scholarly journals Optimization of Financial Penalties for Environmental Pollution by Chinese Traditional Energy Enterprises

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Le Chang ◽  
Yadong Song ◽  
Tao Yu
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Environmental Damage ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionary Processes ◽  
Environmental Laws ◽  
Strategy Game

The formulation of proper financial penalties plays an important role in regulating Chinese traditional energy enterprises’ illegal pollution. Through the construction of a mixed-strategy game model and an evolutionary game model for regulatory agencies and traditional energy enterprises, the article studies how financial penalties impact players’ strategies and evolutionary processes to optimize financial penalties. It found that excessive financial penalties could reduce enforcement, but insufficient financial penalties would cause more pollution discharge violations. The article concludes that Chinese environmental laws should focus more on setting reasonable penalties based on the profit from activities that generate illegal pollution rather than on the environmental damage to improve regulatory effectiveness.

scholarly journals How to Promote Compliance Management in the Electricity Market? An Analysis Based on the Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luosong Jin ◽  
Cheng Chen ◽  
Yun Li ◽  
Xiangyang Wang ◽  
Yuanyuan Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Compliance Cost ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we aim to analyze how to effectively promote compliance management in the electricity market. We construct an evolutionary game model under the two different scenarios, i.e., the scenario without governmental supervision and the scenario with governmental supervision, and explicitly describes the strategic behaviors and dynamic evolution process of power enterprises and regulators in the power market. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, we find that, in the absence of governmental supervision, the long-term stable equilibrium of power enterprises' choice of strategy “Compliance” and regulatory agencies' choice of strategy “Not bribery” is hard to be realized. Only if the government effectively supervises the compliance management of the electricity market can the ideal compliance behavior of the two stakeholders be achieved. Furthermore, we conduct a simulation study to analyze the impacts of the various model parameters on the dynamic evolution process. The specific results show that the lower compliance cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger profit loss of the power enterprises, as well as the lower inspection cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger rewards of the regulatory agencies, can promote the formation of compliance management. Besides, the larger penalty charged by the government is also conducive to the compliance management of the electricity market.

scholarly journals Analysis on Management of Job Burnout of Counselors in Chinese Colleges Based on Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (17) ◽  
pp. 207
Author(s):  
Xiaolei Wang ◽  
Ruoxuan Zhang ◽  
Zengxin Li ◽  
Junlong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Job Burnout ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Incentive System ◽  
College Counselors ◽  
Rational Choices ◽  
Multiple Scenarios ◽  
First Mover

In Chinese colleges, counselors need to simultaneously engage in teaching and management. The dual responsibilities make them probe to job burnout. To solve the problem, this paper puts forward assumptions about the behavior, income, and cost of counselors, and sets up a game model of burnout governance for college counselors. On this basis, the game between the college and counselors was analyzed under multiple scenarios: the two parties make completely independent decisions; the college is the first mover in the decision-making—— namely the equilibrium of the mixed strategy. Suppose a few colleges decide to improve the counselor management system. Based on the evolutionary game model, the authors discussed the influence of the improvement on all the colleges. The results show that the rational choices of the two parties should be “the college reforms the counselor management system”, while “the counselors work actively and avoid job burnout”; if a few colleges decide to improve the counselor management system, all the other colleges will follow suit, which leads to an improvement of efficient incentive system for college counselors. The research results provide a good reference for the burnout governance of college counselors.

scholarly journals Research on Green Construction Supervision Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 98
Author(s):  
Wei Wei ◽  
Zhongfu Qin
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Construction Enterprise ◽  
Construction Enterprises ◽  
Green Construction ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Game Player ◽  
Construction Supervision ◽  
Supervision Mechanism

<p><em>On the basis of the analysis of the game relationship between the construction enterprise and the supervision department, the evolutionary game model of the green construction supervision is established. By analyzing the unilateral stability of the game player, it is found that when the regulatory probability of regulatory authorities is maintained at the corresponding regulatory probability of the mixed strategy equilibrium point, the green construction probability of construction enterprises will evolve to 100%, and has good stability. According to this, the supervision mechanism of setting the threshold of supervision probability is put forward so as to realize full coverage of green construction.</em></p>

scholarly journals RENT-SEEKING DECISIONS OF THE MAIN PARTICIPANTS IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS BASED ON EVOLUTIONARY-GAME AND SYSTEM DYNAMICS

2022 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 106-119
Author(s):  
Weiwei Zuo ◽  
Qiankun Wang ◽  
Peng Li
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Construction Projects ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Interaction Mechanism ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Behavioral Characteristics ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Dynamics Method

The performance of a construction project can be severely harmed by its participants’ rent-seeking. In order to prevent such attempt, this research integrates the evolutionary game theory with system dynamics method to simulate the impact of the change of some factors that may cause/reduce rent-seeking. Based on the analysis of the behavioral characteristics and interactive relationships of the main participants (the owner, supervisor, and contractor), an evolutionary game model is constructed and simulated with the method of system dynamics based on the replication dynamic equation of the mixed strategy solution of the three-party static game model. By assigning the parameters of project scale, supervision likelihood, supervision success rate, supervision cost, and penalty intensity, the interaction mechanism of the participants on each factor is revealed through a case-based simulation. The results show that the impacts of these factors on participants’ rent-seeking decisions are significantly different. Furthermore, some management suggestions are provided to prevent rent-seeking for project owner according to the research conclusions. This research can help the project owners take proper measures to prevent rent-seeking of the supervisors and the contractors to improve the performances of the projects.

PERAN TEKNOLOGI DALAM PENGENDALIAN PENCEMARAN LINGKUNGAN HIDUP

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arie Herlambang
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Carrying Capacity ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Liquid Waste ◽  
Quality Standards ◽  
Environmental Damage ◽  
Waste Processing ◽  
Environment Pollution ◽  
Environment Quality ◽  
Waste Solid

Basically, nature has the ability to perform the restoration of environmental damage caused by increased human activity, but because of the limited carrying capacity, then the environment has decreased the quality from year to year. In saving the environment, technology plays a role in reducing the risk of pollution, increased efi siensi process, and creating processes and environmentall friendly products, monitoring and prediction of environment quality, environmental pollution control, restoration and environmental improvement. Waste Technology (end of pipe technology) are widely used to cope with environmental pollution, both for liquid waste, solid and air. Waste processing technology developed for the waste can be in accordance with quality standards thathave been established, while monitoring technology has been developed either manually or automatically. For recovery and improvement of technology has been developed remedies and restoration that rely on bacteria in nature.Keywords: end of pipe technology, reuse, recycle, reduce (3R), carrying capacity, and environment pollution

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

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