scholarly journals Executive Compensation And Ownership Structure

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 593 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rim Ben Hassen ◽  
Jihene El Ouakdi ◽  
Abdelwahed Omri
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Incentive Plans ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Stock Option Incentive

The objective of this paper is to highlight the impact of ownership discrepancy and type (managers, families, institutions) on executive compensation.Basedon a sample of French listed firms and using panel data regressions, the results show that capital concentration (Jensen 1986) negatively affects both the level of total executive compensation and the probability of use of stock option incentive plans. This confirms our theoretical alignment hypothesis. Moreover, the results show no evidence of the existence of a significant effect of ownership discrepancy on managerial compensation.Institutional shareholders are likely to encourage the use of stock option incentive plans and managerial ownership positively and significantly influences the level of total and fixed compensation. Family shareholding negatively affects executive compensation variables.

scholarly journals STRUKTUR KEPEMILIKAN MANAJERIAL, STRUKTUR KEPEMILIKAN INSTITUSIONAL, DAN UKURAN PERUSAHAAN TERHADAP KINERJA PERUSAHAAN DAN DAMPAKNYA TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA PADA PERUSAHAAN SEKTOR PERTAMBANGAN BATUBARA PADA TAHUN 2017-2019

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Rina Malahayati
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
Coal Mining ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Earning Management ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
Performance Effect ◽  
The Impact

This study is aimed to examine the influence of managerial ownership structure, institutional  ownership structure, and firm size on company performance and the impact on the earning  management on companies of sector  coal mining in 2017 – 2019. Unit analysis are companies listed on coal mining  for period 2017-2019. The population are 75 observations (25 companies x 3 years). Data processing uses panel data processed by using SPSS. For testing the hypothesis, the study uses path analysis. The result showed that (1) managerial ownership structure, institutional  ownership structure, and firm size simultaneously to company performance, (2) the managerial ownership structure no effect on company performance, (3) the institutional  ownership structure effect to negatively on company performance, (4) the firm size effect to  positively on  company performance, and (5) the company performance effect to negatively on earning management.

scholarly journals Executive Compensation, Ownership Structure and Dividend Payout: Evidence from Malaysia

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 4-75
Author(s):  
Ravichandran K. Subramaniam ◽  
Chee Ghee Teh ◽  
Murugasu Thangarajah
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Payout Policy ◽  
Dividend Payout ◽  
Positive Evidence ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
The Relationship

This study seeks to present the relationship between executive compensation, dividend payout policy and ownership structure of listed firms in Malaysia. We examine a panel data on a sample of 300 of the largest Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs) on Bursa Malaysia for the years 2008 to 2014. Based on 2,009 firm-year observations, our results show consistent empirical positive evidence on the association between dividend payout and executive compensation across all models. However, the results are inconsistent with Bhattacharyya model of dividend payout. Further, there is evidence that government and family ownerships are positively associated with dividend payout. Our results show that the positive relationship between executive compensation and dividend payout is more evident in politically connected firms (PCON firms) which is consistent with the clientele (catering) theory.

The impact of board composition and ownership structure on dividend payout policy: evidence from Saudi Arabia

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Helmi A. Boshnak
Keyword(s):  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Payout Policy ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Dividend Payout ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Propensity To Pay ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThis study examines the impact of board composition and ownership structure variables on dividend payout policy in Saudi Arabian firms. In particular, it aims to determine the effect of board size, independence and meeting frequency, in addition to chief executive officer (CEO) duality, and state, institutional, managerial, family, and foreign ownership on both the propensity to pay dividends and dividend per share for Saudi-listed firms over the period 2016–2019.Design/methodology/approachThe paper captures dividend policy with two measures, propensity to pay dividends and dividend per share, and employs a range of regression methods (logistic, probit, ordinary least squares (OLS) and random effects regressions) along with a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model for robustness to account for heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and endogeneity issues. The data set is a large panel of 280 Saudi-listed firms over the period 2016 to 2019.FindingsThe results underline the importance of board composition and the ownership structure in explaining variations in dividend policy across Saudi firms. More specifically, there is a positive relationship between the propensity to pay dividends and board-meeting frequency, institutional ownership, firm profitability and firm age, while the degree of board independence, firm size and leverage exhibit a negative relation. Further, dividend per share is positively related to board meeting frequency, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, firm profitability and age, while it is negatively related to CEO duality, managerial ownership, and firm leverage. There is no evidence that family ownership exerts an impact on dividend payout policy in Saudi firms. The findings of this study support agency, signalling, substitute and outcome theories of dividend policy.Research limitations/implicationsThis study offers an important insight into the board characteristic and ownership structure drivers of dividend policy in the context of an emerging market. Moreover, the study has important implications for firms, managers, investors, policymakers, and regulators in Saudi Arabia.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence on four board and five ownership characteristic drivers of dividend policy in Saudi Arabia as an emerging stock market, thereby improving on less comprehensive previous studies. The study recommends that investors consider board composition and ownership structure characteristics of firms as key drivers of dividend policy when making stock investment decisions to inform them about the propensity of investee firms to pay dividends and maintain a given dividend policy.

How does ownership structure affect the financing and dividend decisions of firm?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tahar Tayachi ◽  
Ahmed Imran Hunjra ◽  
Kirsten Jones ◽  
Rashid Mehmood ◽  
Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al-Faryan
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Debt Financing ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Purpose Ownership structure deals with internal corporate governance mechanism, which plays important role in minimizing conflict of interests between shareholders and management Ownership structure is an important mechanism that influences the value of firm, financing and dividend decisions. This paper aims to examine the impact of the ownership structures, i.e. managerial ownership, institutional ownership on financing and dividend policy. Design/methodology/approach The authors use panel data of manufacturing firms from both developed and developing countries, and the generalized method of moments (GMM) is applied to analyze the results. The authors collect the data from DataStream for the period of 2010 to 2019. Findings The authors find that managerial ownership and ownership concentration have significant and positive effects on debt financing, but they have significant and negative effects on dividend policy. Institutional ownership shows a positive impact on financing decisions and dividend policy for sample firms. Originality/value This study fills the gap by proving the policy implications for both firms and investors, as managers prefer debt financing, but at the same time try to ignore dividend payment. Therefore, investors may not invest in firms with a higher proportion of managerial ownership and may choose to invest more in institutional ownership, which lowers the agency cost.

Earnings management and audit quality at Damascus securities exchange: Does managerial ownership matter?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zukaa Mardnly ◽  
Zinab Badran ◽  
Sulaiman Mouselli
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the individual and combined effect of managerial ownership and external audit quality, as two control mechanisms, on earnings management. Design/methodology/approach This study applies ordinary least squares estimates on fixed-time effects panel regression model to test the impact of the investigated variables on earnings management for the whole population of banks and insurance companies listed at Damascus Securities Exchange (DSE) during the period from 2011 to 2018. Findings The empirical evidence suggests a negative non-linear relationship between managerial ownership (as proxied by board of directors’ ownership) on earnings management. However, neither audit quality nor the simultaneous effect of the managerial ownership and audit quality (Big 4) affects earnings management. Research limitations/implications DSE is dominated by the financial sector and the number of observations is constrained by the recent establishment of DSE and the small number of firms listed at DSE. In addition, the non-availability of data on executive directors’ and foreign ownerships restrict our ability to uncover the impact of different dimensions of ownership structure on earnings management. Practical implications First, it stimulates investors to purchase stocks in financial firms that enjoy both high managerial ownership, as they seem enjoying higher earnings quality. Second, the findings encourage external auditors to consider the ownership structure when choosing their clients as the financial statements’ quality is affected by this structure. Third, researchers may need to consider the role of managerial ownership when analyzing the determinants of earnings management. Originality/value It fills the gap in the literature, as it investigates the impact of both managerial ownership and audit quality on earnings management in a special conflict context and in an unexplored emerging market of DSE. It suggests that managerial ownership exerts a significant role in controlling earnings management practices when loose regulatory environment combines conflict conditions. However, external audit quality fails to counter earnings management practices when conditions are fierce.

scholarly journals Determinants of Capital Structure within the Context of Corporate Governance in Egypt

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanaa A. El-Habashy
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Emerging Economy ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Western Countries ◽  
Specific Factors ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Capital Structure

This study aims to investigate the characteristics of corporate governance that impact the capital structure decisions in listed firms in Egypt, to test the efficiency of the research results conducted in the developed Western countries in an emerging economy. A sample of 240 observations from the most active non-financial companies collected in the period 2009-2014 was used for hypothesis testing. Multiple regression models (OLS) were used for data analysis. Seven variables are used in measuring the attributes of corporate governance; they are the managerial ownership, institutional shareholding, shares owned by a large block, board size, board composition, separation of CEO/Chair positions and audit type. Four ratios were calculated for measuring the capital structure, they are long-term and short-term debt to assets, total debt to assets and debt to equity. The results suggest that corporate governance attributes have a significant impact on the capital structure decisions of listed Egyptian companies. In addition, firm-specific factors such as profitability, tangibility, growth opportunities, corporate tax, firm size and non-debt tax shields influence the choice of capital structure in Egypt. The results showed the same relationship with what was obtained in developed Western countries. The paper offers some contribution in the literature and helps to understand the impact of corporate governance on Egypt's capital structure as an emerging economy.

scholarly journals Ownership structure and voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports of Malaysian listed firms

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 296-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Poh-Ling Ho ◽  
Gregory Tower
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on the voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Malaysian listed firms. The result shows that there is an increase in the extent of voluntary disclosure in Malaysian listed firms over the eleven-year period from 1996 to 2006. Ownership concentration consistently shows positive association with voluntary disclosure. Firms with higher foreign and institutional ownership have a significantly positive association with voluntary disclosure levels while firms with family ownership exhibit lower voluntary disclosure. Consistent with agency theory, different ownership structures have varied monitoring effects on agency costs and clearly influence firm’s disclosure practices. The findings provide insights to policy makers and regulators in their desire to increase transparency and accountability amidst the continual enhancement of corporate governance. The findings provide evidence that optimized ownership structure in any jurisdiction should be considered in any regulatory process that seeks to improve transparency.

scholarly journals The structure of corporate ownership and firm performance: Sri Lankan evidence

2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 723-734 ◽  
Author(s):  
Athula Manawaduge ◽  
Anura De Zoysa
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Sri Lankan ◽  
Accounting Performance ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Strong Positive Relationship ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure and concentration on firm performance in Sri Lanka, an emerging market in Asia. The study estimates a series of regressions using pooled data for a sample of Sri Lankan-listed firms to investigate the impact of ownership concentration and structure on firm performance based on agency theory framework, using both accounting and market-based performance indicators. The results of the study provide evidence for a strong positive relationship between ownership concentration and accounting performance measures. This suggests that a greater concentration of ownership leads to better performance. However, we found no significant impact using market-based performance measures, which suggests the existence of numerous market inefficiencies and anomalies. Furthermore, the findings of the study show that ownership structure does not have a significant distinguishable effect on performance.

Determinants of corporate social and environmental voluntary disclosure in Saudi listed firms

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Helmi A. Boshnak
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Firm Characteristics ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Ifrs Implementation

Purpose This paper aims to examine firm characteristics and ownership structure determinants of corporate social and environmental voluntary disclosure (CSEVD) practices in Saudi Arabia to address the paucity of research in this field for Saudi listed firms. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses manual content and regression analyses for online annual report data for Saudi non-financial listed firms over the period 2016–2018 using CSEVD items drawing on global reporting initiative-G4 guidelines. Findings Models show that Saudi firm CSEVD has increased over time compared to previous studies to an average of 68% disclosure due to new corporate governance regulations and IFRS implementation. The models show that firm size, leverage, manufacturing industry type and government ownership are positive determinants of CSEVD, while family ownership is the negative driver of CSEVD. However, firm profitability, audit firm size, firm age and institutional ownership have no impact on the level of CSEVD. Originality/value Using legitimacy and stakeholder theories, the paper determines the influence of firm characteristics and ownership structure on CSEVD, identifying implications for firm stakeholders and providing some evidence on the impact of corporate governance regulation and IFRS implementation on such disclosure. The paper provides additional evidence on progress towards Saudi’s Vision 2030.

scholarly journals Agency Costs, Corporate Governance and the Nature of Controlling Shareholders: Evidence From French Listed Firms

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dabboussi Moez
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Investment Horizon ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Indirect Benefits ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the impact of internal corporate governance on agency costs for French firms from 2000 to 2015. Our results reveal that shareholders themselves are not a homogenous group since they have no single common investment horizon. We found that managerial ownership is more effective in mitigating operational expenses. However, they take advantage of excessive spending on indirect benefits. We show that board of directors does not serve as a significant deterrent to excessive discretionary expenses. Finally, we found that dividend policy is a useful tool to reduce agency conflicts by reducing cash that is available for discretionary uses.

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