scholarly journals Toleransi dan Diskursus Post-Sekularisme

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 305
Author(s):  
Otto Gusti Madung
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Potential Conflict ◽  
Secular Society ◽  
Democratic Societies ◽  
The Right

This essay presents two types of tolerance: passive tolerance and active or authentic tolerance. Passive tolerance is vertical and is illustrated in the attitude of one being forced by a pluralist societal situation to allow others to exist. Here tolerance is a gift from the powerful majority but can be taken away at any time if minorities infringe a number of conditions. Active or authentic tolerance accepts the right to existence, freedom and the wish of others to develop precisely as others. This principle of tolerance is in accord with the situation of contemporary democratic societies that are plural and which are characterized by potential conflict due to differing concepts of the good life. This essay illustrates how the concept of authentic tolerance is an appropriate model for a post-secular society marked by an increasingly public function by religion. <b>Keywords:</b> Passive tolerance, active tolerance, secularization, postsecularism,public reason,religion --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tulisan ini memperkenalkan dua jenis toleransi yakni toleransi pasif dan toleransi aktif atau autentik. Toleransi pasif bersifat vertikal dan tampak dalam sikap terpaksa membiarkan yang lain hidup karena realitas sosial yang plural. Di sini toleransi adalah hadiah dari penguasa dan setiap saat dapat dicabut kembali jika kaum minoritas melanggar sejumlah ketentuan. Toleransi aktif atau autentik mengiakan hak hidup atau keberadaan, kebebasan dan kehendak yang lain sebagai yang lain untuk berkembang. Prinsip toleransi ini sesuai dengan kondisi masyarakat demokratis dan plural kontemporer yang diwarnai potensi konflik lantaran perbedaan konsep good life. Tulisan ini akan menunjukkan bahwa konsep toleransi autentik merupakan konsep yang cocok dengan kondisi masyarakat post-sekular yang ditandai dengan menguatnya peran publik agama- agama. <b>Kata-kata kunci:</b> Toleransi pasif, toleransi aktif, sekularisasi, postsekularisme,nalar publik, agama

Public Reason and Prostitution

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Sex Work ◽  
State Policy ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Conception Of The Good

This chapter critically engages with the “sex work” approach to prostitution and argues that treating “sex work” like any other form of work is neither possible nor compatible with valuing the freedom and equality of women as citizens. Liberals often claim, erroneously, that liberalism’s commitment to a kind of neutrality among competing conceptions of the good life and its commitment to antipaternalism requires either decriminalization or legalization of prostitution. While arguments that rest on a particular conception of the “good” of sex or of the role of sex in a broader conception of the good are illegitimate grounds for state policy, it is argued that there are, nonetheless, good public reason arguments against decriminalization or legalization of prostitution. A defense of the Nordic model is offered.

What’s good about the good life? Action theory, virtue ethics and modern morality

2020 ◽  
pp. 019145372094837
Author(s):  
Frédéric Vandenberghe
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Critical Realism ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
The Social ◽  
New Research ◽  
The Right

The article explores the scope and the limits of virtue ethics from the perspective of critical theory (Habermas) and critical realism (Bhaskar). Based on new research in moral sociology and anthropology, it ponders how the self-realization of each can be combined with the self-determination of all. The article adopts an action-theoretical perspective on morality and defends the priority of the right over the good. It suggests that in plural and polarized societies, there no longer exists a consensus on any version of the good life. It therefore limits the scope of virtue ethics to personal life and pleads for a minima moralia at the social and political level.

Animal Democracy and the Challenges of Political Participation

2019 ◽  
pp. 202-215
Author(s):  
Eva Meijer
Keyword(s):  
Political Participation ◽  
Animal Rights ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Political Interaction ◽  
Human Animal ◽  
Species Specific ◽  
The Right

Chapter 8 turns the focus from activism to political participation. Non-human animal political participation is often either not considered relevant, or not considered at all, by animal rights theorists. This is problematic, because the right to political participation—to co-shaping the rules under which one lives—is not just any right. Non-human animals are individuals with their own perspectives on life and their own idea of the good life, which cannot be reduced to species-specific templates. In this chapter, the author first discusses how and whether non-human animals can co-author the laws under which they live, and she explores the normative justifications for establishing an interspecies democracy. The second section investigates which non-human animals can or should be seen as part of a shared interspecies community with humans. The chapter concludes by exploring ways to improve democratic interaction with other animals, in which the author discusses Sue Donaldson’s proposals for enabling voice and space, and ends with two examples in which humans and other animals interact politically in order to investigate how democratic non-human animal participation can be improved: material deliberation with seagulls, and human-macaque greeting rituals as new forms of political interaction.

Property Rights, Future Generations and the Destruction and Degradation of Natural Resources

2014 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Dennis
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Next Generation ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
The Right ◽  
At Will

AbstractThe paper argues that members of future generations have an entitlement to natural resources equal to ours. Therefore, if a currently living individual destroys or degrades natural resources then he must pay compensation to members of future generations. This compensation takes the form of “primary goods” (in roughly Rawls’ sense) which will be valued by members of future generations as equally useful for promoting the good life as the natural resources they have been deprived of. As a result of this policy, each generation inherits a “Commonwealth” of natural resources plus compensation (plus, perhaps, other things donated to the Commonwealth). It is this inherited “Commonwealth” which members of that generation must then pass on to members of the next generation.Once this picture is accepted, the standard bundle of property rights is problematic, for it takes the owner of a constituent of the Commonwealth (e.g. that gallon of oil) to have the right to “waste, destroy or modify” that item at will. This paper therefore presents a revised set of property rights which takes seriously the idea that each generation has an equal claim on the resources that nature has bequeathed us, whilst allowing certain effects on those natural resources by each generation, and a degree of exclusive use of those natural resources owned by an individual.

Part I, 3 Liberal Perspectives

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahdar Rex ◽  
Leigh Ian
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Religious Freedom ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Faith Communities ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Faith Based ◽  
State Neutrality ◽  
Litmus Test

This chapter discusses liberal political thought and its understanding and treatment of religion. Section II begins by briefly outlining the nature and character of liberalism. The premise is that liberalism is the principal philosophical foundation for law in modern liberal democracy. Our contemporary notions of ‘religious freedom’ are ones that have been indubitably shaped by liberal attitudes to religion, faith communities, and the call of conscience. The chapter then turns to the liberal claim of neutrality between competing conceptions of the good life. Is liberalism as impartial as it purports to be? What does state neutrality towards religion in practice actually require? This chapter also examines the privatization of religious (and other) beliefs in a liberal polity, and considers a leading liberal litmus test for public policy — John Rawls' concept of ‘public reason’. Section III analyses the principal secular liberal justifications for religious freedom. It argues that unless we know why religious liberty is worth protecting, our ability to deal with new and increasingly insistent faith-based claims for legal recognition and protection will be hampered.

scholarly journals The ‘Good Life’ in Intercultural Information Ethics: A New Agenda

1970 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 26-32
Author(s):  
Pak-Hang Wong
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Information Ethics ◽  
Current Paper ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Right ◽  
And Diffusion ◽  
Intercultural Information Ethics

Current research in Intercultural Information Ethics (IIE) is preoccupied, almost exclusively, by moral and political issues concerning the right and the just (e.g., Hongladarom & Ess 2007; Ess 2008; Capurro 2008) These issues are undeniably important, and with the continuing development and diffusion of ICTs, we can only be sure more moral and political problems of similar kinds are going to emerge in the future. Yet, as important as those problems are, I want to argue that researchers‘ preoccupation with the right and the just are undesirable. I shall argue that IIE has thus far overlooked the issues pertaining to the good life (or, individual‘s well-being). IIE, I claim, should also take into account these issues. Hence, I want to propose a new agenda for IIE, i.e. the good life, in the current paper.

Desirable Directions of Structural Transformation

2019 ◽  
pp. 683-691
Author(s):  
Edmund Phelps
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Structural Transformation ◽  
Economic Model ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Optimal Resource Allocation ◽  
Existing Structures ◽  
Advanced Economies ◽  
Optimal Resource ◽  
The Right

This chapter considers three questions arising from the idea of a ‘structural transformation’ of present-day economies: What is harmful in the existing structures? What goals do we want any new structures to serve? And what structures would serve the chosen goals? It begins with a discussion of the various harms attributed to the structures of advanced economies today, noting the frustration and alienation felt by the working class. It then challenges the belief that optimal resource allocation and well-functioning institutions are sufficient for a satisfactory economy, suggesting that the right economic model is the good economy—the kind of economy offering the good life. It also examines structures that make it possible to attain the desirable goals of prospering, flourishing, and self-expression. Finally, it analyses corporatism as the alternative to genuine capitalism and how it has prevented the system of economic dynamism from delivering the good life for many people.

Property Rights, Future Generations and the Destruction and Degradation of Natural Resources

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Dennis
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Next Generation ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
The Right ◽  
At Will

AbstractThe paper argues that members of future generations have an entitlement to natural resources equal to ours. Therefore, if a currently living individual destroys or degrades natural resources then he must pay compensation to members of future generations. This compensation takes the form of “primary goods” (in roughly Rawls’ sense) which will be valued by members of future generations as equally useful for promoting the good life as the natural resources they have been deprived of. As a result of this policy, each generation inherits a “Commonwealth” of natural resources plus compensation (plus, perhaps, other things donated to the Commonwealth). It is this inherited “Commonwealth” which members of that generation must then pass on to members of the next generation.Once this picture is accepted, the standard bundle of property rights is problematic, for it takes the owner of a constituent of the Commonwealth (e.g. that gallon of oil) to have the right to “waste, destroy or modify” that item at will. This paper therefore presents a revised set of property rights which takes seriously the idea that each generation has an equal claim on the resources that nature has bequeathed us, whilst allowing certain effects on those natural resources by each generation, and a degree of exclusive use of those natural resources owned by an individual.

Evaluative Diversity and the (Ir)Relevance of Well-Being

2020 ◽  
pp. 173-192
Author(s):  
Sean Aas
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Disability Rights ◽  
Wide Range

This chapter is based on a concern that recent philosophical discussions about disability—more and more focused on the relevance of disability to individual well-being—risk losing sight of the original, political concerns motivating the disability rights movements and its academic interpreters. I develop this by explicating some reasons why pro-disability philosophers can and should reject welfarist arguments across a wide range of cases. Taking debates around causing disability in procreative ethics as an illustrative example, I argue that the best versions of pro-disability arguments in this area powerfully buttress long-standing liberal objections to utilitarianism and welfarism more generally—particularly concerns that policies should not be publicly justified in terms of reasonably controversial conceptions of the good life. Public reason precludes these sorts of judgments regarding well-being, I argue, whether they are positive or negative about the welfare value of disability.

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