scholarly journals Corporate governance and transaction cost economics: A study of the equity governance structure

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jimmy A. Saravia Matus ◽  
Silvia Saravia-Matus
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Firm Valuation ◽  
Managerial Discretion ◽  
Full Analysis ◽  
First Time

This paper extends the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory of the equity governance structure by introducing a (hitherto absent) full analysis of the key TCE issue of bilateral dependency between the firm and its shareholders. In addition, the paper discusses the implications of the analysis for the topic of corporate governance and firm performance. We find that when bilateral dependency holds contractual hazards are mitigated as predicted by TCE, but that when it does not contractual safeguards are altered to the disadvantage of shareholders and managerial discretion costs increase as reflected by lower firm valuation. Importantly, our study documents for the first time a class of transactions where business relationships persist indefinitely even though transaction costs are not minimized.

scholarly journals Firms' Choice of Regulatory Instruments to Reduce Pollution: A Transaction Cost Approach

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magali Delmas ◽  
Alfred Marcus
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Command And Control ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Negotiated Agreements ◽  
Regulatory Instruments ◽  
Market Opportunities ◽  
And Control

This paper compares the economic efficiency of firm-agency governance structures for pollution reduction using transaction costs economics. Two governance structures are analyzed with the transaction costs approach: command and control regulation (CCR) and negotiated agreements (NAs). We propose that the choice of governance structure depends on the strategies firms pursue given the attributes of their transactions and their market opportunities. The application of transaction cost economics analysis leads to different choices of regulatory instruments. Firms in more mature, stable industries are likely to choose command and control, while firms in new, dynamic sectors are more likely to opt for negotiated agreements. Frequency of transactions is a key factor in firm choice.

Government Control, Transaction Costs and Commitment Between the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) and the Chinese Government

2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qing Lu
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Foreign Bank ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Government Control ◽  
Local Authorities ◽  
Mutual Dependency ◽  
The Government

We use the tools of transaction cost politics (TCP) developed from transaction cost economics and economic analysis, to analyze the business relationship building between the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), the largest and most successful foreign bank in China, and the Chinese government between 1949 and 1978. We demonstrate the value of the TCP-based approach to evaluating the specialized governance structure of commitment built on mutual dependency. In particular, we identify several transaction attributes that give rise to hazards: transaction uncertainty, the role of the government in the economy, and the strength of the supporting coalition. Our analysis also confirms that commitment built on the mutual dependency between the international company and the local authorities and between the international company's home country authorities and the local authorities did reduce the company's transaction costs by guarding against the local authorities' opportunism.

scholarly journals Analysis of the community supported agriculture model in Brazil from the point of view of the transaction cost economic

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 48-70
Author(s):  
Liliane Ubeda Morandi Rotoli ◽  
Andréa Rossi Scalco ◽  
Giuliana Aparecida Santini Pigatto
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Sao Paulo ◽  
The State ◽  
Community Supported Agriculture ◽  
São Paulo ◽  
Transaction Cost Economic

The marketing relationship between farmers and consumers generates transaction costs, and these costs can be minimized through use of an appropriate governance structure. The main objective of this paper was to analyze the governance structure of Community Supported Agriculture in the State of São Paulo, Brazil, in order to identify whether it favors coordination between agents and promotes the reduction of transaction costs. The investigation followed a qualitative-quantitative approach according to the survey research method. For this, it was described the characteristics of the institutional environment in order to understand the aspects that delimit the behavior of the agents and that influence the structure of governance between the agents, as well as identifying the characteristics of transactions and agents (farmers and consumers), from the viewpoint of Transaction Cost Economics.  The analysis of the characteristics of the agents showed that there is limited rationality in the perception of consumers; the characteristics of the transactions indicated a high level of locational, temporal, physical and brand specificity, in addition to the technological specificity in the farmers' perceptions; and the frequency of transactions is high. The assessed scenario shows that the specified governance structure is the hybrid - with the bilateral dependence between autonomous actors and, although adequate, requires improvements in reducing uncertainty among agents. This article brings scientific contributions by relating the theoretical approach of Transaction Cost Economics to the short channels of food production and consumption and, mainly, in the state of São Paulo, Brazil, where these channels have grown in the last decade. Keywords: Commercialization channel. Institutional environment. Governance structure.

From transaction costs to transaction value: Overcoming the frictional paradigm

2020 ◽  
pp. 51-81
Author(s):  
D. P. Frolov
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Path Dependence ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Cost Minimization ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Transactional Analysis ◽  
Transaction Sector ◽  
Transaction Value

The transaction cost economics has accumulated a mass of dogmatic concepts and assertions that have acquired high stability under the influence of path dependence. These include the dogma about transaction costs as frictions, the dogma about the unproductiveness of transactions as a generator of losses, “Stigler—Coase” theorem and the logic of transaction cost minimization, and also the dogma about the priority of institutions providing low-cost transactions. The listed dogmas underlie the prevailing tradition of transactional analysis the frictional paradigm — which, in turn, is the foundation of neo-institutional theory. Therefore, the community of new institutionalists implicitly blocks attempts of a serious revision of this dogmatics. The purpose of the article is to substantiate a post-institutional (alternative to the dominant neo-institutional discourse) value-oriented perspective for the development of transactional studies based on rethinking and combining forgotten theoretical alternatives. Those are Commons’s theory of transactions, Wallis—North’s theory of transaction sector, theory of transaction benefits (T. Sandler, N. Komesar, T. Eggertsson) and Zajac—Olsen’s theory of transaction value. The article provides arguments and examples in favor of broader explanatory possibilities of value-oriented transactional analysis.

Virtual enterprise networks: the fifth element of corporate governance

2001 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 171-188
Author(s):  
Nicholas C. Georgantzas
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Virtual Enterprise ◽  
Dynamics Simulation ◽  
Enterprise Networks ◽  
Market Uncertainty ◽  
Competitive Edge ◽  
Exchange Governance

Although still flying low under the popular business media's collective radar, virtual enterprise networks (or nets) do receive increased attention in the strategic management literature. A virtual enterprise network (VEN) is a system of autonomous firms that collaborate to achieve common business objectives. VENs give participants a competitive edge in markets demanding agility and rapid response. Seen as an emerging transactional exchange governance (TEG) form within transaction cost economics (TCE), VENs and the relations among firms that form them posit challenges for researchers and managers. VENs differ substantially from markets and hierarchies, and from recurrent and relational contracts, utterly changing what it means to be a firm in today's business. This essay explores alternative TEG forms, their characteristics and the criteria that bear on the choice of corporate governance: flexible specialization, market uncertainty, product (good or service) complexity, reliance on trust, risk, self-organization, shared knowledge, and socio-territorial cohesiveness. The essay offers propositions on the relations among economic criteria and the choice of transactional exchange governance forms by exploring the dynamics of a generic TEG structure. This is a system dynamics simulation model that partially offsets the shortcomings of transaction cost economics (TCE) and points to the potentially rich contribution of system dynamics to exploring VENs beyond the ideal-type TEG forms of markets and hierarchies that dominate the TCE literature.

Broaden the Pathway to Inclusive Entrepreneurship: A Transaction Cost Proposition

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Du ◽  
Jie Lu ◽  
Yanbing Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Social Exclusion ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Inclusive Growth ◽  
Stage Model ◽  
Base Of The Pyramid ◽  
Resource Base ◽  
Personal Competence

Abstract Since entrepreneurship was conceptualised as a panacea for achieving inclusive growth in the “base of the pyramid” (BoP) regions, various ways have been explored to leverage this powerful tool, such as helping potential entrepreneurs build the resource base and capabilities. However, given the severe resources constraints in the BoP regions, such a goal is difficult to achieve. Besides, due to the high demands on personal competence, only a few people can benefit from this method, which fails to solve the problem of social exclusion in the BoP regions. Therefore, we aim to find a better way to leverage entrepreneurship to tackle the problem of the BoP regions by calling for more attention to the inclusiveness of entrepreneurship. Based on data of inclusive entrepreneurs in Zhejiang, China, we construct a three-stage model for inclusive entrepreneurship. We also apply Transaction Cost Economics to look for determinants that foster inclusive entrepreneurship and validate our main assertion that decreasing transaction cost significantly helps to increase the inclusiveness of entrepreneurship, and different phases of inclusive entrepreneurship (i.e., opportunity inclusiveness, participation inclusiveness, and sharing inclusiveness) are influenced by different sets of determinants of transaction costs.

scholarly journals Impact of independent directors and remuneration committee on firm performance? Evidence from Malaysian capital market

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 222-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huson Joher Ali Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Regression Methods ◽  
Developed Markets ◽  
Control Management

This study aims at re-examining whether or not the structure of the corporate governance as defined by the non-executive director matter that lead to better performance. This study is based on 100 firms listed in first board. The analysis is based on a period of 5 years from 1999 through 2003. This study employs a multiple regression methods to examine governance structure and its impact on firm performance. Although previous studies in developed markets exhibit the existence of relations between governance structure and corporate performance, this study however concludes that there is partial relation between corporate governance structure and corporate performance. However, the presence of both audit and remuneration committee serves an important monitoring device to control management actives that lead to increase firm’s performance.

The role of national culture in the impact of board gender diversity on firm performance: evidence from a multi-country study

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Navaz Naghavi ◽  
Saeed Pahlevan Sharif ◽  
Hafezali Bin Iqbal Hussain
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Gender Diversity ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThis study seeks to add more insights to the debate on “whether”, “how”, and “under which condition” women representation on the board contributes to firm performance. More specifically, the current study aims to investigate if the effect of board gender diversity on firm performance is dependent on macro factors of national cultures.Design/methodology/approachThe authors used the generalized method of moments regression and a data set consists of 2,550 company year observations over 10 years.FindingsThe results indicated that cultural variables interact with board diversity to influence firm performance. Having women on the board in countries with high power distance, individualist, masculine and low-uncertainty avoidance culture influences the firm performance negatively.Originality/valueThe findings indicate that the effects of corporate governance structure on firm performance depends on culture-specific factors, providing support for the argument that institutional norms that are governed by cultural norms affect the effectiveness of corporate governance structure.

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