scholarly journals Governance structures in cooperative slaughterhouses: a study on the chain of differentiated beef in the state of Paraná

2022 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaiane Aparecida Pereira ◽  
Amanda Ferreira Guimarães ◽  
Rejane Heloise dos Santos ◽  
Sandra Mara de Alencar Schiavi ◽  
José Paulo de Souza
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Value Distribution ◽  
The State ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Second Moment ◽  
Subjective Measurements ◽  
Market Uncertainties

Abstract: This study sought to discuss the governance structures adopted between livestock producers and their cooperative slaughterhouses in the chain of differentiated beef in the state of Paraná. The theoretical basis used was the Transaction Cost Economics and Measurement Costs Economics, complemented by the specificities of cooperatives. We conducted interviews with three key agents and eleven representatives of six cooperative slaughterhouses operating in this system. As result, we observed that the cooperatives have similar objectives and requirements, although there are differences in the levels of formality or flexibility. Although transactions are recurrent and have been successful, they involve a high asset specificity, depend on subjective measurements, and are still exposed to market uncertainties, which leaves room for the generation of conflicts and disincentives to quality. Despite this, the relational and reputational aspects associated with trust and partnership between the parties are elements that enable reduced transaction and measurement costs in these structures. At first, the measurements conducted by the cooperatives had an important role in the construction of trust between the parties and for value distribution. In a second moment, the trust built enabled the reduction of measurement costs.

scholarly journals Governance structure and transaction cost: relationship between strategy and asset specificity

Nova Economia ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Luiz da Silva ◽  
Maria Sylvia M. Saes
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Theoretical Discussion ◽  
Production Chain ◽  
Cost Approach ◽  
Determining Factors

This article presents a theoretical discussion of the determining factors of governance structures, using the transaction cost approach. The coexistence of distinct structures in the same production chain, whose assets show no difference in terms of specificity, is a problematic challenge for transaction cost economics, since it predicts a convergence towards the most efficient structures. The research is pure and explanatory and seeks to identify the determining or contributing variables to the occurrence of the phenomena. Thus, the research source is documental, encompassing the literature discussing the relation between governance structure and transaction cost.

scholarly journals Firms' Choice of Regulatory Instruments to Reduce Pollution: A Transaction Cost Approach

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magali Delmas ◽  
Alfred Marcus
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Command And Control ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Negotiated Agreements ◽  
Regulatory Instruments ◽  
Market Opportunities ◽  
And Control

This paper compares the economic efficiency of firm-agency governance structures for pollution reduction using transaction costs economics. Two governance structures are analyzed with the transaction costs approach: command and control regulation (CCR) and negotiated agreements (NAs). We propose that the choice of governance structure depends on the strategies firms pursue given the attributes of their transactions and their market opportunities. The application of transaction cost economics analysis leads to different choices of regulatory instruments. Firms in more mature, stable industries are likely to choose command and control, while firms in new, dynamic sectors are more likely to opt for negotiated agreements. Frequency of transactions is a key factor in firm choice.

scholarly journals The Argumentational Texture of Transaction Cost Economics

1995 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niels Noorderhaven
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Economic Organization ◽  
Economic Institutions

The deconstruction method was used to analyze a seminal text in transaction cost economics, viz., Oliver Williamson's Economic Institutions of Capitalism. This deconstructive reading revealed that the assumption of opportunism that gives rise to the problem of economic organization as formulated by William son also tends to undermine the proposed solution to this problem. The plausi bility of unified governance as a solution to the problem of opportunism in transaction relations with asset specificity is shown to hinge on the temporary deferment of the assumption of opportunism. Thus, transaction cost economics finds itself in an impasse of thought: actors have to be assumed to be both opportunistic and not-opportunistic if the logic of the theory is to be main tained.

scholarly journals Sourcing van Internal Auditing-activiteiten

2005 ◽  
Vol 79 (5) ◽  
pp. 221-228
Author(s):  
H. J. Van Elten
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Environmental Uncertainty ◽  
Management Control ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Internal Auditing ◽  
Control Instrument ◽  
Onderzoek Naar

Internal Auditing – traditioneel een intern management control-instrument – wordt in toenemende mate uitbesteed aan externe dienstverleners. In dit artikel wordt verslag gedaan van een onderzoek naar de invloed van Transaction Cost Economics-variabelen op de mate van uitbesteding van Internal Auditing. Ten behoeve hiervan is een schriftelijke enquête verspreid, waaraan is deelgenomen door 66 grote Nederlandse bedrijven. Meervoudige regressieanalyse laat een significant verband zien tussen outsourcing van Internal Auditing-activiteiten, asset specificity en frequency. Deze TCE-variabelen verklaren 57% van de variantie in de mate van uitbesteding van Internal Auditing. Andere TCE-variabelen (behavioral en environmental uncertainty) vertonen geen significante invloed.

scholarly journals A tranzakciós költségek és a szabványosítás kapcsolata (Relationship between transaction costs and standardization)

2013 ◽  
pp. 37-49
Author(s):  
István Kovács
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Economic Impact ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Main Research ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

Az elmúlt néhány évtizedben a szabványosítás terén igen komoly változások mentek végbe. Ugrásszerűen megnőtt a szabványok száma, és jelentősen átalakult a szabványosítás folyamata is. Ezzel párhuzamosan a téma gazdasági hatásaival foglalkozó kutatások száma is megsokszorozódott, ami elsősorban a hálózati externáliák irodalmának robbanásszerű gyarapodásának köszönhető. Jelen tanulmány – az elméletek fősodrától eltérően – a tranzakciós költségek elméletében (TKE) helyezi el a szabványosítást. A szabványok és a tranzakciós költségek kapcsolatáról már születtek korábban is tanulmányok, de ezek a szabványoknak a tranzakciós költségekre gyakorolt hatásaira fókuszáltak. A tanulmány ezzel szemben arra helyezi a hangsúlyt, hogy azonosítsa a tranzakciós költségeknek a szabványosításra gyakorolt hatásait. A kutatás célja, hogy olyan elméleti alapot adjon, amelyben a témakör átfogóan elemezhető. A fő kutatási kérdés az, hogy mitől függ az, hogy melyik mechanizmus kereteiben érdemes a szabványosítást lebonyolítani. ________ Significant changes have characterized the last few decades of standardization. The number of standards has dramatically increased and processes of standardization have also changed a lot. At the same time the amount of researches that are concerned with the economic impact of standardization has also multiplied due to the boom in the literature of network externalities. Unlike the mainstream, this paper places standardization in the theory of transaction cost economics. Although there are earlier papers that are concerned with the relationship between standards and transaction costs, these studies focus on the impact of standards on transaction costs. In contrast, this paper lays emphasis on the identification of the impact of transaction costs on standardization. This study aims to provide a theoretical basis for the comprehensive analyses. The main research question: What determines which coordination mechanism is used to evolve a standard?

A transaction cost economics model for estimating performance effectiveness of relational and contractual governance

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (11) ◽  
pp. 1551-1575 ◽  
Author(s):  
John G. Wacker ◽  
Chenlung Yang ◽  
Chwen Sheu
Keyword(s):  
Problem Solving ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Relative Effectiveness ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Relational Governance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Contractual Governance ◽  
Supplier Contracts

Purpose As outsourcing continues to grow, supplier management becomes critical to the success of manufacturing firms. Transaction cost economics (TCE) suggests that firms should choose supplier governance mechanisms to ensure fulfillment of contractual obligations and safeguard against opportunism for their outsourcing activities. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to examine how buying organizations govern supplier contracts to improve manufacturing competitiveness and financial performance. The relative effectiveness of two primary governance mechanisms, contractual governance (CG), and relational governance, are examined. Design/methodology/approach Expanding upon previous studies, this study delineates three relational governance mechanisms (negotiation efficiency (NE), problem solving relations, and information sharing (IS)) that are conceptually, statistically and pragmatically different. Based on the TCE literature, a conceptual model is developed to decipher the relationships between pre-contract conditions (supplier asset specificity and environmental uncertainty (EU)), governance mechanisms, performance ambiguity (PA), and performance. Using the data collected from 987 firms, the statistical results present several important findings that would advance current theory and practice in outsourcing. Findings The authors find empirical support for the effects of contractual and relational governance in improving manufacturing and financial performance. The governance of supplier contracts clearly facilitates manufacturers’ ability to leverage their resources to improve performance. The relative effectiveness of these two governance mechanisms is related to the levels of EU and supplier asset specificity. Relational governance displays greater influence on performance than CG does. However, CG appears to be complementary to relational governance. Research limitations/implications The interplays between supplier asset specificity and EU should be examined in the future. The relationships among NE, IS, and problem solving should also be examined to facilitate the development of relational governance. Practical implications Managers should be aware of the situational performance of governance mechanisms. Moreover, it is important to realize how differently each of the three relational governance mechanisms and CG contribute to performance. Originality/value This study extends the academic discussion of supplier governance by investigating the alignment of governance mechanisms (relational governance and CG) with pre-contract conditions to reduce PA and, thereby, enhance manufacturing performance. Under the theoretical framework of TCE, the direct and indirect effects of pre-contract conditions and governance variables are fully examined and discussed. Moreover, relational governance involves multiple mechanisms that are conceptually and pragmatically different, and future studies should not treat it as one single construct.

scholarly journals INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: influence on asset specificities

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (108) ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Galindo de Mello ◽  
Deisy Cristina Corrêa Igarashi ◽  
Vinicius Galindo de Mello
Keyword(s):  
Linear Regression ◽  
Multiple Linear Regression ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Intellectual Capital ◽  
Structural Component ◽  
Quantitative Method ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Business Context ◽  
Three Components

The intellectual capital (IC) is gaining prominence both in academic studies as in the business context. When evaluated the development of these elements, the Brazilian agribusiness stands out. Some difficulties are being addressed by studies linked to the transaction cost economics (TCE), resembling mainly with asset specificities. This study aims to understand how the influence of the components of intellectual capital in the formation of asset specificity in the downstream transactions of agribusiness companies. The quantitative method demonstrated relevant to the objective with the companies listed in the Exame M&M 2016, in which a multiple linear regression was performed. Three components of IC are present in the context of agribusiness, but only the structural component has been shown to be significant for the formation of asset specificities. Through this result, managers can identify points of specificities, which can be work in order to carry out efficient transactions.

scholarly journals Traceability and vertical co-ordination in the Italian dairy chain: A transaction cost approach

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Banterle ◽  
S. Stranieri ◽  
L. Baldi
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
Economic Relationships ◽  
Traceability System ◽  
Key Features ◽  
Factor And Cluster Analysis ◽  
And Cluster Analysis

The purpose of this paper is to analyse how the introduction of a voluntary traceability system affects the organisation of economic relationships throughout the Italian dairy chain. Using the theoretical framework of transaction cost economics, we assess whether traceability increases the degree of vertical co-ordination and changes the level of the transaction key features, i.e. degree of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of transactions. A survey was conducted by questionnaire to assess changes in vertical relations, and to underline the different organisational solutions of dairy firms we carried out factor and cluster analysis. The results show increased bilateral dependency among the economic agents as a consequence of the rise in human, physical and site assets. At the same time, growth in the frequency and quantity of information exchanged is observed. Moreover, for medium-sized firms economic incentives play an important role in guaranteeing the safeguarding of transactions, whereas big firms adopt contractual supports.

New Institutional Economics

2020 ◽  
pp. 102-124
Author(s):  
Barak Richman
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Real World ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Production Functions ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Intellectual Traditions ◽  
Micro Level

This chapter assesses New Institutional Economics (NIE). It begins by describing the author’s own understanding of the New Private Law (NPL). The chapter then provides a brief introduction to NIE and its intersection with the study of legal doctrines and institutions. NIE’s roots extend—at least—to Ronald Coase’s famous 1937 article, “The Nature of the Firm,” and more likely to the writings of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century political economists. These intellectual traditions have shaped what is now known as NIE into two distinct branches. The first branch examines institutions as “humanly designed constraints that structure political, social, and economic interactions.” The second branch of NIE focuses on more micro-level behavior. Called “the governance branch” and operationalized by transaction cost economics, the foundational idea is to describe firms not in neoclassical terms as production functions, but in organizational terms as governance structures. The chapter explains how both NPL and NIE exhibit the hallmarks of interdisciplinary, scholarly pluralism, and an inquisitive focus on real-world, tractable problems. It concludes with some thoughts about the future of NPL and, in particular, the lessons it can take from NIE’s successes.

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