scholarly journals SOME ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ASPECTS OF STATE REGULATION OF INSOLVENCY LAW REVISITED Musenwa v Master of the North Gauteng High Court (Unreported 54849/10) [2010] ZAGPPHC 190 (5 November 2010)

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Juanitta Calitz

A general analysis of the global norms recognised by international institutions worldwide yields the conclusion that the essential proposition of insolvency practitioners in all systems is the same: that every effective insolvency system requires competent and ethical insolvency practitioners who should have the experience and expertise necessary to deal with the range of business and legal issues which arise in insolvency matters. In Standard Bank v The Master of the High Court (2010 4 SA 405 (SCA)) the Supreme Court of Appeal also held that liquidators occupy a position of trust towards creditors and companies in liquidation and that they are required to beindependent, to regard equally the interests of all creditors, and to carry out their duties without fear, favour or prejudice. This contribution is a discussion of the recent decision in Musenwa v Master of the North Gauteng High Court ((Unreported) 54849/10) [2010]ZAGPPHC 190 (5 November 2010)) in which the core issue was to decide on the competence and integrity of an insolvency practitioner in order to decide whether the Master of the High Court (Master) acted lawfully in removing the practitioner from its panel. The note will attempt to underline the importance of a fresh approach by policy and law makers to the concept of regulation of South African insolvency law.

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-158
Author(s):  
Saidat Nakitto

On 27 November 2013 the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa affirmed the decision of the High Court that South Africa’s Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 2002 (icc Act) empowered South African officials to initiate investigations into crimes against humanity committed in Zimbabwe in the absence of the perpetrators in South Africa. This decision was in response to the true interpretation of section 4(3)(c) of the icc Act providing for universal jurisdiction. This paper examines the judgment of this Court, arguing that though customary international law is silent on the requirement for presence of the perpetrators for initiation of investigation, the Court should have given proper examination of this section by taking into consideration of the previous presence of some of the perpetrators in South Africa after the alleged crimes were committed.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
LG Curlewis

In this matter, which resulted in an enquiry by the Supreme Court of Appeal and ultimately a unanimous decision, the facts were the following: the appellant, Mrs Y M (M) appealed against an order that she and her minor daughter (Y) submit to DNA testing to determine whether Mr L B (B), the respondent, was the biological father of Y. The order was sought by B, who also claimed that, if the tests proved that he was indeed the father, he should be given full parenting rights. The North Gauteng High Court (Pretoria) (Murphy J sitting as court of first instance), ordered that M submit herself and Y to DNA tests within 30 days of the date of the order, and postponed the other relief sine die. The Supreme Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal. On appeal, B filed no heads of argument, and nor was there any appearance on his behalf.


Author(s):  
Alastair David Smith

The Lehane matter wound its way through the Cape Provincial Division of the High Court and reached the Supreme Court of Appeal. Mr Dunne, the debtor, lived in the United States of America and ran an international web of companies. One of these companies, Lagoon Beach Hotel, operated a Cape Town hotel. Mr Dunne later filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States and soon was also bankrupted by the Irish High Court. The Irish official trustee, Lehane, applied to the Cape court for the recognition of his status as a foreign trustee and for an anti-dissipation order preventing the disposal of South African property to which Mr Dunne was connected. Lehane succeeded at every stage of the South African proceedings.Initially, Steyn J recognised Lehane as the trustee as though a sequestration order had been granted against Mr Dunne in terms of the Insolvency Act 1936, thus diverging from the approach taken by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (Bermuda). Subsequently, Yekiso J's approach to applying the Insolvency Act without derogating from its generality opens up the possibility of applying section 21 of the Insolvency Act to significant effect against Mrs Dunne's South African property. Yet the territorialist restriction in Yekiso J's order that only creditors with causes of action which arose in South Africa were entitled to claim against the insolvent estate excluded many foreign creditors, even those from Ireland.Of the many issues raised by the Lagoon Beach Hotel company, two that are chosen for discussion in this case note are the possible application of the automatic stay under section 362 of the United States Bankruptcy Code 1978 to the South African proceedings, and the standing of Lehane because of the litigants' dispute whether Mr Dunne was domiciled in the United States or Ireland.Yekiso J and subsequently Leach JA held that the American automatic stay did not govern the South African proceedings. Significantly, the American and the Irish trustees were co-operating with respect to proceedings in Ireland and South Africa that involved Mr Dunne. And Leach JA deftly deferred to the Irish court the decision regarding the application of the American automatic stay and its relevance to the Irish proceedings.As for the disputed domicile of Mr Dunne, Yekiso J and Leach JA both considered that Mr Dunne had retained his Irish domicile. The established principles of recognising a foreign domiciliary trustee before he might deal with South African property, whether movable or immovable, were confirmed. Leach JA, however, went on to discuss the assistance that might cautiously be accorded to Lehane if Mr Dunne were domiciled elsewhere than in Ireland. Even then, the relevance of domicile could not be gainsaid.In the comments, it is pointed out that trustees appointed in countries other than the insolvent's domicile may still be recognised by South African courts. The insolvent's submitting to the jurisdiction of a court that is not the court of his domicile is discussed; on its facts, the cited authority does not bear out the relevant principle. And the possibility of recognising non-domiciliary trustees in exceptional circumstances and for exceptional convenience is explored. The cases cited in support of this principle are shown to yield differing results.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.


Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 141-176
Author(s):  
F Brand

The role of abstract values such as equity and fairness in our law of contract has been the subject of controversy for a number of years. In 2002 the Supreme Court of Appeal took the position that these values do not constitute self-standing grounds for interfering with contractual relationships. Despite this being consistently maintained by the SCA in a number of cases, some High Court judges deviated from this position on the basis that they were permitted to do so by some minority judgments and obiter dicta in the Constitutional Court. The uncertainty thus created has fortunately now been removed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Beadica v The Trustees for the Time being of the Oregon Trust.


Author(s):  
Michael Tsele

When a party refers to evidentiary material in the course of litigation, ordinarily this party is under an obligation to make this evidence available to his opponent, particularly when called upon to do so. However, over the years various principles have developed which make this obligation subject to certain limitations. The Fochville cases dealt with a situation where a party to litigation sought to withhold certain information from its adversary, notwithstanding the fact that the material had been relied upon as a ground for the institution of the litigation. This note critiques the judgments of the High Court and in particular the Supreme Court of Appeal in this dispute. In so doing, it draws on useful foreign law to argue that the Supreme Court of Appeal's judgment was an unfortunate one in that the court failed to clarify with reasonable precision the circumstances in which a party to litigation involving children's interests may legitimately resist disclosing evidence to his adversary, in which the party resisting disclosure invokes the principle of public interest immunity. In this regard, the note concludes that the High Court's overall approach to the issue is to be preferred.       


Author(s):  
Motseotsile Clement Marumoagae

This article reflects on the law relating to pension interest in South Africa. In particular, it assesses whether the Supreme Court of Appeal in Ndaba v Ndaba had adequately clarified how this area of law should be understood. In light of the inconsistent approaches from various divisions of the High Court, it has not always been clear how the courts should interpret the law relating to pension interest in South Africa. In this paper, aspects of this area of law which have been clarified by the Supreme Court of Appeal are highlighted. This paper further demonstrates aspects of this area of law which the Supreme Court of Appeal did not settle and would potentially be subject to future litigation. This paper is based on the premise that while Ndaba v Ndaba is welcomed, the Supreme Court of Appeal nonetheless, missed a golden opportunity to authoritatively provide a basis upon which the law relating to pension interest in South Africa should be understood. 


Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maleka Femida Cassim

A crucial prerequisite for a derivative action is that the applicant must be acting in good faith in terms of section 165(5)(b)(i) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 in order to obtain the leave of the court to bring the proposed derivative action. Both the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Court have recently made important pronouncements of legal principle on the approach that the courts would take to the determination of good faith for the purposes of the statutory derivative action under section 165 of the Companies Act. These judicial findings relate not only to the complex issue of how to prove good faith but also to the meaning and content of the requirement of good faith. The courts have now reached a crossroads in delineating the content of good faith and how it is to be proved. This two-part series of articles critically evaluates these judicial pronouncements. While the focus of these articles is mainly on the tangled requirement of good faith, relevant judicial findings on the other prerequisites for a derivative action under section 165(5)(b) read with (7) and (8) of the Companies Act are also discussed. A comparative approach is adopted that takes into account the jurisprudence developed in Australia, Canada and Singapore. This article, the first in the series of two articles, focuses on the test of good faith. The proof of good faith will be discussed in the second article.


1966 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 92-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. A. Keay

Prior to the events which began on January 15th, 1966, Nigeria was a Federal country consisting of four Regions and the Federal Territory of Lagos (a small area including the capital and adjoining areas). Each Region had its own Constitution providing for a bicameral legislature; a Westminster-type ministerial system and cabinet with collective responsibility; a Regional High Court, from which restricted appeal lay to the Supreme Court of Nigeria; a Regional public service with power of appointment and dismissal vested in an independent Public Service Commission; and over all a Governor whose functions were those of a constitutional Head and carefully spelt out in the Constitution. In addition, the North's Constitution provided for the Sharia Court of Appeal, a court of status coordinate with that of the High Court and having exclusive and final appellate jurisdiction in civil cases based on Moslem family law.


Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

Abstract Case law, amongst other sources, shows that many people in Uganda are living together as husband and wife although they are not married. Unlike legislation in other African countries such as Tanzania and Malawi, in Uganda, the pieces of legislation governing marriages are silent on the issue of presumption of marriage. Likewise, unlike in Kenya and South Africa where legislation does not provide for presumption of marriage but courts have held that such a presumption exists based on long cohabitation, Ugandan courts, the High Court, and the Court of Appeal, have held that Ugandan law does not recognise marriage based on long cohabitation (marriage by repute). However, courts will presume the existence of a marriage where a marriage ceremony took place. Since 2003, attempts to enact legislation to provide for the presumption of marriage in Uganda have not been successful. In this article, the author argues that there is still room for the Supreme Court to hold, on the basis of common law, that Ugandan law recognises the principle of presumption of marriage. This recognition would also be in line with Uganda’s international law obligation as the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has called upon States Parties to CEDAW to enact legislation giving effect to de facto unions. The author relies on case law and legislation from some African countries to suggest ways in which the Supreme Court could deal with the issue of presumption of marriage.


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