scholarly journals THE CISG AND PARTY AUTONOMY IN BRAZILIAN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT LAW

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-186
Author(s):  
Iacyr De Aguilar Vieira

This paper focus on the principle of party autonomy in the choice of the law applicable to international contracts under CISG and Brazilian law. It analyses the different possibilities of application of this principle as well as its limits under both legal systems.

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-186
Author(s):  
Iacyr De Aguilar Vieira

This paper focus on the principle of party autonomy in the choice of the law applicable to international contracts under CISG and Brazilian law. It analyses the different possibilities of application of this principle as well as its limits under both legal systems.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-186
Author(s):  
Iacyr De Aguilar Vieira

This paper focus on the principle of party autonomy in the choice of the law applicable to international contracts under CISG and Brazilian law. It analyses the different possibilities of application of this principle as well as its limits under both legal systems.


Contract Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 245-258
Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick

Requirements of form (such as writing) are not as important today as they were in the past. As a general rule, contracts can be made in any form and can be proved by any means, although there remain exceptional cases where the law does insist upon requirements of form. This chapter, which considers the reasons for continued reliance upon requirements of form, along with the criticisms levelled against such requirements, begins by explaining why legal systems impose formal requirements upon contracting parties. It then outlines the formal requirements in English contract law, followed by a discussion of the future of formal requirements, noting the distinction between cases where the contract must be made in writing and cases in which contracts must be evidenced in writing.


Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick

Requirements of form (such as writing) are not as important today as they were in the past. As a general rule, contracts can be made in any form and can be proved by any means, although there remain exceptional cases where the law does insist upon requirements of form. This chapter, which considers the reasons for continued reliance upon requirements of form, along with the criticisms levelled against such requirements, begins by explaining why legal systems impose formal requirements upon contracting parties. It then outlines the formal requirements in English contract law, followed by a discussion of the future of formal requirements, noting the distinction between cases where the contract must be made in writing and cases in which contracts must be evidenced in writing.


1991 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-218
Author(s):  
Eyal Zamir

Section 2 of the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 1970 defines a breach as “an act or omission contrary to the contract”. This general definition applies to any obligation in any contract, and to every form of its breach. Thus, a seller who has undertaken to deliver certain property at an agreed time and place is in breach of his obligation whether he delivers a different property than the agreed or a defective one, whether he makes the delivery after the agreed time or at a wrong place, and so forth. This abstraction of the notion of breach, and the application of similar rules to all kinds of breach (subject to some specific rules in specific Laws and in the Remedies Law itself), are prominent features of the law of contractual remedies and of contract law in general under Israeli legislation. This abstraction enables one to deal generally with subjects, that in other legal systems in various contexts are treated separately. The question discussed in this article refers to the degree of similarity required between the content of the contract and its actual performance. In other words, the question is whether a slight or trivial deviation from the contract's content is to be considered a breach.


Author(s):  
He Qisheng

This chapter addresses Chinese perspectives on the Hague Principles. The modern legislation of private international law in China began with the establishment of choice of law in contracts. The first statute enacting private international law rules was the Foreign Economic Contract Law of 1985. Article 5 of the Law stipulated that the parties to a contract may choose the law applicable to the contract dispute. Since the promulgation of the Foreign Economic Contract Law, party autonomy and the closest connection doctrine have been two major approaches in determining the law applicable to a contract dispute. In 2010, the National People’s Congress of China promulgated a new private international law: the Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relationships. The chapter then compares the current position of private international law of contract in Mainland China with the Hague Principles.


1995 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 360-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shirley Renner

Two questions are central in the law of contracts: first, what are the conditions necessary to the formation of a contract; second, what is the scope of the contractual obligation. The first question deals with the two basic requirements for the formation of a contract — offer and acceptance, whose substantive components are the intention to form a legal obligation and definiteness. It also deals with the substantive requirement of writing, in those classes of contracts in which it is required, and the requirement of consideration, in those legal systems in which it exists. The second question deals with those rules which determine the remedies for breach of contract such as specific performance, damages and restitution. In this article I shall try to identify and evaluate recent trends in Israeli law concerning these questions, as demonstrated by decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court, and to evaluate these trends by measuring their consistency with one another.


2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-100
Author(s):  
Raffaele Caterina

“A system of private ownership must provide for something more sophisticated than absolute ownership of the property by one person. A property owner needs to be able to do more than own it during his lifetime and pass it on to someone else on his death.”1 Those who own things with a long life quite naturally feel the urge to deal in segments of time. Most of the owner's ambitions in respect of time can be met by the law of contract. But contract does not offer a complete solution, since contracts create only personal rights. Certain of the owner's legitimate wishes can be achieved only if the law allows them to be given effect in rem—that is, as proprietary rights. Legal systems have responded differently to the need for proprietary rights limited in time. Roman law created usufruct and other iura in re aliena; English law created different legal estates. Every system has faced similar problems. One issue has been the extent to which the holder of a limited interest should be restricted in his or her use and enjoyment in order to protect the holders of other interests in the same thing. A common core of principles regulates the relationship between those who hold temporary interests and the reversioners. For instance, every system forbids holder of the possessory interest to damage the thing arbitrarily. But other rules are more controversial. This study focuses upon the rules which do not forbid, but compel, certain courses of action.


Author(s):  
Eva Steiner

This chapter examines the law of contract in France and discusses the milestone reform of French contract law. While this new legislation introduces a fresh equilibrium between the contracting parties and enhances accessibility and legal certainty in contract, it does not radically change the state of the law in this area. In addition, it does not strongly impact the traditional philosophical foundations of the law of contract. The reform, in short, looks more like a tidying up operation rather than a far-reaching transformation of the law. Therefore, the chapter argues that it is questionable whether the new law, which was also intended to increase France's attractiveness against the background of a world market dominated by the Common Law, will keep its promise.


Author(s):  
Chen Lei

This chapter examines the position of third party beneficiaries in Chinese law. Article 64 of the Chinese Contract Law states that where a contract for the benefit of a third party is breached, the debtor is liable to the creditor. The author regards this as leaving unanswered the question of whether the thirdparty has a right of direct action against the debtor. One view regards the third party as having the right to sue for the benefit although this right was ultimately excluded from the law. Another view, supported by the Supreme People’s Court, is that Article 64 does not provide a right of action for a third party and merely prescribes performance in ‘incidental’ third party contracts. The third view is that there is a third party right of action in cases of ‘genuine’ third party contracts but courts are unlikely to recognize a third party action where the contract merely purports to confer a benefit on the third party.


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