scholarly journals REDUKTYVIZMO RAIŠKA ŠIUOLAIKINĖJE ANALITINĖJE FILOSOFIJOJE

Problemos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 85 ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Jonas Dagys ◽  
Vilius Dranseika ◽  
Vytautas Grenda ◽  
Ieva Vasilionytė
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Anomalous Monism ◽  
Ontological Reduction ◽  
General Account ◽  
Similarities And Differences

Šio straipsnio tikslas – bendrais bruožais aptarti reduktyvizmo raišką šiuolaikinėje analitinėje sąmonės, moralės, veiksmo ir priežastingumo filosofijoje bei įvertinti redukcijos strategijų šiose filosofijos šakose panašumus ir skirtumus. Straipsnyje aptariamos šešios reduktyvizmo strategijos – sąvokų sinonimija paremta redukcija, a posteriori tapatybės tezė, analitinis funkcionalizmas, anomalusis monizmas, analizė pasitelkiant pareities sąvoką, konceptualinė analizė be sąvokų sinonimijos – ir konstatuojama, kad skirtingose filosofijos srityse šios strategijos reiškiasi skirtingai, taip pat yra skirtingai kritikuojamos ir interpretuojamos. Straipsnyje mėginama paaiškinti kai kuriuos šių skirtumų ir daroma išvada, kad šiuolaikinėje analitinėje filosofijoje neperspektyvu kalbėti apie reduktyvizmą apskritai, kaip vieną visas sritis apimantį reiškinį, paremtą visas reduktyvistines koncepcijas vienijančiu reduktyvizmo modeliu, forma ar vizija.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: reduktyvizmas, analitinė filosofija, konceptualinė redukcija, ontologinė redukcija. Reductionism in Contemporary Analytical PhilosophyJonas Dagys, Vilius Dranseika, Vytautas Grenda, Ieva Vasilionytė AbstractThe aim of this paper is to provide a general account of the forms of reductionism in contemporary analytical philosophy of mind, morality, action and causation, and also to evaluate the similarities and differences of reductionist strategies in these fields. We discuss six reductionist strategies – reduction based on synonymy of terms, the thesis of a posteriori identity, analytical functionalism, anomalous monism, analysis invoking the concept of supervenience, and conceptual analysis without synonymy – and maintain that these strategies have different manifestations in different areas of philosophy, and so they are prone to different criticisms and interpretations. In this paper we attempt to provide an explanation for some of those differences, and also conclude that speaking of reductionism in general in contemporary analytical philosophy, as a phenomenon encompassing all fields, based on a single unifying model or vision of reduction, is not viable.Keywords: reductionism, analytical philosophy, conceptual reduction, ontological reduction.

scholarly journals Laying ghosts to rest

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donnchadh O’Conaill
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Rule Out

AbstractOne of the most widely-discussed arguments against physcialism appeals to the conceivability of zombies, being which are physically or functionally identical to humans but which have no conscious experiences. Philip Goff (Philos Phenomenol Res 81(1): 119–139, 2010; Consci Cognit 21(2): 742–746, 2012a; in Sprevak M, Kallestrup J (eds) New waves in philosophy of mind. Palgrave, 2014) has recently presented a number of different anti-physicalist arguments appealing to the conceivability of ghosts, entities whose nature is exhausted by their being conscious. If ghosts are conceivable, this would rule out a priori physicalism. If the conceivability of ghosts entails that they are metaphysically possible, then this forms the basis for arguments against a posteriori physicalism. Drawing on work on conceivability by Peter Kung (Philos Phenomenol Res 81(3):620–663, 2010, Noûs 50(1): 90–120, 2016) and my own discussion of arguments which appeal to the conceivability of zombies (O’Conaill in Mihretu P Guta (ed) Consciousness and the ontology of properties. Routledge, New York, 2019), I shall argue that ghosts are conceivable, but that what allows us to conceive of them (our ability to make certain stipulations about the scenarios we conceive) undermines the belief that conceivability is a reliable guide to possibility. While this does not undermine Goff’s argument against a priori phyiscalism, it suggests that a posteriori physicalists need not be haunted by ghosts.

Psychology: Autonomous or Anomalous?

Dialogue ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Kernohan
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Mental Activity ◽  
Essential Difference ◽  
Anomalous Monism

In a recent series of papers, Donald Davidson has put forward a challenging and original philosophy of mind which he has called anomalous monism. Anomalous monism has certain similarities to another recent and deservedly popular position: functionalist cognitive psychology. Both functionalism, in its materialist versions, and anomalous monism require token-token psychophysical identities rather than type-type ones. (Token identities are identities between individual events; type identities represent a stronger claim of identities between interesting sorts of events.) Both deny that psychology can be translated into, or scientifically reduced to, neurophysiology. Both are mentalistic theories, allowing psychology to make use of intentional descriptions in its theorizing. Anomalous monism uses a belief/desire/action psychology; cognitive science makes use of information-bearing states. But these similarities must not be allowed to conceal an essential difference between the two positions. Cognitive psychology claims to be a science, making interesting, lawlike generalizations for the purpose of explaining mental activity. Anomalous monism denies that psychology is a science by denying that psychological laws can be formulated. Davidson has other ideas for psychology connected with his work on meaning and truth. Hence, the title of one of his essays on anomalous monism is “Psychology as Philosophy”.

scholarly journals On the Return to Metaphysics in Analytical Philosophy of Mind

2018 ◽  
pp. 130-142
Author(s):  
G. A. Zolotkov
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind

The article examines the change of theoretical framework in analytic philosophy of mind. It is well known fact that nowadays philosophical problems of mind are frequently seen as incredibly difficult. It is noteworthy that the first programs of analytical philosophy of mind (that is, logical positivism and philosophy of ordinary language) were skeptical about difficulty of that realm of problems. One of the most notable features of both those programs was the strong antimetaphysical stance, those programs considered philosophy of mind unproblematic in its nature. However, the consequent evolution of philosophy of mind shows evaporating of that stance and gradual recovery of the more sympathetic view toward the mind problematic. Thus, there were two main frameworks in analytical philosophy of mind: 1) the framework of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy dominated in the 1930s and the 1940s; 2) the framework that dominated since the 1950s and was featured by the critique of the first framework. Thus, the history of analytical philosophy of mind moves between two highly opposite understandings of the mind problematic. The article aims to found the causes of that move in the ideas of C. Hempel and G. Ryle, who were the most notable philosophers of mind in the 1930s and the 1940s.

Metaphysics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin McGinn
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
De Re ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
Possible Worlds Theory ◽  
De Dicto

This chapter explores philosophical issues in metaphysics. It begins by distinguishing between de re and de dicto necessity. All necessity is uniformly de re; there is simply no such thing as de dicto necessity. Indeed, in the glory days of positivism, all necessity was understood as uniformly the same: a necessary truth was always an a priori truth, while contingent truths were always a posteriori. The chapter then assesses the concept of antirealism. Antirealism is always an error theory: there is some sort of mistake or distortion or sloppiness embedded in the usual discourse. The chapter also considers paradoxes, causation, conceptual analysis, scientific mysteries, the possible worlds theory of modality, the concept of a person, the nature of existence, and logic and propositions.

Action

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Hornsby
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Detailed Account ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Study ◽  
General Account ◽  
The Status ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

Philosophical study of human action owes its importance to concerns of two sorts. There are concerns addressed in metaphysics and philosophy of mind about the status of reasoning beings who make their impact in the natural causal world, and concerns addressed in ethics and legal philosophy about human freedom and responsibility. ‘Action theory’ springs from concerns of both sorts; but in the first instance it attempts only to provide a detailed account that may help with answering the metaphysical questions. Action theorists usually start by asking ‘How are actions distinguished from other events?’. For there to be an action, a person has to do something. But the ordinary ‘do something’ does not capture just the actions, since we can say (for instance) that breathing is something that everyone does, although we don’t think that breathing in the ordinary way is an action. It seems that purposiveness has to be introduced – that someone’s intentionally doing something is required. People often do the things they intentionally do by moving bits of their bodies. This has led to the idea that ‘actions are bodily movements’. The force of the idea may be appreciated by thinking about what is involved in doing one thing by doing another. A man piloting a plane might have shut down the engines by depressing a lever, for example; and there is only one action here if the depressing of the lever was (identical with) the shutting down of the engines. It is when identities of this sort are accepted that an action may be seen as an event of a person’s moving their body: the pilot’s depressing of the lever was (also) his moving of his arm, because he depressed the lever by moving his arm. But how do bodies’ movings – such events now as his arm’s moving – relate to actions? According to one traditional empiricist account, these are caused by volitions when there are actions, and a volition and a body’s moving are alike parts of the action. But there are many rival accounts of the causes and parts of actions and of movements. And volitional notions feature not only in a general account of the events surrounding actions, but also in accounts that aim to accommodate the experience that is characteristic of agency.

scholarly journals The attitudes of psychiatrists to philosophy

1994 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 343-345
Author(s):  
K.W.M. Fulford ◽  
G. Adshead
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Royal College ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
High Level

Questionnaires exploring the attitudes of psychiatrists to philosophy were distributed at two meetings of the Royal College of Psychiatrists. Out of a possible 240, 126 questionnaires were returned (53%). The results showed a surprisingly high level of interest in and support for philosophy. Over 50% of respondents indicated that they considered conceptual analysis, ethics, jurisprudence, the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind to be practically important in psychiatry. Similarly, 89% believed that ethics, and 72% that other areas of philosophy, should be included in the MRCPsych syllabus. The significance of the study is reviewed briefly.

Rethinking the Synthetic a priori de re

1998 ◽  
pp. 15-22
Author(s):  
Paul Burger
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Commitment ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Radical Empiricism ◽  
De Re ◽  
Direct Awareness ◽  
Synthetic A Priori ◽  
Ontological Turn

Hume and Kant destroyed the belief in the apriori de re, i.e. the rationalist’s doctrine of direct awareness of necessary facts about the nature of being. Later on, analytical philosophy told us that there are only two general classes of statements, synthetics a posteriori and analytics a priori. Quine eventually rejected the a priori in general and advanced a radical empiricism. However, both moderate and radical empiricism has recently been challenged by realistic minded philosophers. They have argued that ontological topics such as the nature of properties, laws or causation remain strongly undetermined by semantic ascent and Quinean ontological commitment, and announced an ontological turn. Are not ontological or metaphysical explanations a priori explanations? Despite his preferred talk in terms of a posteriori realism and inference of the best explanation, Armstrong’s defence of universals looks very much like an apriori one. Others, such as Barry Smith, explicitly defend that there are synthetic propositions a priori de re. I believe in both: Kant was right in claiming that an understanding of what metaphysics can teach us is dependent upon a clear concept of the synthetic a priori, but—against Kant— synthetics a priori de re are legitimate. In this paper I will defend synthetics a priori de re. However, I will reject the rationalist’s appeal to direct awareness of necessary facts as well as undeniableness or infallibility as necessary conditions for a prioris. Instead I will claim that all synthetics a priori express hypothetical truths.

scholarly journals Monismo anómalo, irreductibilidad y ciencias cognitivas

1970 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alicia Rodríguez Serón
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Great Influence ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Central Position ◽  
Anomalous Monism ◽  
Wide Range

RESUMENEl pensamiento de Donald Davison ocupa un lugar central en la filosofía actual. Su obra ha ejercido una gran influencia y ha suscitado numerosas discusiones que han interesado campos tan diversos como la filosofía de la mente, la psicología, la semántica, la lógica o las ciencias sociales. El presente trabajo pretende poner de manifiesto cómo lo que más seduce de la postura de Davidson es también lo que constituye la raíz de sus dificultades: el intento de reconciliación de un fisicalismo monista y un antireduccionismo.PALABRAS CLAVEDAVIDSON-MONISMO ANÓMALO-IRREDUCTIBILIDAD-CIENCIAS COGNITIVASABSTRACTDonald Davidson´s thought occupies a central position within the current philosophy. His work exerted great influence and has provoked a number of discussions that have affected a wide range of fields such as philosophy of mind, psychology, semantics, logic or social sciences. This paper argues the fact that, what attracts most about Donald Davidson´s view, is also what constitutes the root of its difficulties: the attempt of reconciliatioon between a monist physicalism and an antireductionism.KEYWORDSDAVISON-ANOMALOUS MONISM-IRREDCTIBILITY-COGNITIVES SCIENCES

scholarly journals Levels of critique in models and concepts of human information behaviour research

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Reijo Savolainen
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Information Science ◽  
Library And Information Science ◽  
Research Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Information Behaviour ◽  
Depth Analysis ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
Research Domain

PurposeTo elaborate the nature of critique presented in the models and concepts of human information behaviour (HIB) research by identifying the issues to which the critique is directed and the ways in which the critique is conducted.Design/methodology/approachConceptual analysis focusing on 58 key studies on the topic. First, the objects and ways of conducting the critique were identified. Thereafter, three levels of depth at which the critique is conducted were specified. The conceptual analysis is based on the comparison of the similarities and differences between the articulations of critique presented at these levels.FindingsAt the lowest level of depth, critique of HIB research is directed to the lack of research by identifying gaps and complaining the neglect or paucity of studies in a significant domain. At the level of critiquing the shortcomings of existing studies, the attention is focused on the identification and analysis of the inadequacies of concepts and models. Finally, constructive critiques of research approaches dig deeper in that they not only identify weaknesses of existing studies but also propose alternative in which the shortcomings can be avoided, and the conceptualizations of HIB enhanced.Research limitations/implicationsAs the study focuses on critiques addressed to HIB models and concepts, the findings cannot be generalized to concern the field of Library and Information Science (LIS) as a whole. Moreover, due to the emphasis of the qualitative research approach, the findings offer only an indicative picture of the frequency of the objects critiqued in HIB research.Originality/valueThe study pioneers by providing an in-depth analysis of the nature of critiques presented in a LIS research domain.

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