LOVE (AMORE AND CARITAS) AS A COGNITION AND LINK BETWEEN RATIO AND INTELLECTUS. THE HIGHEST DIMENSION OF CREATIVITY

Author(s):  
X. Zborovska

The purpose of the article is to reveal the historical and philosophical analysis of the phenomenon of love, which is the key to the work of Nicholas of Cusa in the light of his epistemological constructions, and in view of his reflections on the nature of human. The author focuses on the anthropological nature of the system of Nicholas of Cusa, exploring that this approach makes it possible to better understand the ontological basis of the tradition of correlation in the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusan intellectus and creative intentions in man, and also leads to the final concept of the anthropological doctrine of Nicholas of Cusa, namely, deiformitatem (deification). The obtained results can be used in the development of normative courses, special courses on the history of philosophy and philosophy of religion when considering medieval mysticism.

Author(s):  
Eleonore Stump ◽  
Norman Kretzmann

The distinctive, philosophically interesting concept of eternity arose very early in the history of philosophy as the concept of a mode of existence that was not only beginningless and endless but also essentially different from time. It was introduced into early Greek philosophy as the mode of existence required for fundamental reality (being) contrasted with ordinary appearance (becoming). But the concept was given its classic formulation by Boethius, who thought of eternity as God’s mode of existence and defined God’s eternality as ‘the complete possession all at once of illimitable life’. As defined by Boethius the concept was important in medieval philosophy. The elements of the Boethian definition are life, illimitability (and hence duration), and absence of succession (or timelessness). Defined in this way, eternality is proper to an entity identifiable as a mind or a person (and in just that sense living) but existing beginninglessly, endlessly and timelessly. Such a concept raises obvious difficulties. Some philosophers think the difficulties can be resolved, but others think that in the light of such difficulties the concept must be modified or simply rejected as incoherent. The most obvious difficulty has to do with the combination of atemporality and duration. Special objections have arisen in connection with ascribing eternality to God. Some people have thought that an eternal being could not do anything at all, especially not in the temporal world. But the notion of an atemporal person’s acting is not incoherent. Such acts as knowing necessary truths or willing that a world exist for a certain length of time are acts that themselves take no time and require no temporal location. An eternal God could engage in acts of cognition and of volition and could even do things that might seem to require a temporal location, such as answering a prayer. The concept of God’s eternality is relevant to several issues in philosophy of religion, including the apparent irreconcilability of divine omniscience with divine immutability and with human freedom.


Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Timpe

Free will is a perennial issue in philosophy, both in terms of the history of philosophy and in contemporary discussions. Aspects of free will relate to a wide range of philosophical issues, but especially to metaphysics and ethics. For roughly the past three decades, the literatures on free will and moral responsibility have overlapped to such a degree that it is impossible to separate them. This entry focuses on contemporary discussions about the nature and existence of free will, as well as its relationship to work in the sciences and philosophy of religion.


Philosophy ◽  
1958 ◽  
Vol 33 (126) ◽  
pp. 193-220
Author(s):  
Morris Lazerowitz

Occasionally there has appeared in the history of philosophy a thinker who has become aware of the chaotic condition of philosophy and of the intellectual anarchy that exists in all of its branches, and has attempted to remedy the situation. Descartes cast about for a guiding principle, a compass which would show him the way through the treacherous terrain of philosophy. As is well known he devised the method of systematic doubt, by means of which he hoped to discover an axiom on which he could securely erect a system of basic and reassuring beliefs. Leibniz had before his mind the notion of an ideal language which would by calculation solve problems with certainty. With this he thought we “should be able to reason in metaphysics and morals in much the same way as in geometry and analysis.” Descartes' attempt was a failure; and nothing came of Leibniz's ideal, even with the development of modern symbolic logic. Russell's claim that “logic is the essence of philosophy” frightened many philosophers and gave new hope to others; but his claim was as empty as the proverbial political promise. With G. E. Moore we have a further attempt to introduce sobriety and certainty into philosophy and to make fruitful research possible in it. He has made prominent a method for obtaining results in philosophy; and he has also formulated a philosophical platform, i.e., set out a list of Common-sense propositions which he says are known to be true by everyone, philosopher as well as non-philosopher, and are not, therefore, open to debate. The method, which he used extensively and with great skill, is the method of analysing concepts.


Author(s):  
Dušan Travar

The author begins by first presenting Freud’s critique of religion and then Jung’s supplement encapsulated in his teachings concerning depth psychology. He explains the psychological approach to religious contents and the complementary rational attitude. He goes on to give a dynamic elaboration of the afore-mentioned supplementary attitude and to give a short perusal of Hegel’s motivation for a philosophy of religion. Religious reason is supplemented by creativity and love while querying and the method of questioning are given precedence over the mere giveness of facts as answers. The author concludes his articles with a brief review of trust as it is thematized through the history of philosophy and as it is acccepted in religion with all the ambiguity and wavering of the concept and die attendant behaviour.


2006 ◽  
pp. 38-42
Author(s):  
Georgii D. Pankov

An important place in the creative work of thinkers of the Orthodox tradition in the broad occupied the philosophical understanding of religion. However, the national religious and philosophical heritage of Orthodoxy of the past is mainly studied in the history of philosophy, but not in religious studies. Therefore, according to the author, for modern academic religious studies one of the urgent tasks is to study the philosophy of religion in its theological paradigm, which is expressed in its various confessional variants. While there are still no fundamental works in this field, but to create them it is necessary to take into account the experience of theological-philosophical thought and to critically revise it


2013 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaco W. Gericke

J.H. le Roux had a passion for philosophy. His writings contain recourse to the history of philosophy in a way that bespeaks a deep underlying interest in the subject. This much is relatively well-known. This contribution, by contrast, aims at reconstructing something hitherto mostly covert: Le Roux�s philosophy of religion. Of interest is what his writings presuppose about the nature of religion, religious language, the nature of God, the existence of God, religious epistemology, the relation between religion and morality and the problem of religious pluralism.


Religions ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 404
Author(s):  
William Large

Kant marks a fundamental break in the history of philosophy of religion and the concept of God. God is no longer interpreted as a being necessary to understand the existence of a rational universe, but as an idea that makes sense of our morality. Cohen supplements this idea with the concept of personality, which he argues is the unique contribution of Judaism. For Rosenzweig and Levinas, the monotheistic God is neither a being nor an idea, but the living reality of speech. What would the atheism be that responds to this theism? Linguistics makes a distinction between direct, indirect, and free indirect speech. In the latter form, the origin of speech is not a subject, but narrated language. It is this difference between direct and indirect speech that is missing in Rosenzweig and Levinas’s description of God. It would mean that God is produced by language rather than the subject of language. What menaces the reality of God is not whether God exists, or is intelligible, but the externality of language without a subject.


2020 ◽  
pp. 62-68
Author(s):  
VALERIYA V. SLEPTSOVA ◽  

This paper analyzes the concepts of “possible” and “necessary” in the philosophy of the medieval Jewish-Catalan philosopher and theologian Hasdai Crescas. The main work of Crescas is named “Light of the Lord” (“Or-ha-Shem”). It is still not translated into Russian. The ideas of Crescas are not spread widely in the Russian philosophy of religion and in the Russian history of philosophy. Meanwhile, Crescas is one of the most original Jewish thinkers of the Middle Ages, who proposed, in particular, his own concept of combining divine omniscience and human free will. He developed this concept in the fifth section of the second book of “Or-a-Shem”. It is obvious, that this concept cannot be understood without a detailed analysis of Crescas’ understanding of the categories of “possible” and “necessary”. As a result of the analysis, it is concluded that within the framework of the concept proposed by Crescas both categories are coexisting. Crescas demonstrated this proposition by both philosophical and exegetical arguments...


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document