Defending the Rule-based Trading Regime: The Multilateral Trading System at Risk and Required Responses

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 78-87
Author(s):  
Fukunari Kimura

The current trade turmoil is not limited to negative economic effects stemming from the series of recent trade measures erected by the United States as part of the escalating U.S.–China trade war. The more serious issue that will unfold in the middle to long term is the potential collapse of the rule-based trading regime. The weakening of the multilateral trading system centered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) seems to continue. East Asia has been one of the largest beneficiaries of the rule-based trading regime in its course of extending and deepening international production networks and must now take proactive moves to defend and preserve this stable economic environment. Two crucial tasks in the preservation of the WTO are efforts to maintain the functionality of the dispute settlement mechanism and the revival of the WTO as a forum for future trade negotiations. At the same time, East Asia must develop a network of mega–free trade agreements (FTAs) to partially supplement a possible loss of the multilateral framework.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristen Hopewell

Abstract Under President Trump, the United States abdicated its traditional leadership role in the trading system, abandoning multilateralism for aggressive unilateralism and launching an active assault on the World Trade Organization (WTO). Most strikingly, the US blocked appointments to the Appellate Body, jeopardizing the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism. With the trade regime in crisis, a key question has been whether other states would have the will and capacity to lead system-preserving initiatives. While most attention has focused on whether China—widely seen as the chief hegemonic challenger to the US—would assume the mantle of leadership, there has been considerable scepticism about the European Union's capacity to exercise leadership amid the crisis. The EU has generally been seen as punching below its weight in terms of leadership at the WTO. In this article, however, I argue that it is the EU, rather than China, that has taken the lead in advancing concrete initiatives directed at defending and maintaining the multilateral trading system. The EU led the creation of an interim appeals arrangement to replace the defunct Appellate Body—in effect, creating an ‘Appellate Body minus the US’. Although the rules-based multilateral trading system remains under threat, it is the EU, not China, that is acting as a system-preserving power, leading efforts to defend the established order.


Author(s):  
Asif Khan ◽  
Ximei Wu

The World Trade Organization's (WTO’s) dispute settlement mechanism, known as the "pearl in the crown," is stalled due to United States (U.S.) obstruction, which prevents appellate body members from being ordained. This situation continues, and the WTO’s dispute settlement function is paralyzed since 2019. The WTO has faced a crisis in recent years, and the trade legislation has stagnated. The dispute settlement body was also blocked due to U.S. interference, which led to the failure of the appellate body’s members to be selected. The data has been gathered for this descriptive study using secondary research method, including different newspaper articles and the internet, which were outlined and noted. This paper presents and evaluates several existing proposals on how to get out of the impasse. This paper points out whether the existing WTO members can choose to join or not participate in establishing a new appellate body. On this basis, it makes its own relatively unique proposal, namely, to establish a substantial dispute settlement mechanism outside the WTO, parallel to the existing dispute settlement mechanism, and it demonstrates the legal feasibility of the proposal. Immediately, the states should begin negotiations on the significant agreements required for this new appellate body. It will effectively solve the deadlock in the dispute settlement mechanism caused by the United States, blocking the appointment of members of the appellate body.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 304-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Elsig

This article asks why the dispute settlement provisions of the multilateral trading system underwent significant reforms during the negotiations that led to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Why did the leading trading powers accept a highly legalized system that departed from established political–diplomatic forms of settling disputes? The contribution of this article is threefold. First, it complements existing accounts that exclusively focus on the United States with a novel explanation that takes account of contextual factors. Second, it offers an in-depth empirical case study based on interviews with negotiators who were involved and novel archival evidence on the creation of the new WTO dispute settlement system. Third, by unpacking the long-standing puzzle of why states designed a highly legalized system, it addresses selected blind spots of the legalization and the rational design literatures with the aim of providing a better understanding about potential paths leading toward significant changes in legalization.


2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
BARIS KARAPINAR

AbstractExport restrictions imposed on various food products and natural resources have been subject to extensive public attention. Most recently, China's restrictions of its exports of certain minerals and rare earth metals have led to heated debates. The United States (US), European Union (EU), and Mexico have already filed a WTO dispute case against China on this matter. This paper describes the policy objectives and the global welfare implications of export restrictions. It summarizes the relevant WTO regulation, and offers a detailed analysis of the China–Raw Materials case which is before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). It argues that although export restrictions is arguably an area of ‘under-regulation’ or ‘regulatory deficiency’ in the WTO law, it is strongly biased against the late accession Members, including China. Yet, the way that China institutes its export restrictions raises serious questions about its role in the multilateral trading system, which it relies on for its economic prosperity. Hence, this is an area where China is likely to feel the implications of its so-called ‘WTO-plus’ commitments on its domestic and trade policies.


2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 300
Author(s):  
Mrs. Koesrianti

A rule-based system of World Trade Organization (WTO) should be supported by effective mechanism of disputes that ensure the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) rulings toward the respondent could be enforced. The WTO DSM aims to provide predictability and security in international trade by providing strict time-frames, and was designed to be mutually agreed by the disputing members, flexible and binding. For the developing countries in the WTO, they need major effort in terms of training and institutional reform to meet the challenges of participation in the WTODSM. Indonesia has involved in the WTODSM. Sistem perdagangan WTO harus didukung oleh mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa yang efektif. Kepatuhan pada putusan Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) sangat penting agar manfaat perdagangan dapat dirasakan oleh seluruh anggota WTO, termasuk negara-negara berkembang. Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) WTO memberikan keamanan dan prediktabilitas atas proses sengketa di WTO yang dibutuhkanoleh seluruh anggota WTO sehingga memberikan kesempatan luas bagi negara-negara anggota WTO untuk berpartisipasi dalam mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa di WTO, termasuk Indonesia.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Pitschas

Abstract The European Union (EU) and the United States are currently negotiating a free-trade agreement, the so-called Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). These negotiations have to be seen in perspective, since a number of other - bilateral and plurilateral - trade deals are being pursued at the same time. All these negotiations point to a worrisome aspect: the World Trade Organisation’s failure to come to a meaningful agreement in the Doha-round negotiations, in terms of market access, new rules and development. Like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), TTIP would stand out among the crowd of trade agreements because of the sheer volume of trade and investment flows across the Atlantic and the declared intention to boost regulatory cooperation and compatibility which is expected to bring the bulk of TTIP’s economic benefits. However, the prospect of concluding such a transatlantic agreement raises many concerns; the public in the European Union and the United States fears that TTIP could undermine existing levels of protection in areas such as health and the environment and impinge on either side’s “right to regulate”. Moreover, questions are being posed as to what TTIP would mean for the multilateral trading system and how it would affect third countries, especially developing countries. Against this backdrop, this article addresses the following issues in relation to TTIP: the vision underlying the negotiations; the European Commission’s negotiating mandate; the structure of the negotiations and their state of play; the Union’s competence for concluding TTIP and whether it is shared with EU Member States; and finally TTIP’s impact on the multilateral trading system and developing countries.


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