scholarly journals Governance structure and transaction cost: relationship between strategy and asset specificity

Nova Economia ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Luiz da Silva ◽  
Maria Sylvia M. Saes
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Theoretical Discussion ◽  
Production Chain ◽  
Cost Approach ◽  
Determining Factors

This article presents a theoretical discussion of the determining factors of governance structures, using the transaction cost approach. The coexistence of distinct structures in the same production chain, whose assets show no difference in terms of specificity, is a problematic challenge for transaction cost economics, since it predicts a convergence towards the most efficient structures. The research is pure and explanatory and seeks to identify the determining or contributing variables to the occurrence of the phenomena. Thus, the research source is documental, encompassing the literature discussing the relation between governance structure and transaction cost.

scholarly journals Firms' Choice of Regulatory Instruments to Reduce Pollution: A Transaction Cost Approach

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magali Delmas ◽  
Alfred Marcus
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Command And Control ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Negotiated Agreements ◽  
Regulatory Instruments ◽  
Market Opportunities ◽  
And Control

This paper compares the economic efficiency of firm-agency governance structures for pollution reduction using transaction costs economics. Two governance structures are analyzed with the transaction costs approach: command and control regulation (CCR) and negotiated agreements (NAs). We propose that the choice of governance structure depends on the strategies firms pursue given the attributes of their transactions and their market opportunities. The application of transaction cost economics analysis leads to different choices of regulatory instruments. Firms in more mature, stable industries are likely to choose command and control, while firms in new, dynamic sectors are more likely to opt for negotiated agreements. Frequency of transactions is a key factor in firm choice.

Impacts of non-GMO standards on poultry supply chain governance: transaction cost approach vs resource-based view

2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 743-758 ◽  
Author(s):  
Houda Ghozzi ◽  
Claudio Soregaroli ◽  
Stefano Boccaletti ◽  
Loïc Sauvée
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Genetically Modified Organisms ◽  
Animal Feed ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Resource Based View ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Cost Approach

Purpose Following a negative attitude of consumers toward genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and the spaces left by the labeling legislation on GMOs of different countries, some retailers and processors introduced their own non-GMO standards, with the intention of avoiding the presence of GMOs in their products. This paper aims to understand how the implementation of these new retailer-driven standards affects governance structures along the supply chain and the determinants of such change focusing on transaction cost approach (TCA) vs resource-based view (RBV). Design/methodology/approach The non-GMO introduction is investigated as a case study in the poultry industry of France and Italy. The case relies on data primarily collected from interviews with the main actors at five stages of the supply chain from the retailer up to animal feed and crop production. Findings Findings indicate that the introduction of non-GMO products had different impacts on the transactions along the supply chain, generally leading to more integrated relationships. Theoretical relevance depends on the observed transaction and the type of governance structure considered. Interestingly, only RBV explains the shift toward hierarchical governance when this is observed. Originality/value This paper contributes to the empirical literature highlighting the upstream effects caused by the adoption of new standards. On the theoretical side, building on Conner and Prahalad’s (1996) seminal work and leveraging on the concepts of opportunism, “potential” superior knowledge and strategic importance of an activity, this research suggests a comparative framework for identifying governance structures and their determinants under TCA and RBV.

scholarly journals Governance structures in cooperative slaughterhouses: a study on the chain of differentiated beef in the state of Paraná

2022 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaiane Aparecida Pereira ◽  
Amanda Ferreira Guimarães ◽  
Rejane Heloise dos Santos ◽  
Sandra Mara de Alencar Schiavi ◽  
José Paulo de Souza
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Value Distribution ◽  
The State ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Second Moment ◽  
Subjective Measurements ◽  
Market Uncertainties

Abstract: This study sought to discuss the governance structures adopted between livestock producers and their cooperative slaughterhouses in the chain of differentiated beef in the state of Paraná. The theoretical basis used was the Transaction Cost Economics and Measurement Costs Economics, complemented by the specificities of cooperatives. We conducted interviews with three key agents and eleven representatives of six cooperative slaughterhouses operating in this system. As result, we observed that the cooperatives have similar objectives and requirements, although there are differences in the levels of formality or flexibility. Although transactions are recurrent and have been successful, they involve a high asset specificity, depend on subjective measurements, and are still exposed to market uncertainties, which leaves room for the generation of conflicts and disincentives to quality. Despite this, the relational and reputational aspects associated with trust and partnership between the parties are elements that enable reduced transaction and measurement costs in these structures. At first, the measurements conducted by the cooperatives had an important role in the construction of trust between the parties and for value distribution. In a second moment, the trust built enabled the reduction of measurement costs.

scholarly journals The Argumentational Texture of Transaction Cost Economics

1995 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niels Noorderhaven
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Economic Organization ◽  
Economic Institutions

The deconstruction method was used to analyze a seminal text in transaction cost economics, viz., Oliver Williamson's Economic Institutions of Capitalism. This deconstructive reading revealed that the assumption of opportunism that gives rise to the problem of economic organization as formulated by William son also tends to undermine the proposed solution to this problem. The plausi bility of unified governance as a solution to the problem of opportunism in transaction relations with asset specificity is shown to hinge on the temporary deferment of the assumption of opportunism. Thus, transaction cost economics finds itself in an impasse of thought: actors have to be assumed to be both opportunistic and not-opportunistic if the logic of the theory is to be main tained.

scholarly journals Sourcing van Internal Auditing-activiteiten

2005 ◽  
Vol 79 (5) ◽  
pp. 221-228
Author(s):  
H. J. Van Elten
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Environmental Uncertainty ◽  
Management Control ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Internal Auditing ◽  
Control Instrument ◽  
Onderzoek Naar

Internal Auditing – traditioneel een intern management control-instrument – wordt in toenemende mate uitbesteed aan externe dienstverleners. In dit artikel wordt verslag gedaan van een onderzoek naar de invloed van Transaction Cost Economics-variabelen op de mate van uitbesteding van Internal Auditing. Ten behoeve hiervan is een schriftelijke enquête verspreid, waaraan is deelgenomen door 66 grote Nederlandse bedrijven. Meervoudige regressieanalyse laat een significant verband zien tussen outsourcing van Internal Auditing-activiteiten, asset specificity en frequency. Deze TCE-variabelen verklaren 57% van de variantie in de mate van uitbesteding van Internal Auditing. Andere TCE-variabelen (behavioral en environmental uncertainty) vertonen geen significante invloed.

scholarly journals Corporate governance and transaction cost economics: A study of the equity governance structure

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jimmy A. Saravia Matus ◽  
Silvia Saravia-Matus
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Firm Valuation ◽  
Managerial Discretion ◽  
Full Analysis ◽  
First Time

This paper extends the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory of the equity governance structure by introducing a (hitherto absent) full analysis of the key TCE issue of bilateral dependency between the firm and its shareholders. In addition, the paper discusses the implications of the analysis for the topic of corporate governance and firm performance. We find that when bilateral dependency holds contractual hazards are mitigated as predicted by TCE, but that when it does not contractual safeguards are altered to the disadvantage of shareholders and managerial discretion costs increase as reflected by lower firm valuation. Importantly, our study documents for the first time a class of transactions where business relationships persist indefinitely even though transaction costs are not minimized.

scholarly journals The Comparative Effects of Transaction Cost Economics and Resource Based View: A Technological Alliance Motivational Perspective

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hwan Jin Kim
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
High Tech ◽  
Resource Based View ◽  
Alliance Partner ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Alliance Partners ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Alliance Governance

<p>This paper examines the impact of two main alliance motivation theories, transaction cost economics (TCE) and resource based view (RBV), on alliance processes among Korean manufacturing high-tech ventures. Results show that TCE and RBV are complimentarily explaining the formation of inter-firm alliances. TCE variables are more related with alliance partner characteristics while RBV is more linked with partner capabilities. Both show positive effects on performance. No significant effect is found on determining an alliance governance structure. While selecting appropriate technological alliance partners show positive effects on performance, no significant effect is found between alliance governance structure and performance. Factors of both theories impacting each alliance stage and analytical explanations of such impacts are discussed.</p>

A transaction cost economics model for estimating performance effectiveness of relational and contractual governance

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (11) ◽  
pp. 1551-1575 ◽  
Author(s):  
John G. Wacker ◽  
Chenlung Yang ◽  
Chwen Sheu
Keyword(s):  
Problem Solving ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Relative Effectiveness ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Relational Governance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Contractual Governance ◽  
Supplier Contracts

Purpose As outsourcing continues to grow, supplier management becomes critical to the success of manufacturing firms. Transaction cost economics (TCE) suggests that firms should choose supplier governance mechanisms to ensure fulfillment of contractual obligations and safeguard against opportunism for their outsourcing activities. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to examine how buying organizations govern supplier contracts to improve manufacturing competitiveness and financial performance. The relative effectiveness of two primary governance mechanisms, contractual governance (CG), and relational governance, are examined. Design/methodology/approach Expanding upon previous studies, this study delineates three relational governance mechanisms (negotiation efficiency (NE), problem solving relations, and information sharing (IS)) that are conceptually, statistically and pragmatically different. Based on the TCE literature, a conceptual model is developed to decipher the relationships between pre-contract conditions (supplier asset specificity and environmental uncertainty (EU)), governance mechanisms, performance ambiguity (PA), and performance. Using the data collected from 987 firms, the statistical results present several important findings that would advance current theory and practice in outsourcing. Findings The authors find empirical support for the effects of contractual and relational governance in improving manufacturing and financial performance. The governance of supplier contracts clearly facilitates manufacturers’ ability to leverage their resources to improve performance. The relative effectiveness of these two governance mechanisms is related to the levels of EU and supplier asset specificity. Relational governance displays greater influence on performance than CG does. However, CG appears to be complementary to relational governance. Research limitations/implications The interplays between supplier asset specificity and EU should be examined in the future. The relationships among NE, IS, and problem solving should also be examined to facilitate the development of relational governance. Practical implications Managers should be aware of the situational performance of governance mechanisms. Moreover, it is important to realize how differently each of the three relational governance mechanisms and CG contribute to performance. Originality/value This study extends the academic discussion of supplier governance by investigating the alignment of governance mechanisms (relational governance and CG) with pre-contract conditions to reduce PA and, thereby, enhance manufacturing performance. Under the theoretical framework of TCE, the direct and indirect effects of pre-contract conditions and governance variables are fully examined and discussed. Moreover, relational governance involves multiple mechanisms that are conceptually and pragmatically different, and future studies should not treat it as one single construct.

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