Animal Democracy and the Challenges of Political Participation

2019 ◽  
pp. 202-215
Author(s):  
Eva Meijer

Chapter 8 turns the focus from activism to political participation. Non-human animal political participation is often either not considered relevant, or not considered at all, by animal rights theorists. This is problematic, because the right to political participation—to co-shaping the rules under which one lives—is not just any right. Non-human animals are individuals with their own perspectives on life and their own idea of the good life, which cannot be reduced to species-specific templates. In this chapter, the author first discusses how and whether non-human animals can co-author the laws under which they live, and she explores the normative justifications for establishing an interspecies democracy. The second section investigates which non-human animals can or should be seen as part of a shared interspecies community with humans. The chapter concludes by exploring ways to improve democratic interaction with other animals, in which the author discusses Sue Donaldson’s proposals for enabling voice and space, and ends with two examples in which humans and other animals interact politically in order to investigate how democratic non-human animal participation can be improved: material deliberation with seagulls, and human-macaque greeting rituals as new forms of political interaction.

Philosophy ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 48 (183) ◽  
pp. 21-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Nielsen

Self-realizationist theories are among the classical attempts to develop a comprehensive normative ethical theory. Plato and Aristotle, in giving classical statements of such theories, argue that a man's distinctive happiness, a man's distinctive flourishing, will only be realized when he realizes himself, i.e. when he achieves to the fullest possible degree his distinctive function. And to achieve one's function is to develop to the full those capacities which are distinctive of the human animal. In doing this we are being most truly ourselves and in doing this we are doing what it is our own nature to do. Men who cultivate to the fullest that which men and only men have will be the happiest men and in so acting they will realize themselves most fully; they will achieve their maximum potential or their fullest distinctively human growth. To so realize oneself is the final end of all moral activity. It defines what is to constitute ‘the good life’ and what is to count as ‘a good man’.


2020 ◽  
pp. 019145372094837
Author(s):  
Frédéric Vandenberghe

The article explores the scope and the limits of virtue ethics from the perspective of critical theory (Habermas) and critical realism (Bhaskar). Based on new research in moral sociology and anthropology, it ponders how the self-realization of each can be combined with the self-determination of all. The article adopts an action-theoretical perspective on morality and defends the priority of the right over the good. It suggests that in plural and polarized societies, there no longer exists a consensus on any version of the good life. It therefore limits the scope of virtue ethics to personal life and pleads for a minima moralia at the social and political level.


2014 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Dennis

AbstractThe paper argues that members of future generations have an entitlement to natural resources equal to ours. Therefore, if a currently living individual destroys or degrades natural resources then he must pay compensation to members of future generations. This compensation takes the form of “primary goods” (in roughly Rawls’ sense) which will be valued by members of future generations as equally useful for promoting the good life as the natural resources they have been deprived of. As a result of this policy, each generation inherits a “Commonwealth” of natural resources plus compensation (plus, perhaps, other things donated to the Commonwealth). It is this inherited “Commonwealth” which members of that generation must then pass on to members of the next generation.Once this picture is accepted, the standard bundle of property rights is problematic, for it takes the owner of a constituent of the Commonwealth (e.g. that gallon of oil) to have the right to “waste, destroy or modify” that item at will. This paper therefore presents a revised set of property rights which takes seriously the idea that each generation has an equal claim on the resources that nature has bequeathed us, whilst allowing certain effects on those natural resources by each generation, and a degree of exclusive use of those natural resources owned by an individual.


1970 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 26-32
Author(s):  
Pak-Hang Wong

Current research in Intercultural Information Ethics (IIE) is preoccupied, almost exclusively, by moral and political issues concerning the right and the just (e.g., Hongladarom & Ess 2007; Ess 2008; Capurro 2008) These issues are undeniably important, and with the continuing development and diffusion of ICTs, we can only be sure more moral and political problems of similar kinds are going to emerge in the future. Yet, as important as those problems are, I want to argue that researchers‘ preoccupation with the right and the just are undesirable. I shall argue that IIE has thus far overlooked the issues pertaining to the good life (or, individual‘s well-being). IIE, I claim, should also take into account these issues. Hence, I want to propose a new agenda for IIE, i.e. the good life, in the current paper.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 305
Author(s):  
Otto Gusti Madung

This essay presents two types of tolerance: passive tolerance and active or authentic tolerance. Passive tolerance is vertical and is illustrated in the attitude of one being forced by a pluralist societal situation to allow others to exist. Here tolerance is a gift from the powerful majority but can be taken away at any time if minorities infringe a number of conditions. Active or authentic tolerance accepts the right to existence, freedom and the wish of others to develop precisely as others. This principle of tolerance is in accord with the situation of contemporary democratic societies that are plural and which are characterized by potential conflict due to differing concepts of the good life. This essay illustrates how the concept of authentic tolerance is an appropriate model for a post-secular society marked by an increasingly public function by religion. <b>Keywords:</b> Passive tolerance, active tolerance, secularization, postsecularism,public reason,religion --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tulisan ini memperkenalkan dua jenis toleransi yakni toleransi pasif dan toleransi aktif atau autentik. Toleransi pasif bersifat vertikal dan tampak dalam sikap terpaksa membiarkan yang lain hidup karena realitas sosial yang plural. Di sini toleransi adalah hadiah dari penguasa dan setiap saat dapat dicabut kembali jika kaum minoritas melanggar sejumlah ketentuan. Toleransi aktif atau autentik mengiakan hak hidup atau keberadaan, kebebasan dan kehendak yang lain sebagai yang lain untuk berkembang. Prinsip toleransi ini sesuai dengan kondisi masyarakat demokratis dan plural kontemporer yang diwarnai potensi konflik lantaran perbedaan konsep good life. Tulisan ini akan menunjukkan bahwa konsep toleransi autentik merupakan konsep yang cocok dengan kondisi masyarakat post-sekular yang ditandai dengan menguatnya peran publik agama- agama. <b>Kata-kata kunci:</b> Toleransi pasif, toleransi aktif, sekularisasi, postsekularisme,nalar publik, agama


Author(s):  
Edmund Phelps

This chapter considers three questions arising from the idea of a ‘structural transformation’ of present-day economies: What is harmful in the existing structures? What goals do we want any new structures to serve? And what structures would serve the chosen goals? It begins with a discussion of the various harms attributed to the structures of advanced economies today, noting the frustration and alienation felt by the working class. It then challenges the belief that optimal resource allocation and well-functioning institutions are sufficient for a satisfactory economy, suggesting that the right economic model is the good economy—the kind of economy offering the good life. It also examines structures that make it possible to attain the desirable goals of prospering, flourishing, and self-expression. Finally, it analyses corporatism as the alternative to genuine capitalism and how it has prevented the system of economic dynamism from delivering the good life for many people.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Dennis

AbstractThe paper argues that members of future generations have an entitlement to natural resources equal to ours. Therefore, if a currently living individual destroys or degrades natural resources then he must pay compensation to members of future generations. This compensation takes the form of “primary goods” (in roughly Rawls’ sense) which will be valued by members of future generations as equally useful for promoting the good life as the natural resources they have been deprived of. As a result of this policy, each generation inherits a “Commonwealth” of natural resources plus compensation (plus, perhaps, other things donated to the Commonwealth). It is this inherited “Commonwealth” which members of that generation must then pass on to members of the next generation.Once this picture is accepted, the standard bundle of property rights is problematic, for it takes the owner of a constituent of the Commonwealth (e.g. that gallon of oil) to have the right to “waste, destroy or modify” that item at will. This paper therefore presents a revised set of property rights which takes seriously the idea that each generation has an equal claim on the resources that nature has bequeathed us, whilst allowing certain effects on those natural resources by each generation, and a degree of exclusive use of those natural resources owned by an individual.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Nelza Mulki Iqbal

The Greek thinker Aristotle ever tried to explain cities phenomenon by mentioning that a good life can be founded in the togetherness of city living. Nevertheless, today’s fact there is no city has ever meant the good life for all its inhabitants. It becomes harder and harder to define a good life inside the city, as well as looking what makes a good city in current perspective. Cities are now seen at best as a great social problem and at worst as utopian city solution that yet never come. That makes sense that the concept of making good city is debatable, and somehow it is very subjective. Starting with an explanation of the period when a good city notion emerged, this essay will try to analyze in a very brief manner the discourses between physical and non-physical strategies to develop a good city notion. Afterwards, it will be extended to the role of opportunity to build a future good city. The opportunity will be in line with the concept of the right to the city, which originally based on Henri Lefebvre’s Theory (Lefebvre, 1996). Staying back to the musing between what is good and what is bad, this essay is trying to investigate what is reasoning behind good or bad and how to solve it. Then, it will be navigated to how people can deal with the bad condition of the city and solving their problem as a part of their right. The notions of a good city, however, belong to the residents. What city needs the most was a most intricate and close-grained diversity of uses that give each other constant mutual supports (Jacobs, 1961). The cases of Kampung Code in Yogyakarta, which was the winner of Aga Khan Award for Architecture in 1992 will be highlighted to be an example of how people are dealing with their bad condition, struggling on their right and taking the opportunity given.


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