THE GENEVA ACCORD

2004 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-101

One reflection of the rising discontent among Israelis and Palestinians concerning the prospect of continuing violence is the intense debate surrounding a private Israeli-Palestinian ““civil society”” peace initiative announced in Jordan on 10 October. The so-called Geneva Accord, described by its signatories as a ““model draft framework final status agreement,”” has no official standing: it was negotiated in secret by Israeli opposition figures and prominent Palestinians, some of them PA officials but acting in their private capacities. More important, the framework agreement was vigorously denounced by Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon as soon as it was made public, its Israeli drafters branded in some quarters as ““traitors.”” Despite this official rejection, it has met with considerable international backing: its formal unveiling in Geneva on 1 December was attended by Nobel Peace Prize laureates including former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, and it has been praised by, among others, British prime minister Tony Blair, French president Jacques Chirac, former U.S. president Bill Clinton, former South African president Nelson Mandela, and former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. It was warmly endorsed by the European Parliament. The United States remained cool toward the plan itself, though Secretary of State Colin Powell received the accord's main drafters while they were in Washington promoting the initiative. The interest generated by the Geneva Accord also drew attention to an earlier effort, the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Agreement (see Doc. A1). The project was initiated by former Israeli justice minister Yossi Beilin and PA cabinet minister Yasir ““Abid Rabbuh soon after Israel called off the Taba talks of January 2001; both had been senior negotiators at Taba as well as at earlier Palestinian-Israeli talks. (Beilin had been one of the prime movers behind the Oslo Accord.) In the course of more than two years of meetings, which were underwritten by the Swiss Foreign Ministry, the two negotiating teams called on over 100 Israeli and Palestinian experts in hammering out joint positions on the various issues. In addition to Beilin, the Israeli team comprises Professor Arie Arnon, Brig. Gen. (Res.) Shlomo Brom, MK Avraham Burg, Giora Inbar, Brig. Gen. (Res.) David Kimche, Dr. Menachem Klein, MK Amram Mitzna, MK Haim Oron, and Amos Oz. The Palestinian team, in addition to ““Abid Rabbuh, includes Khadura Faris, Muhammad ““Abd al-Fattah al-Hourani, Basil Jabir, Radi Jamil Jarai, Nazmi Ju'beh, Samih H.A. Karakra, Saman Khouri, Ibrahim Muhammad Khrishi, Zuhayr al-Manasra, Nabil Qassis, Hisham Ali Hassan ““Abd al-Raziq, and Jamal Awad Zaqut. The drafters themselves recognize the blueprint as a ““nonstarter”” as long as the present Israeli government remains in power. Their main goal, beyond formulating a document that can serve as a guide for future negotiations, was to revitalize the Israeli and Palestinian peace camps by demonstrating that there is ““a partner”” on the other side and that a comprehensive agreement ““taking into account the vital interests of both parties”” could be reached even after three years of intifada. An ambitious two-year public information campaign, aimed inter alia at getting a copy of the plan into every Israeli and Palestinian household, has been launched to promote it. By mid-November, this effort was well underway. The draft accord reflects significant ““advances”” by both sides relative to the Taba understandings (see Special Documents in JPS123). It represents the first time that agreement on final status issues has been reached and committed to paper; in this sense, the drafters have argued that the accord, to which Yasir Arafat reportedly gave his blessing, complements the U.S. road map by supplying detailed solutions missing from what is essentially a timetable emphasizing preliminary steps. The document has aroused heated debate in both the Israeli and Palestinian camps. A November 2003 poll in Israel and the occupied territories jointly commissioned by the James Baker Institute at Rice University and the Brussels-based International Crisis Group found 53 percent of Israelis and 56 percent of Palestinians supporting the accord; the survey questions, however, neglected to mention the agreement's more controversial aspects, including renunciation of the refugee right to return, Israeli retention of the largest settlement blocs (but ceding Ariel), and Palestinian control of the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif). A poll carried out in October by the Nablus-based Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (where survey questions gave a more complete picture of the accord) found only 31 percent of Palestinians in favor and 51 percent opposed (33 percent strongly). Palestinian opposition among refugees, both in the territories and in surrounding countries, as well as by Palestinian human rights groups has been particularly strong. The accord also includes the ““end of claims”” clause that has bedeviled earlier efforts: Article I (““The Purpose of the Agreement””) specifies that implementation of the agreement ““will settle all the claims of the parties arising from events occurring prior to its signature”” and with the agreement ““no further claims ……mayberaised by either party.”” The ““authoritative English version”” of the accord was made available to Ha'Aretz in mid-October. It comprises seventeen articles dealing with relations between the parties, the formation of joint and verification committees, territory, security, Jerusalem, refugees, road use, religious sites, Palestinian prisoners, and dispute settlement mechanism. Three articles, notably on water, economic relations, and legal cooperation, have yet to be completed, and the annexes referred to in the text have not been made available. JPS is reproducing four articles in their entirety, those dealing with territory, security, Jerusalem, and refugees. The numbering of the paragraphs is as in the original, including inconsistent section numbers and crossreferences.

2005 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-207

Ha'Aretz's lengthy interview with Dov Weisglass, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's ““point man”” with Washington and probably his closest advisor, was conducted by Ari Shavit and published first in excerpts and two days later in its entirety. In addition to bringing into sharp contrast the contradiction between Israel's declaratory policies and assurances and its actual policies and intentions——and in so doing eliciting a swift ““clarification”” from the Prime Minister's Office——the interview also conveys a sense of the intimacy and easy camaraderie that characterizes U.S.-Israeli interactions. The full text is available at www.haaretz.com. Tell me about the dynamics of the relationship between you [and U.S. national security advisor Condoleezza Rice], and whether it's an unusual relationship.


1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 424-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes L. Schloemann ◽  
Stefan Ohlhoff

The 1994 Uruguay Round revision of the dispute settlement mechanism under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) has made it a forum both for traditional trade issues and for interests ranging from environmental protection to national security. The limits of GATT jurisdiction have become important issues of dispute settlement within the WTO, especially as the emergence of the WTO and its rule-based, quasi-obligatory dispute settlement system has spurred a significant shift toward legalism. Constitutional structures are developing much faster in international trade law than in any other area of international law and, in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round, are integrating ever more aspects of economic relations among states. Within the WTO regime the dispute settlement mechanism established by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) plays a prominent role in enforcing its rules and reconciling a wide array of the members’ interests. The limits of the reach of the dispute settlement mechanism, given its obligatory character, are, to a certain degree, the limits of the constitutionalization of the organization as a whole.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristen Hopewell

Abstract Under President Trump, the United States abdicated its traditional leadership role in the trading system, abandoning multilateralism for aggressive unilateralism and launching an active assault on the World Trade Organization (WTO). Most strikingly, the US blocked appointments to the Appellate Body, jeopardizing the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism. With the trade regime in crisis, a key question has been whether other states would have the will and capacity to lead system-preserving initiatives. While most attention has focused on whether China—widely seen as the chief hegemonic challenger to the US—would assume the mantle of leadership, there has been considerable scepticism about the European Union's capacity to exercise leadership amid the crisis. The EU has generally been seen as punching below its weight in terms of leadership at the WTO. In this article, however, I argue that it is the EU, rather than China, that has taken the lead in advancing concrete initiatives directed at defending and maintaining the multilateral trading system. The EU led the creation of an interim appeals arrangement to replace the defunct Appellate Body—in effect, creating an ‘Appellate Body minus the US’. Although the rules-based multilateral trading system remains under threat, it is the EU, not China, that is acting as a system-preserving power, leading efforts to defend the established order.


Author(s):  
M. Iqbal Simatupang ◽  

The research explained comparatively the application of the first to file doctrine and the trademark dispute settlement mechanism in Indonesia and in the United States. The purpose of this research was to provide a broad explanation of the application of the first to file doctrine and provide an overview of the mechanism for settling the problem of infringement of trademark rights. This study used a normative juridical research method with a statutory approach (Statute Approach) accompanied by a Comparative Approach, the data used was secondary data. Based on the research results, it was known that the Trademark Law still recognizes and / or implements the first to file and first to use doctrine. In Indonesian law, which basically adheres to the first to file doctrine, it still provides room for the first user to claim ownership of a trademark. Meanwhile, The Lanham Act accommodates the doctrine of first to use and first to file simultaneously but is limited by the trademark rights protection space. The mechanisms for settling trademark rights infringement disputes in Indonesia and in the United States have similarities and differences. The similarity is in both country, trademark dispute settllement is done through the litigation and non-litigation mechanism. The difference is that in Indonesia the most common mechanism is litigation, while in the United States the non-litigation mechanism is preferred in settling disputes over trademark rights.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-277
Author(s):  
Mariana Clara de Andrade

Abstract Several factors triggered the legitimacy crisis which paralysed the WTO Appellate Body in December 2019. This article focuses on one of them: the criticism expressed by the United States that the ‘Appellate Body claims its reports are entitled to be treated as precedent’. This work describes the origins of the problem and examines the issue of the precedential value of adopted reports within the WTO dispute settlement. It argues that the problem cannot be addressed through textual attempts to better define the value of precedent, as some have suggested, but can be alleviated through the practice of adjudicators. Moreover, it argues that the criticisms regarding the precedential value of past reports is due to the inherent hierarchy ensuing from the existence of an appeals organ. Therefore, the demise of the Appellate Body may weaken the precedential value of past adopted reports.


2004 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 164-166

Since its inception in December 2000, the Herzliya Conference has become an important annual event bringing together the country's top leaders in government, the military, business, the media, and academia as well as Jewish invitees from abroad, particularly the United States, to reflect on Israel's long-term security. In his address to the conference, the prime minister, while expressing support for the U.S. road map, announced Israeli's intention to initiate a ““unilateral security step of disengagement from the Palestinians”” if they fail to fulfill their security obligations. He also stated his intention to implement an earlier commitment to dismantle ““unauthorized [settlement] outposts.”” The closed-door conference is sponsored by eight institutions, including the Prime Minster's Office, the Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministries, the American Jewish Committee, the Jewish Agency, and the World Zionist Organization. The White House spokesman sharply criticized the ““unilateral steps”” called for in Sharon's speech, but within hours a ““senior White House official”” welcomed the speech, and the following day the spokesman recanted. The full text is available online at www.israelpr.com.


Author(s):  
Nnamdi Stanislaus Umenze

In its over 25 years' history, the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has been touted as one of the most active and successful international adjudicatory systems in relation to other international dispute settlement fora. The process in the engagement of the system presents a tripartite structure consisting of consultation, panel and appellate stages, and the enforcement proceedings. The functions of these processes help to promote the trust and confidence of the member states in the WTO trade dispute settlement system. Now the Appellate Body (AB) is paralysed following the incapacitation and consequential suspension of the appellate function of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), because of the insufficient membership caused by the United States blockade on the appointment process of AB members. The paper discusses the trajectory of the WTO dispute settlement reform from the GATT regime, the root cause of the suspension of the Appellate Body, and the options available for the disputants in and outside the WTO system. It concludes that the system possesses policy defects if the attitude of a single state can render the AB non-functional and should be transformed when the appellate system is resuscitated.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
GONZALO VILLALTA PUIG ◽  
ERIC D DALKE

AbstractSafety standards can function as non-tariff barriers to trade. Canada is a large exporter of goods and so it has an interest in the regulation of safety standards, both at the multilateral level through its membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and, most especially, at the bilateral and regional level through its Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). Canada has signed PTAs with provisions that go beyond the obligations of WTO Members under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. This article analyses the nature and enforceability of WTO-plus provisions on sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) as well as product standards (TBT) in Canada's PTAs, from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, Mexico, and the United States to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union. First, it finds that the inclusion of WTO-plus SPS and TBT provisions in Canada's PTAs is a relatively recent practice that is still in development. Only about half of Canada's PTAs contain WTO-plus SPS and TBT provisions and, those treaties that do, commonly concern institutions for regulatory cooperation and information exchange arrangements, without much commitment to harmonization. Secondly, it finds that nearly half of the SPS and TBT provisions in Canada's PTAs are unenforceable. They either are in a language that is too imprecise for enforcement or do not allow access to a dispute settlement mechanism. Thirdly, it finds that, by global standards, most of Canada's PTAs are modest in their approach to SPS and TBT issues, with NAFTA and CETA as key exceptions. The article concludes that the extent to which regulatory convergence occurs on safety standards for Canada is dependent more on political cooperation between the parties than on the nature and enforceability of SPS and TBT provisions in its PTAs.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 78-87
Author(s):  
Fukunari Kimura

The current trade turmoil is not limited to negative economic effects stemming from the series of recent trade measures erected by the United States as part of the escalating U.S.–China trade war. The more serious issue that will unfold in the middle to long term is the potential collapse of the rule-based trading regime. The weakening of the multilateral trading system centered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) seems to continue. East Asia has been one of the largest beneficiaries of the rule-based trading regime in its course of extending and deepening international production networks and must now take proactive moves to defend and preserve this stable economic environment. Two crucial tasks in the preservation of the WTO are efforts to maintain the functionality of the dispute settlement mechanism and the revival of the WTO as a forum for future trade negotiations. At the same time, East Asia must develop a network of mega–free trade agreements (FTAs) to partially supplement a possible loss of the multilateral framework.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradly J. Condon

The renegotiation of NAFTA was surrounded by a dramatic atmosphere, just as Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland predicted. The negotiations took place against a backdrop of unilateral trade measures, President Trump’s mercantilist approach to trade policy, and the United States’ specified preference for bilateral trade deals. This article argues that, for the most part, economic, political and cultural relations in the NAFTA countries are bilateral in nature, but with important trilateral production chains in specific sectors, most notably in the automotive sector. Beyond these trilateral sectors, the relationship between Canada and Mexico plays a relatively minor role. However, replacing NAFTA with bilateral agreements would have placed Canada and Mexico at a disadvantage, relative to the United States, in terms of attracting foreign direct investment. Nevertheless, Canadian and Mexican interests do not always coincide, nor do their negotiating positions. For example, Mexico was willing to give up Chapter 19 dispute settlement for trade remedies, whereas Canada insisted on keeping it in place. In end, USMCA Chapter 10 preserves this dispute settlement mechanism for all three parties. Canada was willing to give up NAFTA Chapter 11 on foreign investment disputes, whereas Mexico accepted a modified version. The result is a trilateral agreement with significant bilateral elements, as well as global elements that will serve as a possible model in future megaregional and multilateral negotiations.


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