scholarly journals ECOLOGICAL-ECONOMIC BALANCE IN FINING ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION SUBJECTS BY A DYADIC 3-PERSON GAME MODEL

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 1451-1474
Author(s):  
V V ROMANUKE
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Ecological Economic ◽  
Economic Balance ◽  
Person Game

scholarly journals Antagonistic One-To-N Stochastic Duel Game

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
pp. 1114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Song-Kyoo (Amang) Kim
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Marketing Strategies ◽  
Time Dependent ◽  
Random Time ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Explicit Formulas ◽  
Entry Timing ◽  
The One ◽  
Person Game

This paper is dealing with a multiple person game model under the antagonistic duel type setup. The unique multiple person duel game with the one-shooting-to-kill-all condition is analytically solved and the explicit formulas are obtained to determine the time dependent duel game model by using the first exceed theory. The model could be directly applied into real-world situations and an analogue of the theory in the paper is designed for solving the best shooting time for hitting all other players at once which optimizes the payoff function under random time conditions. It also mathematically explains to build the marketing strategies for the entry timing for both blue and red ocean markets.

A Game Model of Social Subjects Relationship in Rural Environment of China

2010 ◽  
Vol 113-116 ◽  
pp. 1447-1451
Author(s):  
Ji Chang Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Rural Environment ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Environmental Relations

The environmental social subjects relationship are benefit relations among the environmental social social subjects, the occurrence of the environmental right infringement are main manifestation of the unbalanced environmental relations. The exacerbation of environmental pollution in the Chinese countryside is mainly rooted in its unbalanced environmental relations. The environmental pollution process is a gaming process among the environmental social subjects. The gaming among Chinese rural environmental subjects has many characteristics.

scholarly journals REVERSE LOGISTICS IN THE DISPOSAL OF RESIDUAL LUBRICATING OIL

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Márcia Eduarda Amâncio
Keyword(s):  
Boundary Layer ◽  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Reverse Logistics ◽  
Lubricating Oil ◽  
Proper Treatment ◽  
Residual Oil ◽  
Logistics System ◽  
Lubricant Oil ◽  
Economic Balance

With the ascending growth in car acquisitions worldwide, there is also an increase on environmental pollution. It is very important to control the various factors that have an impact on this situation. Therefore, this paper had the goal of promote an efficient reverse logistics system, aiming to reuse the residual car lubricant oil in bottles after being used. The analysis were made with the intent of establishing a proper treatment to inappropriate discarded oil and reinsert it in the market, contributing to the economic balance and to a sustainable development between society and companies. The impacts on environment by residual lubricant oil in used bottles were presented and the boundary layer after full oil drain was calculated. Samples were collected from a gas station in order to quantify the volume of the generated residual oil after the oil change, and also the time for full residual oil drain was measured. Results show that each 1 L used lubricant oil bottle has approximately 20 mL of unused residual oil.

scholarly journals A Tripartite Game Analysis of Environmental Pollution Control Based on Complicated Intergovernmental Relations

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Ling Li ◽  
Yao Song ◽  
Zhiqiang Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Intergovernmental Relations ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Control Level ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Cooperative Game Model

An excellent ecological environment is conducive for improving economic benefits and social benefits. The environmental pollution control requires the cooperation of governments at all levels and a large amount of capital investment. However, under the system with Chinese characteristics, the intergovernmental relations present complex and dynamic characteristics: the central government is authoritative, the local governments are obedient and self-interested, and the environmental pollution control usually involves multiple government departments, while it has strong externality, which makes it easy to breed “free rider” behavior in the process of environmental pollution control. Therefore, the cross-regional environmental pollution control cooperation model of governments at all levels is a complex and worthwhile research problem. Based on this, the paper studies a tripartite game problem of environmental pollution control from both horizontal and vertical intergovernmental relations. The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation was used to obtain the optimal effort strategy, environmental pollution control level, and environmental pollution losses under the Nash game model, the Stackelberg game model, and the Cooperative game model. The results show the following: firstly, the governments’ environmental pollution control efforts are positively related to their own execution ability and influence ability and negatively related to the cost coefficient; secondly, from the perspectives of environmental pollution control level and environmental pollution losses, the Cooperative game model is superior to the Nash game model and the Stackelberg game; thirdly, this paper analyzes the relationship between the loss-bearing ratio, the special financial funds, the effort level of government, and the environmental pollution control level; finally, the conclusions are verified by numerical analysis, which proves the validity of the models.

scholarly journals Optimization of Financial Penalties for Environmental Pollution by Chinese Traditional Energy Enterprises

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Le Chang ◽  
Yadong Song ◽  
Tao Yu
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Environmental Damage ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionary Processes ◽  
Environmental Laws ◽  
Strategy Game

The formulation of proper financial penalties plays an important role in regulating Chinese traditional energy enterprises’ illegal pollution. Through the construction of a mixed-strategy game model and an evolutionary game model for regulatory agencies and traditional energy enterprises, the article studies how financial penalties impact players’ strategies and evolutionary processes to optimize financial penalties. It found that excessive financial penalties could reduce enforcement, but insufficient financial penalties would cause more pollution discharge violations. The article concludes that Chinese environmental laws should focus more on setting reasonable penalties based on the profit from activities that generate illegal pollution rather than on the environmental damage to improve regulatory effectiveness.

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