scholarly journals The Political Economic Effects of Political Institutions : Focusing on Associative Effects between Form of Government and Electoral system

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-29
Author(s):  
Lee Sung-woo
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Economic Effects ◽  
The Political ◽  
Form Of Government ◽  
Political Economic

Initiatives, Referenda and Socialism in Switzerland

1970 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth R. Libbey
Keyword(s):  
Political Culture ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Environment ◽  
Political Actor ◽  
Political Behaviour ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Political Forces ◽  
British Labour

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN DEMOCRATIC STATES HAVE USUALLY COME into existence as the manifestation of a principle of political philosophy or as the result of a compromise among forces with different aspirations for the polity. Often both factors have been involved. Certainly the consequences for political behaviour of introducing any particular structure have been of concern to its architects, but many of these consequences are unforeseeable and the actual impact of an institutional change or the character of a formal role may in time become quite different from that intended.For a political actor, such as an individual, an interest group or a party, formal structures are given attributes of the political environment. Along with the more diffuse qualities of the political culture, they constitute the framework within which political actors must compete for influence over public policy. This framework, both formal and informal, is uneven in its effects on the fortunes of the various political forces. It favours some approaches and some groups more and in different ways than it favours others. The British Labour Party, with its concentrated voting strength, is disadvantaged by the single-member district/plurality electoral system, while its counterpart in Germany is able to maximize its strength in a system of proportional representation.

The Transition to Democracy and the Struggles to Take Over the Party

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joy K. Langston
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Transition To Democracy ◽  
Authoritarian Regime ◽  
The Political ◽  
National Party ◽  
Economic Crises ◽  
Party Change

This chapter provides a description of the political and economic crises of the mid-1990s that led to the loss of the PRI’s majority in the Chamber and the presidential defeat in 2000. Even as leaders of the authoritarian regime grappled with downward electoral trends, groups within the party began to battle among themselves over the timing and scope of the transition and of party change. The PRI adapted to the rigors of electoral competition because vote-winning groups within its ranks took over the party and defeated their internal rivals, who were less able to respond to the challenges of the ballot box. Political institutions such as federalism and the two-tiered electoral system helped define winners and losers within the party and gave the winning groups—the party’s governors and the national party officers—ways of controlling resources (candidacies and finances) that did not come into direct conflict.

Candidate Selection Reform in South Korea: The Persistence of Exclusive Practices Despite Inclusive Rules

2020 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 735-758
Author(s):  
Eun Hee Woo
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
National Level ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
The Political ◽  
Electoral Campaigns ◽  
Legal Provisions ◽  
Party Elites

This paper analyzes how democratization has affected the dynamics of candidate selection in South Korea. After democratization in the late 1980s, it was expected that intra-party democracy would follow. In response to increasing public demand, the major parties adopted primary systems in the early 2000s. Nonetheless, most candidates for the legislature are still nominated by a small number of central party elites without additional ballots in the local branches. To explain the persistence of such exclusive, centralized features of candidate selection, I highlight the limited impact democratization has had on the political environment in which the parties operate. More specifically, since the 1987 democratization process resulted in a compromise agreement established by a small number of party leaders, South Korea retained much of the political legacy from authoritarian times, such as an electoral system advantageous to the major parties and legal provisions restricting electoral campaigns, party activities, and political participation. The continuation of these political institutions makes radical candidate selection reform highly unlikely as the party elites have no incentive to expand and decentralize the selection process. Without significant changes to the political institutions at the national level, the dominance of the central party elite over the final outcome of candidate selection looks likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

“The Devil Begins to Roar”: Opposition to Early Methodists in New England

2006 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Baldwin
Keyword(s):  
New England ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
French Government ◽  
Sexual Predators ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Form Of Government ◽  
Hearts And Minds ◽  
The Devil

In the several decades after their arrival in the New England states in the late 1780s, Methodists were the objects of a wide variety of attacks, some of them mutually contradictory. Their preachers were accused of being pickpockets, horse thieves, and sexual predators, while on the other hand some converts were mocked for their excessive moral seriousness. They were suspected alternatively of being agents of the English crown, spies for the French government, and Jeffersonian radicals. Further, to some it seemed that their episcopal form of government and ecclesiastical tribunals functioned as a sort of shadow government undermining the political institutions of the nation. They were attacked for their Arminian theology, in defense of which they vigorously condemned Calvinist doctrine. They were mocked as enthusiasts and fanatics whose preachers, pretending to an immediate divine calling, inflamed the passions of their listeners and whose gatherings degenerated into bedlams of disorder, confusion, and moral scandal. They were disturbers of churches, transgressing parochial boundaries, sowing disorder, and fracturing the covenant relationship between minister and flock, all of which recalled memories of the upheaval accompanying the awakenings of the 1740s. They were unlearned rustics not fit to instruct people in divinity, but they were also sly enough to worm their way into the hearts and minds of people by shrewdly hiding their true intentions and prejudicing their hearers against the standing ministers.

scholarly journals Technologies of Manipulation During the Presidential Elections of 1999 in Ukraine

2021 ◽  
pp. 170-185
Author(s):  
Andrii Konet
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Struggle ◽  
Political Pluralism ◽  
Late Twentieth ◽  
Mixed Electoral System ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Favorable Conditions ◽  
Collective Goals

The article examines the election campaigns of the late twentieth century. in Ukraine and proved, that they operated manipulation technologies. The state was democratizing the political system, adoption of new election legislation, transition to a mixed electoral system; political pluralism was formed, the number of parties has increased significantly, the struggle for power intensified. With each subsequent election campaign (presidential, parliamentary), the political struggle intensified, and voter engagement technologies have become more vulnerable. The author proves, that the ways and purposes of application of technologies depend on motivations of subjects of the power, as: obtaining, exercising and retaining power; the desire to achieve political and social results, most profitable for pragmatic actors, although this may run counter to collective goals. In Ukraine, democratic processes are not yet complete, traditions of democracy and stable political institutions are absent. Instead, manipulation technologies, electoral engineering, which are aimed at limiting the actions of competitors and creating favorable conditions for their own victory. This prevents the formation of certain restraints, barriers to manipulation technologies, familiar to many civilized democracies.

scholarly journals Introduction: (De)democratisation in Slovenia and Montenegro: Comparing the Quality of Democracy

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-592
Author(s):  
Olivera Komar ◽  
Meta Novak
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Small Population ◽  
The Political ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Quality Of Democracy ◽  
Eu Integration ◽  
Internal And External Factors

AbstractThis paper creates a framework for the comparison of two similar and yet different democratisation cases – Slovenia and Montenegro. The two countries have obvious similarities: their geography and small population, as well as their common socialist Yugoslav heritage and common aspirations to join international organisations, most importantly the European Union. However, while Slovenia went through the democratisation process rather smoothly, Montenegro took the longer road, struggling for more than a decade to regain its independence and complete its transition. We take into account different internal and external factors in these two cases such as the year of independence and of joining NATO, the political and electoral system, ethnic homogeneity, the viability of civil society, EU integration status, economic development and the presence of war in each territory in order to identify and describe those factors that contributed to the success of democratisation in different areas: the party system, the interest groups system, the defence system, Europeanisation and social policy. We find that the democratisation process in these countries produced different results in terms of quality. Various objective measures of the quality of democracy score Slovenia higher compared to Montenegro, while public opinion data shows, in general, greater satisfaction with the political system and greater trust in political institutions in Montenegro than in Slovenia.

scholarly journals Las reglas del juego político en Chile: incentivos y restricciones para la gobernabilidad

2009 ◽  
Vol 46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Form Of Government ◽  
El Sistema ◽  
Para Determinar ◽  
Point Of Departure ◽  
Rules Of The Game

RESUMEN: El propósito del artículo es explorar las instituciones y reglas del juego que rigen el comportamiento y las relaciones entre los actores políticos chilenos desde una perspectiva de gobernabilidad democrática. Se examina en qué forma las instituciones y reglas del juego –formales e informales– contribuyen positiva o negativamente a la gobernabilidad democrática en Chile. Se centrará la atención primero en las instituciones políticas de carácter formal y después, en las de carácter informal. Al examinar las instituciones de carácter formal se distinguirá a aquellas que se vinculan más estrechamente con la forma de gobierno, los mecanismos de pesos y contrapesos, el sistema electoral y el sistema de partidos. En las informales se repasarán brevemente aquellas más visibles: clientelismo, circuitos extrainstitucionales del poder y captura del Estado. El punto de partida para este análisis recoge la idea de que un criterio clave para determinar el nivel de la consolidación democrática en un país es el que resulta de una adecuación razonablemente cercana entre reglas formales y comportamientos y prácticas de los actores.ABSTRACT: The intention of this article is to explore the institutions and rules of the game that govern the behavior of and relations between Chilean political actors from a perspective of democratic governability. It examines the ways in which the institutions and rules of the game –both formal and informal– contribute positively or negatively to democratic governability in Chile. It first focuses its attention on formal political institutions and later examines those that are informal in nature. When examining formal institutions, a special emphasis is put on those most closely linked to the form of government, the mechanisms of weights and counterweights, the electoral system and the party system. The examination of informal institutions concentrates on the most visible such institutions: clientelism, extrainstitutional circuits of power and the capture of the State. The point of departure for this analysis is the idea that a key criterion for determining the level of democratic consolidation in a country is the relative fit between formal rules and the behavior and practices of political actors.

Post-Colonial Studies of Native America. A Review Essay

2004 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 845-853
Author(s):  
Crisca Bierwert
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
Native America ◽  
Post Colonial ◽  
Colonial Studies ◽  
Power Change ◽  
Tribal Leadership ◽  
Political Economic

Twenty years ago a work entitled The Nations Within examined the political structures that keep Native polities embedded within the United States, and the legal armature that sovereignty principles might provide for future activism (Deloria and Lytle 1984). The Native nations are still “within,” in the political sense, but they are “out” in public discourses; activism has given sovereignty claims more standing that all but dreamers would have imagined in 1984. During the same period, however, federal Indian policies have alternatively buttressed and undercut the power of tribal leadership, just as they have on other continents where imperial powers have cultivated “Native authorities.” Such destabilizing shifts impel scholars of Native political, economic, and cultural histories to examine less visible violence and inequalities that underlie political institutions, particularly those that remain as evident constructions of power change.

scholarly journals An analysis of how political governance of liquid fuels contributes to energy security in Papua New Guinea

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Francis Hualupmomi
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Energy Security ◽  
Liquid Fuels ◽  
The Political ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Energy Regime ◽  
Energy Governance ◽  
Development Outcomes ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
Political Governance

<p>This study examines how political governance of liquid fuels at the institutional level contributes to energy security in Papua New Guinea (PNG) from a political economic perspective. An interpretive methodology and critical case analysis design were used to analyse LNG energy governance regime (policies, legislation, and institutions) and its relationship with energy security. The research design involved analysis of participants’ observations and documents in relation to the critical cases (instances) in the practice of the energy regime under the Somare and O’Neill governments between 2002 and 2017.  By using the characteristics of the Quality Energy Governance Framework (QEGF) which emerged from the analysis of the literature on energy governance and energy security, this study shared a new policy insight that energy security is actually created through the interactions that occur between political actors and the institutions and processes of energy governance. The study found that energy governance is a system of interacting institutions, policies and legislation created by the political institutions for the purpose of achieving economic efficiency in order to produce public value. The effective functioning of this system depends on the quality of the political institutions. A strong political institution constructs a quality policy regime which, in turn, translates into operational and adaptive qualities of an energy regime that enhances energy security. Alternatively, where a political institution is weak, the operational and adaptive qualities of the energy governance system are also incrementally diminished, thus generating energy insecurity, which, in turn, affects development outcomes.  Accordingly, the study concludes that in PNG the qualities of the energy governance system did not seem to effectively function efficiently as a whole due to the political-economic interests and non-compliance to the institutional qualities. This, in turn, has had the effect of generating energy insecurity rather than enhancing energy security. In effect, the practices associated with the formal governance arrangements have failed to deliver a consistent and predictable governance system for PNG LNG and development outcomes have suffered as a result. The social interaction of political and economic actors and their interests in the energy governance system is complex and quite difficult to predict, resulting in an unstable energy regime. Given the unpredictability of this energy regime, political reform should assume primacy as a first order priority to withstand emerging energy governance issues and challenges that might contribute to energy insecurity.</p>

scholarly journals Przemiany polityczne na Islandii w warunkach kryzysu bankowego i gospodarczego

2011 ◽  
pp. 14-45
Author(s):  
Joachim Osiński
Keyword(s):  
The Netherlands ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Banking Crisis ◽  
Banking System ◽  
The State ◽  
Political Life ◽  
The Political ◽  
Special Role ◽  
Form Of Government

The author begins with a brief description of the essential political institutions of Iceland, as a republic with a parliamentary cabinet form of government and the special role of the president, arguing with the point of views that Iceland should be seen as a state with a semi-presidential form of government. Describing the political situation before the banking crisis, the author underlines the strong position of the Independence Party, which according to the results of the parliamentary elections (elections in 2007), plays a leading role in the "political life" of the state. The author pays attention to the process of oligarchisation in that party and the informal systems of social-network-based links and pathological links between the worlds of politics and business. Growing since the 90s, the dominance of a few family clans, together with the deregulation and privatization of the economy, led to nepotism and lack of accountability on the part of politicians and business representatives. An expansion of the three largest Icelandic banks Landsbanki, Kaupthing and Glitnir, without any significant criticism and state control, has led to a situation where at the end of 2008 their assets were 10-fold greater than the GDP of Iceland. Loss of confidence in the interbank markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the U.S., caused inhibition of liquidity and consequently the collapse of these banks, eventually acquired by the state. The most spectacular was the collapse of Icesave - the Internet branch of Landsbanki operating in the UK and the Netherlands. The disintegration of the banking system led to a disintegration of the coalition government. Early elections in April 2009, won by the Social Democratic Alliance and the Left-Green Movement, led to the formation of a center-left government of Prime Minister, Ms J. Sigur?ardóttir. The first major action was the government's reorientation of foreign policy and submitting an application for EU membership, and the subsequent arrangement of the debts after the collapse of these banks, reform of the central bank and banking supervisors, the establishment of a parliamentary committee to investigate the banking crisis and identify those responsible, the appointment of a special Prosecutor investigating violations of law during privatization of the banking sector and the actions taken on the eve of the crisis. The article contains the constitutional and legal analysis of the first and second so-called referendum. on Icesave, conducted after the President vetoed a further act concerning Iceland's agreements with its creditors - the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. As a result, residents of Iceland have not agreed to repay debts incurred without any fault on their part and through arrogance, incompetence and greed of the financial elite and the political managers controlling the banking system. This puts into question the country's future membership in the EU. The government, despite the opposition to the proposal made by a vote of no confidence, which fell, still take the difficult decisions associated with the revitalization of the banking system and economy of Iceland and improve its international image.

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