Restitution(Unjust Enrichment), Comparative Negligence and Good Faith - Comment on Decision by Supreme Court(March 13. 2014, Case Number 2013Da34143) -

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 497-527
Author(s):  
Jong-Hee Seo ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Unjust Enrichment ◽  
Comparative Negligence ◽  
Case Number

scholarly journals The Constitution as a Code of Honor

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Shane
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Faith Commitment ◽  
The Government

This article argues that the Senate’s refusal to consider the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court should be deemed unconstitutional. The Senate’s stonewalling disrespected the institutional needs of the judiciary, violated the constitutional norm of forbearance in the exercise of power, and assumed a Senate role in the appointments process that was never intended. Although no court would ever enjoin a recalcitrant President to make a nomination or an obstructionist Senate to meet with, deliberate over, or vote on a presidential nominee to the Supreme Court or anything else, the President’s and the Senators’ oaths to “support the Constitution” should be understood as entailing a good faith commitment to enabling the government to function.

scholarly journals Pravni položaj poštenog i nepoštenog posjednika u odnosu na vlasnika stvari

2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 527-543
Author(s):  
Jadranko Jug
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Basic Method ◽  
Unjust Enrichment ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Basic Characteristics ◽  
The Right

This paper deals with the problems related to the legal position of honest and dishonest possessors in relation to the owner of things, that is, it analyses the rights belonging to the possessors of things and the demands that possessors may require from the owners of things to whom the possessors must submit those things. Also, in contrast, the rights and requirements are analysed of the owners of things in relation to honest and dishonest possessors. In practice, a dilemma arises in defi ning the essential and benefi cial expenditure incurred by honest possessors, what the presumptions are for and until when the right of retention may be exercised for the sake of remuneration of that expenditure, when the statute of limitations expires on that claim, and the signifi cance of the provisions of the Civil Obligations Act in relation to unjust enrichment, management without mandate and the right of retention, and which provisions regulate these or similar issues. The answers to some of these dilemmas have been provided in case law, and therefore the basic method used in the paper was analysis and research of case law, especially decisions by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia. The introduction to the paper provides the basic characteristics of the concept of possession and possession of things, and the type and quality of possession, to provide a basis for the subsequent analysis of the legal position of the possessor of a thing in relation to the owner of that thing.

A Digest of Recent Israeli Cases

1984 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-157
Author(s):  
Paul Sharon
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Standard Form ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Company Directors ◽  
General Part ◽  
A Company

This was an Additional Hearing granted by leave of the President of the Supreme Court for the purpose of considering the incidence, ratione personae, of the good faith requirement established under sec. 12 of the Contracts (General Part) Law, 1973. The significance of the decision lay in the question of the liability of agents and company directors who negotiate contracts to which they are not themselves party. In particular, the Court was called upon to consider whether, on the basis of sec. 12, a company director negotiating a contract solely on the company's behalf could be held personally liable in relation to that contract, or whether he could seek refuge behind the corporate veil.The respondent, David Castro (hereafter: the Purchaser), had negotiated with Yosef Pnini (hereafter: the Appellant) for the purchase of an apartment to be built by Pnidar, Development and Building Investments Company, Ltd. (hereafter: the Company). The Appellant was manager of the Company, and he and his wife were the sole stockholders. The Appellant and the Purchaser signed a standard-form preliminary agreement which the Company used for the sale of apartments in buildings that it constructed, and the Purchaser made all payments due for the purchase of the apartment. During the course of negotiations it was not revealed to the Purchaser that neither the Company nor the Appellant owned the property upon which the apartment was to be constructed.

SUBROGATION AS A REMEDY FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT

2016 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Watterson
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Purchase Price ◽  
Unjust Enrichment ◽  
Security Interest ◽  
The Supreme Court

WHERE claimant C is responsible for discharging a liability of debtor D to creditor X, secured over D's assets, C is sometimes entitled to be subrogated to X's extinguished security interest. Typically, C is a lender, who loaned money to enable D, the borrower, to purchase property or refinance existing borrowing from X, in return for some agreed security. If that security proves defective, the courts commonly find that C is subrogated to X's security, which was paid off via the loan. Where C's loan funded a valid purchase transaction, that commonly entails subrogation to the “unpaid vendor's lien”, which the vendor held as security for payment of the purchase price. Why might C acquire these rights? Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd. [1999] 1 A.C. 221 suggested a bold new rationalisation: such subrogation is a “restitutionary remedy” which prevents or reverses “unjust enrichment”. The Supreme Court had its first opportunity to explore the implications of this insight in Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus Plc [2015] UKSC 66; [2016] A.C. 176.

scholarly journals The Law of Contribution – An Equitable Doctrine or Part of the Law of Unjust Enrichment?

2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 471
Author(s):  
Victoria Stace
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Enrichment Analysis ◽  
The Other ◽  
Unjust Enrichment ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Significant Change

This article looks at the changes made to the equitable doctrine of contribution by the New Zealand Supreme Court in a 2016 decision, Hotchin v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd. The approach now favoured by the Supreme Court is that to establish a claim for contribution by one defendant against another, there is no need to find any greater degree of coordination between the liabilities other than that the plaintiff could pursue either defendant for its loss and either would be liable for it, in whole or in part. The underlying rationale is that by paying the plaintiff, the defendant who was pursued not only discharges itself but also discharges the other defendant's liability. If mutual discharge is established, the court then determines the amount of contribution based on what is just and reasonable in the circumstances. The Supreme Court's approach to the doctrine of equitable contribution, which is a significant change to previous law, bears similarities to the approach proposed in the leading text on unjust enrichment, raising the issue of whether a future claim for contribution could be approached using an unjust enrichment analysis.

scholarly journals Upaya Hukum Banding Terhadap Putusan Verstek Yang Diajukan Oleh Pihak Tergugat Dikaitkan Dengan Asas Kepastian Hukum Dalam Tinjauan HIR/RBG

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 129
Author(s):  
Sherly Ayuna Putri ◽  
Achmad Syauqi Nugraha
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Research Method ◽  
The State ◽  
District Court ◽  
State Court ◽  
Court Ruling ◽  
Positive Law ◽  
Civil Proceedings ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Case Number

The verdict of Verstek is the ruling that where the defendant, although called legitimately, does not come on a given day, and does not tell others to be facing his deputy, the claim is accepted with a decision without the presence (Verstek). Resistance is a legal effort against the verdict that was dropped outside the presence of the defendant. Essentially the resistance was provided for the defendant who (in general) was defeated. The Verzet is governed in article 125 paragraph (3) and 129 HIR, article 149 clause (3) Jo. 153 RBg. The research method which is conducted in this study is normative juridical research that emphasizes on the science of law and conduct an inventory of positive law relating to the effectiveness of statutory regulations in the fi eld of legal and descriptive analytical describing and analyzing the problems based on the legislation governing the law of civil proceedings regarding the legal efforts of Verstek decision. Based on the results of the study obtained fi rst problem of Verstek decision to be fi led by the defendant on the decision of the District Court of Bale Bandung Case Number: 37/PDT. G/2018/PN. BLB and the state court ruling of the Simalungun case number: 36/PDT. G/2013/PN. LICENSE does not conform to the norm in article 125 HIR and section 149 RBg. The two remedies that can be done by the plaintiff or the appeal is to apply for the appeal with the reasons set out in article 30 paragraph (1) of Law No. 5 of 2004 concerning the Supreme Court, among other things relating to the judge is not authorized or exceeds the limits of authority and or wrong in implementing or violating applicable laws.

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