East Asian Regional Security

Asian Survey ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 754-776 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jörg Friedrichs

Abstract The “ASEAN family” of regional security institutions has a mixed record: it has proved very helpful in improving interstate trust, fairly helpful in managing peaceful change, somewhat helpful in enhancing regime stability, but virtually useless in resolving interstate conflict. Overall, East Asia remains dominated by conventional forms of international relations.

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-175
Author(s):  
Richard Javad Heydarian

The paper examines the evolution of the Asian regional security architecture in the past three decades, evaluating relations between China and its neighbors, and considering various approaches in International Relations theory. First, the paper examines the assumptions of liberal institutionalism in the context of “econophoria,” assessing its merits in East Asia. Second, the paper addresses China and its relations with the East Asian neighborhood in the latter decades of the 20th century. Third, the paper examines growing territorial tensions between China and its neighbors in the past decade -- and how this undermines regional security and regional integration. Lastly, the paper evaluates the contributions of alternative IR theories such as realism and constructivism in providing a better understanding of China’s new assertiveness.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 598-611 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph MacKay

Abstract International relations (IR) has seen a proliferation of recent research on both international hierarchies as such and on historical IR in (often hierarchical) East Asia. This article takes stock of insights from East Asian hierarchies for the study of international hierarchy as such. I argue for and defend an explanatory approach emphasizing repertoires or toolkits of hierarchical super- and subordination. Historical hierarchies surrounding China took multiple dynastic forms. I emphasize two dimensions of variation. First, hierarchy-building occurs in dialogue between cores and peripheries. Variation in these relationships proliferated multiple arrangements for hierarchical influence and rule. Second, Sinocentric hierarchies varied widely over time, in ways that suggest learning. Successive Chinese dynasties both emulated the successes and avoided the pitfalls of the past, adapting their ideologies and strategies for rule to varying circumstances by recombining past political repertoires to build new ones. Taken together, these phenomena suggest new lines of inquiry for research on hierarchies in IR.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 740-764 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Phillips

International Relations scholars have turned to China’s tributary system to broaden our understanding of international systems beyond the ‘states-under-anarchy’ model derived from European history. This scholarship forms the inspiration and foil for this article, which refines International Relations scholars’ conceptualizations of how international hierarchy arose and endured in East Asia during the Manchu Qing Dynasty — China’s last and most territorially expansive imperial dynasty. I argue that existing conceptions of East Asian hierarchy overstate the importance of mutual identification between the region’s Confucian monarchies in sustaining Chinese hegemony. Instead, we can understand Qing China’s dominance only once we recognize the Manchus as a ‘barbarian’ dynasty, which faced unique challenges legitimating its rule domestically and internationally. As ‘barbarian’ conquerors, Manchus did not secure their rule by simply conforming to pre-existing Sinic cultural norms. Instead, like other contemporary Eurasian empires, they maintained dominance through strategies of heterogeneous contracting. Domestically, they developed customized legitimacy scripts tailored to win the allegiance of the empire’s diverse communities. Internationally, meanwhile, the Manchus strategically appropriated existing Confucian norms and practices of tributary diplomacy in ways that mitigated — but did not eliminate — Confucian vassals’ resentment of ‘barbarian’ domination. East Asian hierarchy may have been more peaceful than Westphalian anarchy, but the absence of war masks a more coercive reality where the appearance of Confucian conformity obscured more fractious relations between Qing China and even its ostensibly most loyal vassals.


2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
David C. Kang

Long understudied by mainstream international relations (IR) scholars, the East Asian historical experience provides an enormous wealth of patterns and findings, which promise to enrich our IR theoretical literature largely derived from and knowledgeable about the Western experience. The intellectual contributions of this emerging scholarship have the potential to influence some of the most central questions in international relations: the nature of the state, the formation of state preferences, and the interplay between material and ideational factors. Researching historical East Asia provides an opportunity to seek out genuine comparisons of international systems and their foundational components. This introduction surveys the field and sets out to frame debate and the intellectual terms of inquiry to assess progress and guide future research. Theoretically, the essays in this issue provide insights on the emerging literature on hierarchy in international relations, and move beyond simplistic assertions that power “matters” to explore the interplay of material and ideational causal factors. Methodologically, scholars are no longer treating all East Asian history as simply one case, while also becoming more careful to avoid selection bias by avoiding choosing selective evidence from the rich historical record. Collectively, the empirical cases discussed in this volume span centuries of history, include a wide variety of political actors across East Asia, and represent an exciting wave of new scholarship.


Significance With Trump within striking distance of catching Clinton in popular polls, though not yet the Electoral College, South-east Asian leaders and diplomats have privately expressed concern about the next US administration and the outlook for South-east Asia-US relations. Impacts A Trump presidency could destabilise South-east Asian economies and regional security. Maritime frictions could soon flare if China 'tests' the incoming US president. If the TPP is delayed or fails, Vietnamese labour rights and state-owned enterprise reform will likely founder.


2021 ◽  
pp. 030582982110506
Author(s):  
Ji-Young Lee

The field of international relations has long treated the Westphalian system and states in the territorial sovereign sense as the standard or ‘normal’ in IR. The World Imagined by Hendrik Spruyt boldly challenges this habit as the biases of our times and instead brings non-European historical international systems into their rightful place in our study of international order and international relations theorising more generally. Unpacking Spruyt’s discussion of ‘the East Asian interstate society’, the article argues that an in-depth examination of what is known as a ‘tribute system’ and early modern East Asian historical orders richly illuminates the book’s arguments on the heterogeneity and diversity of order-building practices. It also argues that from a practice-oriented approach, the experience of early modern East Asia presents a compelling case that legitimation holds the key to explaining order building processes at both the domestic and international levels, with legitimation at these two levels working in tandem.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weizhan Meng ◽  
Weixing Hu

AbstractThe rise of China and how other countries respond to China’s rising is widely studied. But little has been done on how other countries reacted to the rise of China throughout history and how China strategically interacted with them. The conventional wisdom holds East Asian international relations did not operate in the Westphalian way and China’s rising in history did not trigger regional balancing actions. In this article, we challenge that view. We argue East Asian international relations were not exceptional to basic rules of the Westphalian system. Each time China rose up, it triggered balancing actions from neighboring regimes, including nomadic empires and settled kingdoms. The neighboring regimes would accommodate China only after they were defeated by China or pro-China regimes propped up in these countries. The Chinese hegemony in East Asian history could not be taken for granted. Over last 2,000 plus years, only during three periods of time (the Qin-Han 秦汉, Sui-Tang 隋唐, and Ming-Qing 明清 dynasties) China could successfully overpower regional resistance and enjoyed a stable tributary relationship with neighboring states. In the rest of time, the Chinese state could not retain hegemony in East Asia.


Author(s):  
Chaesung Chun

Lacking strong multilateral institutions, the East Asian regional order essentially seems to function along the lines suggested by realist perspectives on international relations. However, growing economic interdependence has transformed the conflictual landscape in ways that facilitate international cooperation. This may help to explain why in East Asia no major war has taken place since 1979. In the future, US–China rivalry will likely affect all aspects of East Asian regional order, but this competition will take place within the framework of a heavily institutionalized regional order offering some anchors to hold the power shift within the bounds of certain norms and principles. This might leave room for maneuver for middle and small powers in the region. Both the USA and China have also tried to find a common basis on which they can pursue mutual interests and sustain cooperation, thus steering clear of the fearsome “Thucydides trap.”


Author(s):  
Paul Midford

This chapter analyzes Japan’s experience with, and motivations for participating in, security multilateralism. It considers the historical legacies of a lack of multilateral interaction when international relations in East Asia were governed by the Sinocentric tributary system, the security multilateralism of the Washington system of the 1920s, Japan’s failed multilateral Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere during the Pacific War, as well as Tokyo’s security isolationism during the Cold War, before turning to Japan’s pivot from 1991 toward embracing regional security multilateralism. It argues that Japan’s promotion of security multilateralism since 1991 is part of a broader shift away from security isolationism and toward global and regional security engagement on bilateral and multilateral levels. Japan’s 1992 decision to begin participating in UN peacekeeping and its promotion of the ASEAN Regional Forum’s creation through the 1991 Nakayama proposal are examples of Japan’s post–Cold War security multilateralism. The chapter argues that Japan’s embrace of security multilateralism after the Cold War, like its embrace of security isolationism during the Cold War, has been driven by its reassurance strategy of convincing other East Asian nations that Japan can be trusted as a military power that will not repeat its pre-1945 expansionism. Moderating its alliance security dilemma vis-à-vis the US is another motivation for Japan’s promotion of security multilateralism. Since 2000 Japan has promoted the creation of other regional security multilateral forums, including the counter-piracy ReCAAP organization, the East Asian Summit, the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus Dialogue Partners, and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum.


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