperative behaviour, because the latter is associated with more actions and efforts to promote peace. Cooperative behaviour is akin to Tinbergen’s notion of world government. Non-cooperative behaviour by states also leads to moral hazard, and there can be free-riding in joint peaceful behaviour by some nations, particularly when the strategies of the countries are substitutes. The model is extended to aggressive international behaviour, including that mandated by populist plebiscites or election victories, as well as an outline of individual behaviour driven by identity-based politics.

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