scholarly journals Selective Distribution Restrictions in the EU Competition Law

Lexonomica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-280
Author(s):  
Daria Kostecka-Jurczyk
Keyword(s):  
Distribution Channels ◽  
Demarcation Line ◽  
Selective Distribution ◽  
Sales Channels ◽  
Safe Harbour ◽  
Online Sales ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Internet Sales ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Eu

The dynamic development of digital technologies favours the rapid increase the popularity of electronic commerce, but at the same time causes an ever-stronger competitive pressure, prompting manufacturers and wholesalers to use various tools for controlling the sales system, especially prices. They often impose various restrictions on commercial partners (e.g. distributors) by preventing them from using certain sales channels. However, it is difficult to delimit the legality of such sales restrictions. It is very difficult to find an answer to the question of where the appropriate demarcation line should be drawn that determines the violation of competition rules, especially in online sales. Regulation 330/2010 seems not to be tailored to the assessment of restrictions in online distribution channels. The aim of the article is to point out the lack of appropriate tools to assess the restrictions of internet sales. The article shows that there is currently no uniform approach by antitrust authorities, which in turn results in legal uncertainty. It seems that the amendment of Regulation 330/2010 should be considered and the market share threshold set out in it should be lowered, while at the same time ensuring that it will be an actual safe harbour for companies, including online distributors.

scholarly journals Europeanisation and the restraint of trade doctrine

Legal Studies ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 623-641 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Catherine Lucey
Keyword(s):  
Negative Impact ◽  
Interface Problem ◽  
Top Down ◽  
High Court ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Applied Art ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Restraint Of Trade ◽  
The Eu

The common law restraint of trade doctrine continues to provide valuable protection in a variety of business contexts. This paper analyses an incompatibility problem that has arisen between that doctrine and EU competition rules (in particular Art 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU [TFEU]) as implemented by EU Regulation 1/2003, which, amongst other matters, delineates the interface between national law and EU competition law. According to the High Court, once a court has applied Art 101 TFEU, Art 3 of the Regulation prevents a court from reaching a contrary finding under the restraint of trade doctrine. Thus, the court cannot find a clause is void under the doctrine if the clause comes within the scope of, but is not prohibited by, Art 101 TFEU. In effect, this conclusion displaces the restraint of trade doctrine for parties who are subject to unreasonable restraints that fall foul of the doctrine but are not prohibited by Art 101 TFEU. The interface problem and the possible solution are presented as issues of Europeanisation. The negative impact on national law deriving from an EU measure is portrayed as a ‘top down’ Europeanisation scenario. A contrary ‘uploading’ perspective reveals how and why Art 3 and associated Recitals in Regulation 1/2003 were ‘constructed’. These findings on the intended scope of Art 3 are used to challenge the High Court's view on the negative implications of the Regulation for the restraint of trade doctrine. Finally, this paper offers specific proposals as to how courts in the United Kingdom and Ireland could ensure that the restraint of trade doctrine is not an inevitable casualty of Europeanisation. It argues that when looking for a solution to the ‘top-down’ Europeanisation problem faced by the restraint of trade doctrine, the ‘uploading’ perspective of Europeanisation suggests a solution.

23. Particular sectors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1019-1055
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Transport Sector ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Electronic Communications ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Military Equipment ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Eu

This chapter deals with four issues. First it will briefly examine three sectors of the economy that are wholly or partly excluded from EU competition law, namely nuclear energy, military equipment and agriculture; the special regime that once existed for coal and steel products under the former European Coal and Steel Community (‘the ECSC’) Treaty is also mentioned in passing. Secondly, it will explain the application of the EU competition rules apply to the transport sector. Thirdly, the chapter will consider the specific circumstances of four so-called ‘regulated industries’, electronic communications, post, energy and water, where a combination of legislation, regulation and competition law seek to promote competition. Last, but by no means least, the current debate concerning digital platforms is discussed where it is likely that ex ante regulatory rules will be introduced, both in the EU and the UK, to address concerns about anti-competitive conduct and a tendency towards the monopolisation of markets.

scholarly journals The Implementation of the ECN+ Directive in Hungary and Lessons Beyond

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 55-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin J. Cseres
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Institutional Aspects ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
The Eu

In order to facilitate national competition authorities (NCAs) in their application of EU competition rules, the EU legislator adopted Directive 2019/1/EU. The Directive’s aim is to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers of competition law and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. The so-called ECN+ Directive introduces minimum harmonisation rules allowing competition authorities to have common investigative, decision-making (notably fining decisions) and enforcement powers. The Directive, furthermore, sets minimum safeguards for the NCAs’ independence, accountability and resources as well as harmonizes leniency programmes including the coordination of national leniency programmes with each other and with that of the European Commission. This paper critically analyzes the legal and policy developments that paved the way for the adoption of this Directive. Moreover, it examines the changes the implementation of the Directive is likely to generate in current Hungarian law and policy of competition protection. The focus of the paper’s assessment is on the institutional aspects of the Directive and the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in particular the mechanisms for ensuring independence and accountability of the NCAs. Through the assessment of the Hungarian implementation, the paper aims to shed light on a broader context of the Directive and the enforcement of EU competition law in EU Member States. The paper shows that the implementation of the Directive may fail to translate into (more) effective enforcement without an effective institutional capacity on the side of the NCAs, and in the broader legal and constitutional context of competition law and its multilevel enforcement

Rule of Law Values in the Decentralized Public Enforcement of EU Competition Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin J Cseres
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Governance Model ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Consistent Application ◽  
The Eu

This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.

scholarly journals The Constitutional Limits of EU Competition Law—United in Diversity

2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-283
Author(s):  
Chris Townley ◽  
Alexander H. Türk
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
The Eu

The allocation of legislative and executive competences in multilevel governance structures affects who controls norms. Over the last two decades we see a general trend in EU law, towards “flexibility, mixity and differentiation.” Yet many think that EU competition policy and enforcement marches to a different tune. Competence is rarely discussed there and, when it is, most assume that uniformity is desirable. This article discusses the EU constitutional system as it relates to competition policy and enforcement. It investigates what choices the EU Treaties make about diversity. As with many constitutional arrangements, the EU Treaties sometimes leave space for others to decide. In these spaces we advocate answers, based on our understanding of the constitutional settlement between the EU and the Member States. This has major implications for, amongst others: the Commission’s power to relieve the Member States’ national competition authorities (NCAs) of their competence to apply Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); the vires of EU merger control outside of the remit of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU; Commission efforts to make the NCAs more independent of political influence; and the resolution of conflicts between EU and national competition rules.

Market Competition

2019 ◽  
pp. 99-130
Author(s):  
Anu Bradford
Keyword(s):  
Market Competition ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Critical Dimension ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Global Effect ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Regulatory Capacity ◽  
Key Aspects ◽  
The Eu

Chapter 4 discusses competition law, which offers one of the most prominent examples of the EU’s global regulatory hegemony. This chapter first introduces the key aspects of EU competition law. It then explains why the EU has chosen to build an extensive regulatory capacity in this area, illustrating how competition law forms a critical dimension of the EU’s broader, single market program. Following that, it offers examples of the de facto and de jure Brussels Effects pertaining to competition regulation. These examples illustrate that the de jure Brussels Effect has been extensive. At the same time, the occurrence of the de facto Brussels Effect often turns to the question of non-divisibility, at times enabling while at times limiting the global effect of EU competition rules.

scholarly journals Marketplaces Restrictions and Selective Distribution after Coty Germany

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (18) ◽  
pp. 241-284
Author(s):  
Patrycja Szot ◽  
Ana Amza
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Luxury Good ◽  
Luxury Goods ◽  
Selective Distribution ◽  
Price Comparison ◽  
Online Platforms ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Key Points ◽  
The Eu

This article discusses the framework of selective distribution agreements within EU competition law following the Coty Germany case and the EU Commission’s 2017 E-commerce report. It argues that the judgment removed, in essence, the limitation of sales via online platforms from the ‘by object box’. In respect of luxury goods, the ban is considered not to infringe competition law at all. In this context, the article addresses one of the judgment’s key points: what constitutes a ‘luxury good’ and evaluates to what an extent this definition can be practically applied. The authors also embark on the conditions under which the restriction is considered proportionate (when applied to non-luxury goods) and point to the risk of divergent interpretations of platform bans across member states. To illustrate the latter, several examples are given from national case-law. The considerations are completed with a brief look at problematic restrictions on the use of price comparison tools.

scholarly journals The indirect route of securing interest of consumers and competitors under the EU competition law

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Krusha Bhatt
Keyword(s):  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Competitive Market ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Object Effect ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Indirect Route ◽  
The Eu

The theme of the present article is to deliver the notion that in order to enforce competition rules which, are aimed at maintaining a balance between profitability of the competitors and welfare of the consumers, the crucial aspect in attainting it is a healthy competitive market. Therefore, an attempt is made to analyses the role and practice of the European Courts and the Commission in protecting the structure of the competitive market as a means to secure the interests of the consumers and competitors. To convey the notion of the paper, sustenance from one of the imperative decisions given by the European Court of Justice purporting the predominant idea has been taken from the case of GlaxoSmithKline v Commission1 and other relevant cases from the locales of Article 101 coupled with Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The idea is to critically discuss the rationale of the decision delivered by the hierarchy of courts, the object-effect dichotomy under Article 101(1) for apprehending anti- competitive conduct, and to reflect upon the Commission guidelines.

Antitrust Damages in EU Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-151
Author(s):  
Albertina Albors-Llorens
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
New Era ◽  
Legal Instrument ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
The Eu

The adoption of Directive 2014/104/EU on actions for damages for infringements of the competition rules has marked the beginning of a new era in the field of the private enforcement of the EU competition rules. The arduous legislative journey leading to the adoption of the Directive, the specific aspects pertaining to the exercise of damages actions covered by it and its attempt to establish an effective coordination between the systems of public and private enforcement have already received intense attention by antitrust scholars. However, this contribution will focus on the study of the Directive’s significance as a novel legal instrument in both the fields of EU competition law and EU law in general.

6. The obligations of Member States under the EU competition rules

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Take All

This chapter examines the obligations of Member States in relation to EU competition law. Specifically, it considers the obligations that Article 4(3) TEU and Articles 37 and 106 TFEU place upon Member States. Article 4(3) requires all Member States to take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties, and to avoid any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the EU’s objectives. Article 106 particularly obligates Member States to refrain from enacting or maintaining measures contrary to the rules provided in Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109 of the TFEU. Article 37 is concerned with the procurement of goods.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document