scholarly journals Robust Market Equilibria with Uncertain Preferences

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (02) ◽  
pp. 2192-2199
Author(s):  
Riley Murray ◽  
Christian Kroer ◽  
Alex Peysakhovich ◽  
Parikshit Shah
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Convex Programming ◽  
Real World ◽  
Market Design ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Uncertainty Sets ◽  
Uncertain Preferences ◽  
Market Equilibria ◽  
Practical Question

The problem of allocating scarce items to individuals is an important practical question in market design. An increasingly popular set of mechanisms for this task uses the concept of market equilibrium: individuals report their preferences, have a budget of real or fake currency, and a set of prices for items and allocations is computed that sets demand equal to supply. An important real world issue with such mechanisms is that individual valuations are often only imperfectly known. In this paper, we show how concepts from classical market equilibrium can be extended to reflect such uncertainty. We show that in linear, divisible Fisher markets a robust market equilibrium (RME) always exists; this also holds in settings where buyers may retain unspent money. We provide theoretical analysis of the allocative properties of RME in terms of envy and regret. Though RME are hard to compute for general uncertainty sets, we consider some natural and tractable uncertainty sets which lead to well behaved formulations of the problem that can be solved via modern convex programming methods. Finally, we show that very mild uncertainty about valuations can cause RME allocations to outperform those which take estimates as having no underlying uncertainty.

scholarly journals Combining Outcome-Based and Preference-Based Matching: A Constrained Priority Mechanism

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Avidit Acharya ◽  
Kirk Bansak ◽  
Jens Hainmueller
Keyword(s):  
Machine Learning ◽  
Host Country ◽  
Real World ◽  
Test Scores ◽  
Standardized Test ◽  
Market Design ◽  
Standardized Test Scores ◽  
Real World Data ◽  
Refugee Families ◽  
Strategy Proof

Abstract We introduce a constrained priority mechanism that combines outcome-based matching from machine learning with preference-based allocation schemes common in market design. Using real-world data, we illustrate how our mechanism could be applied to the assignment of refugee families to host country locations, and kindergarteners to schools. Our mechanism allows a planner to first specify a threshold $\bar g$ for the minimum acceptable average outcome score that should be achieved by the assignment. In the refugee matching context, this score corresponds to the probability of employment, whereas in the student assignment context, it corresponds to standardized test scores. The mechanism is a priority mechanism that considers both outcomes and preferences by assigning agents (refugee families and students) based on their preferences, but subject to meeting the planner’s specified threshold. The mechanism is both strategy-proof and constrained efficient in that it always generates a matching that is not Pareto dominated by any other matching that respects the planner’s threshold.

scholarly journals Computing Large Market Equilibria Using Abstractions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Kroer ◽  
Alexander Peysakhovich ◽  
Eric Sodomka ◽  
Nicolas E. Stier-Moses
Keyword(s):  
Practical Problem ◽  
Market Design ◽  
Matrix Completion ◽  
Fair Division ◽  
Problem Size ◽  
Solution Quality ◽  
Computing Power ◽  
Large Market ◽  
Market Equilibria

Computing market equilibria is an important practical problem for market design, for example, in fair division of items. However, computing equilibria requires large amounts of information, often the valuation of every buyer for every item, and computing power. In “Computing Large Market Equilibria Using Abstractions,” the authors study abstraction methods for ameliorating these issues. The basic abstraction idea is as follows. First, construct a coarsened abstraction of a given market, then solve for the equilibrium in the abstraction, and finally, lift the prices and allocations back to the original market. The authors show theoretical guarantees on the solution quality obtained via this approach. Then, two abstraction methods of interest for practitioners are introduced: (1) filling in unknown valuations using techniques from matrix completion and (2) reducing the problem size by aggregating groups of buyers/items into smaller numbers of representative buyers/items and solving for equilibrium in this coarsened market.

scholarly journals The innovative personal potential: the content of the concept and empirical study

2019 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
pp. 00057
Author(s):  
Valeriia Kapustina ◽  
Eugenia Bykova
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Empirical Study ◽  
Personality Traits ◽  
Real World ◽  
Self Esteem ◽  
State Technical ◽  
Behavioral Component ◽  
Simple Idea ◽  
Cognitive Component ◽  
New Information

The article is devoted to the theoretical analysis of an innovative personal potential as a psychological construct. Well-known definitions of an innovative personal potential have such characteristics as openness to new information and experience (cognitive component), a desire to change/willingness to create something new (motivational component), innovative activity (behavioral component) and value-semantic system (axiological component). The empirical study of an innovative personal potential of student was held in Novosibirsk State Technical University. Authors used psychological tests (KTS by D. Keirsey, TAS by S. Badner; Tests by F. Williams, the scale of self-esteem of an innovative personality traits by N.M. Lebedeva, A.N. Tatarko, “Problems of the real world” by R. Sternberg). The sample included 177 students. The correlational analysis showed that students, who consider themselves innovative persons, show interest, plays with ideas, reflects on the hidden meaning. They are tolerant to new situations, to the emergence of possible difficulties, they tend to be open, relaxed, free, mobile, trendwatching and are able to deviate from obvious and generally accepted things and develop a simple idea to make it more interesting. Also, it is found that Rational and Idealist types have more apparent characteristics of an innovative personal potential.

scholarly journals Preference-Aware Task Assignment in On-Demand Taxi Dispatching: An Online Stable Matching Approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 2245-2252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boming Zhao ◽  
Pan Xu ◽  
Yexuan Shi ◽  
Yongxin Tong ◽  
Zimu Zhou ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
User Experience ◽  
Real World ◽  
Online Algorithm ◽  
Task Assignment ◽  
Stable Matching ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
New Model ◽  
On Demand ◽  
Long Run

A central issue in on-demand taxi dispatching platforms is task assignment, which designs matching policies among dynamically arrived drivers (workers) and passengers (tasks). Previous matching policies maximize the profit of the platform without considering the preferences of workers and tasks (e.g., workers may prefer high-rewarding tasks while tasks may prefer nearby workers). Such ignorance of preferences impairs user experience and will decrease the profit of the platform in the long run. To address this problem, we propose preference-aware task assignment using online stable matching. Specifically, we define a new model, Online Stable Matching under Known Identical Independent Distributions (OSM-KIID). It not only maximizes the expected total profits (OBJ-1), but also tries to satisfy the preferences among workers and tasks by minimizing the expected total number of blocking pairs (OBJ-2). The model also features a practical arrival assumption validated on real-world dataset. Furthermore, we present a linear program based online algorithm LP-ALG, which achieves an online ratio of at least 1−1/e on OBJ-1 and has at most 0.6·|E| blocking pairs expectedly, where |E| is the total number of edges in the compatible graph. We also show that a natural Greedy can have an arbitrarily bad performance on OBJ-1 while maintaining around 0.5·|E| blocking pairs. Evaluations on both synthetic and real datasets confirm our theoretical analysis and demonstrate that LP-ALG strictly dominates all the baselines on both objectives when tasks notably outnumber workers.

scholarly journals An Event Conflation Model based on the Realization Event

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 188-213
Author(s):  
Xinyan Kou ◽  
Jill Hohenstein
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Real World ◽  
The Real ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Speech Generation ◽  
Generation Mechanisms

Abstract In this theoretical analysis, we first identify four event components essential to the conceptualization of Realization – manner salience, agentivity, the intended result and the real-world result. We move on to establish an event conflation model which reflects their interplay in an attempt to outline the speech generation mechanisms behind different lexicalization patterns. By offering alternative interpretations for some well-established findings in the Motion domain from the Realization perspective, we also explore the possibility of applying unified analysis to different macro-event types.

The Problem of International Order and How to Think about It

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Trachtenberg
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
International Society ◽  
Real World ◽  
International Order ◽  
Frame Of Reference ◽  
Economic Interdependence ◽  
Theoretical Question ◽  
Point Of Departure ◽  
Real World Problems

This chapter argues that, to get at the issue of international order, one must first deal with the theoretical question of how politics works in the highly stylized world associated with the term anarchy—a world where security and thus power are the only things that matter, a world in which no effective international society can be said to exist. The workings of such an idealized world are worth examining not because the real world necessarily works the same way, but simply because that sort of analysis is a necessary point of departure for thinking about real world problems. Only when one understands how a highly stylized world of this sort works can questions about the role of various factors—international law, for example, or economic interdependence—be posed in any meaningful way. If the goal is to understand what difference those factors make—that is, whether they contribute to order—one needs to start with a certain preexisting frame of reference, one that only theoretical analysis can provide.

Contextual Inference in Markets: On the Informational Content of Product Lines

2008 ◽  
Vol 98 (5) ◽  
pp. 2127-2149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emir Kamenica
Keyword(s):  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Informational Content ◽  
Compromise Effect ◽  
Choice Overload ◽  
Product Lines ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Market Equilibria ◽  
Stable Preference

Context can influence decisions. This malleability of choice is usually invoked as evidence that people do not maximize stable preference orderings. In a market equilibrium, however, context conveys payoff-relevant information to consumers. Consequently, these consumers rationally violate naïve formulations of standard choice theoretic principles. I identify informational asymmetries under which apparently anomalous behaviors, namely the compromise effect and choice overload, arise as market equilibria. Firms respond to consumers' contextual inference; in case of the compromise effect, a firm may introduce premium loss leaders (expensive goods of overly high quality that increase the demand for other goods). (JEL D11, D83, M31)

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document