scholarly journals Widziana z III RP prawnopolityczna tożsamość Polski Ludowej

2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 89-101
Author(s):  
Artur Ławniczak

The Polish People’s Republic is a matter of the past, but not entirely. Finally, nolens volens, the current version of our old statehood is its continuation, manifested in numerous formal solutions. This is in an evident manner a republican form of statehood and a democratic system. Similar to the Stalinist Constitution of 1952, it was called a people’s democracy, but from 1976 a socialist democracy as the effect of changes in the written Ius Supremum. In the political practice, after partial totalitarianism came authoritarianism. Before 1980, there were no changes in the institutional state power system. Theoretically, the first in this structure was the Sejm — the official emanation of the Volonté Générale. The collective head of the state was the State Council with a more republican identity than the contemporary president. The Council of Ministers actually has the same shape as before 1989, as well as the parliamentary cabinet system of government. In similar situation are: the Supreme Court, the Administrative Court, the Constitutional Court, the State Tribunal, the Ombudsman, and the Supreme Chamber of Control. Their identity and philosophy of action are similar to the socio-political reality from before the system transformation, mythologized in many aspects. This does not mean that it is fiction. Its result, according to the ancient nomenclature, was the transformation of socialist democracy into bourgeois people’s rule. Actually, we rather talk about the transition from “communism” or totalitarianism to liberal democracy. But Marxist-Leninist classics claimed that communism will be a post-state society without class opposites. Finally, in the Polish People’s Republic real socialism existed, with partial totalitarian character, replaced shortly after Stalin’s death by authoritarianism, which in the socio-economic and cultural spheres tolerates spontaneous manifestations of activity, without inspirations of the authorities, its culmination being in the time of the several-month-long “Carnival of Solidarity”. The Gdańsk Agreement we can understand as a social agreement, later transformed into the Round Table Agreements. After the continuation of these events it is possible to find on the constitutional ground in 1989, and then in 1997, when the new, formalized and complete Highest Law was created, as a formal recapitulation of political transformation. So we observe the mild transition of the Polish People’s Republic into the Third Polish Republic. The first one does not exist in the text of the actual Constitution, but it is impossible to not see a certain continuity. In the situation of the important difference between the two forms of our statehood — old and new — probably in the case of a system transformation there significant revolutionary accidents would have been unavoidable, but they have not happened. Parliamentary democracy was liberalized, which manifested in in the replacement of Gierek’s famous slogan of moral and political unity with the conviction that an official electoral struggle for power between parties is necessary. The second important change in the political sphere is the greater consideration of Montesquieu’s dogma concerning the division of state power. Other changes are less significant. Also, the republican democracy has maintained its fundamental identity, although the system of institutionalized rule had changed.

Potentia ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 78-106
Author(s):  
Sandra Leonie Field

This chapter argues that Hobbes’s late view of human collective power, unlike the early view, is able to grasp informal and emergent collective power. Hobbes’s later works, with their new relational conception of potentia, offer both theoretical resources to conceive informal collective power distinct from the state, and also analytical reasons to expect such power to be politically troubling. The ‘political problem’ emerges: in order to achieve the concrete power sufficient to uphold its absolute authority (potestas), the state needs to harness or tame the informal collective powers within the populace. The chapter argues that the political problem explains the absence of the ‘sleeping sovereign’, so central to the radical democratic interpretation of Hobbes, from Hobbes’s later writings. But informal collective power cannot necessarily be celebrated as a welcome popular insurgency against excessive state power: for its characteristic inner structure is complex oligarchic allegiance rather than equal horizontal affiliation.


Author(s):  
M.A. Manokhina ◽  

The problem of reception of the antiquity through tapestries in the Russian historiography was considered. Using as an example the Flemish tapestries of the 15th–16th centuries from the Collection of the State Hermitage Museum, the transformation and popularity of ancient motifs in this art form were demonstrated, as well as their special role in the propaganda of power, high social status, and wealth. The following main elements of tapestries were analyzed: subjects, characters, costumes, and Latin banderoles. The methodology of tapestry analysis is similar to the one used by structuralists: an additional link (customer) is introduced in the author – text – reader research field. The subjects of the tapestries were compared with the plots of the corresponding ancient literary sources. As a result, it was concluded about different perception of the antiquity in the literature and fine arts. Tapestries reflect the attitude of customers to the political reality of that time. The Northern Renaissance and how it was influenced by the ideas of humanists embodied in the tapestries was discussed.


Author(s):  
O. Kosilova

The article examines the problem of restriction of political rights and freedoms. It is emphasized that the protection against unlawful restrictions on political rights and freedoms is particularly important for the functioning of direct and mediatory democracy. The meaning of the concept of «restriction of rights and freedoms» is analyzed. The article addresses the basic principles which should not be violated when the restriction of rights and freedoms is applied. To achieve this goal, the author analyzes the rules of domestic law, the practice of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, the rules of international law governing these issues. The author differentiates political rights and freedoms into those that may be restricted in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law of Ukraine and those that are not subject to any restrictions; features of realization of political rights and freedoms in comparison with other groups of rights, such as social and economic, cultural are defined. Some of the political rights and freedoms that may be restricted are analyzed and ways to restrict them are identified, in particular: the right to join political parties, suffrage, the right to peaceful assembly, rallies, marches and demonstrations, the right to equal access to public service, freedom words, thoughts, views and beliefs. It is noted that from the standpoint of the ECHR it is important to check whether the possibility of restricting the exercise of the right was provided by law; whether the purpose of such a restriction is legitimate; whether such a restriction is necessary in a democratic society. The legitimate grounds for restricting human rights enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine have been identified: public health; social necessity; rights, freedoms and dignity of citizens; public order; economic well-being; national security; territorial integrity; morality of the population. It is emphasized that in accordance with the practice of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, the restriction of the content and scope of rights and freedoms should be considered as a restriction. It is important that all restrictions were established exclusively by the constitution; were not arbitrary and unjust; the law restricting human rights must be of a general nature; restrictions must be proportionate and justified; they must optimally achieve a legitimate goal with minimal interference in the exercise of rights or freedoms, not to violate the essential content of the relevant right. It is determined that special qualification requirements for holding public positions, as well as participation in the electoral process (implementation of active and passive suffrage) cannot be considered restrictions. It is emphasized that the state, represented by its organs, should refrain from unjustified interference with political rights (for example, from discriminatory restrictions on the suspension of political rights of prisoners, violation of electoral secrecy of the ballot); take measures against possible violations of political rights by third parties (individuals, companies, etc.). It is concluded that restrictions on the exercise of political rights of individuals can be introduced either in favor of guaranteeing the rights of other individuals, or in favor of ensuring the functioning of the state. The legitimate exercise of political rights can be restricted only if the general conditions for interfering with fundamental human rights are met.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 103
Author(s):  
Marhaban Marhaban

This article describes the political philosophy of Ali Hasjmy in formulating the ideal Islamic state. Hasjmy is an intellectual who has produced many works in the topics of politics, literature, and culture that are very useful for the progress and welfare of the Acehnese people and the Indonesian nation in general. The main source of this research is the work and writings of Hasjmy which are directly oriented to politics and the concept of the state. By using analytical content, this article shows several premises on Hasjmy’s utopian visions, which are; First, Muslims should not be anti-politics due to its important in achieving the benefit of the people; Second, the existence of a Islamic state as mandatory; Third, an Islamic state does not have to exist constitutionally but what must exist as Islamic values in a state; Fourth, the importance of obeying the leader; Fifth, every official or government element is responsible for exercising power.


2019 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-30
Author(s):  
O. S. Bakumov

Special attention has been paid to the fact that the doctrine of legal liability of the state to a person is increasingly affirmed in Ukraine as a theoretical basis for the functioning of state power in general and all its agencies in particular. However, despite the large number of scientific developments, the national legal science still can not boast of an unambiguous and generally recognized understanding of the essence of the phenomenon of legal liability of the state. It has been stressed that legal liability was interpreted for a long time as a kind of “continuation” of the state itself: in the context of the concept of state coercion means it was solely perceived as an instrument of state power for punishing offenders. However, such a concept denied the question about legal liability of the state itself as an equal personality of the subject of law. It has been stated that the phenomenon of legal liability of the state one can consider a certain continuation of the political and legal strategy on self-limitation of the state by law. Such liability is naturally considered a characteristic feature of the legal type of statehood, and it directly concerns only the democratic type of states. Instead, undemocratic states do not bear or acknowledge (or only declare) any real legal liability to society. Therefore, in terms of a democracy, the state is a real subject of liability to society, which is guaranteed on the normative and institutional levels. The current stage of development of the institution of legal liability of the state is characterized by the highest normative level of its institutionalization – constitutional one. This level ensures: 1) the irreversibility of the state’s course on the establishment of legal statehood; 2) fixing the starting, the main elements of the normative model of legal liability of the state; 3) completion of the registration of legal personality of the state in the modern world, which was incomplete without constitutional establishment of its legal liability; 4) the parity nature of the relations of the state with other subjects of law on the basis of a combination of dispositive and imperative, public and private components. The constitutional model of the state’s legal liability to a human being is based on the same principles in Ukraine. Such liability, in particular, is not limited to the political or moral liability of public authorities to society, but has the features of legal liability as applying measures of public and legal (constitutional or international) nature to the state and its agencies for the failure or improper performance of the duties.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Fauzan

The authority of the Constitutional Court to adjudicate and decide upon the opinion of the House of Representatives that the President and/or vice  president has violated the law of treason to the state, corruption, bribery, other felonies, or moral turpitude, and/or that the President and /or Vice President no longer meets the conditions as President and/or Vice President are normative efforts to avoid a repeat of dismisal that are soley based on slander and suspicion which are only to satisfy the political interests of political elites. Key words : The authority of the Constitutional Court, Impeachment


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 84-90
Author(s):  
Balaklytskyi A.

The article on the theoretical level explores the peculiarities of the transformation of the nation state in conditions of globalization in the context of contemporary realities. It is emphasized that globalization with varying strengths and intensities, that is, has uneven effects on the state and its components. In particular, if we take the form of the state, which includes the form of government, the form of state administrative-and-territorial system and political regime, then, given the empirical material of recent decades, we can conclude that globalization has a significant impact primarily on a political regime that is increasingly transformed towards the democratization and liberalization of public life. At the same time, globalization exerts less influence on such constituent forms of the state as the form of state government and the form of state administrative-and-territorial system, which is conditioned, among other things, by the specific nature of the latter. In particular, in the conditions of globalization, the form of state government of a modern state is transformed primarily in the context of the dynamics of the functioning of the system of higher power institutions in the state, and not in the context of a specific way of existence and expression of the system of supreme bodies of state power. At the same time, globalization affects on the development of democratic foundations of the organization and functioning of the system of public authorities, contributing to ensuring the practical implementation of the rule of law, regardless of the specific model of government (monarchy or republic), whose presence in the state is associated with a certain historical tradition of its development and level of its perception in the mass consciousness in society. Influencing on the form of state administrative-and-territorial system, globalization facilitates processes of regionalization as a complex process of redistribution of administrative powers between the state and its administrative-territorial units, as a result of which new governmental and institutional forms are gradually being formed, corresponding to the new role of regional state formations in the decision-making process at national and supranational levels. In addition, in the context of globalization, the democratic model of the political regime acquires special features related to the formation and functioning of supranational institutions and associations, within which the political domination of nation-states gradually moves to a new level, the ultimate stage of which is global governance. Also, globalization not only causes the corresponding transformations of the content of the traditional functions of the state, in particular, economic, political, social, etc., but also creates the appropriate prerequisites for the rapid development of new functions, the content of which previously had no independent meaning and was considered mainly as an integral part of some other function of the state (for example, the environmental and information functions of the modern state). Thus, it is concluded that the transformation of the state in the conditions of globalization is systemic and, at the same time, contradictory, because, on the one hand, it manifests itself both at the level of all its constituent elements of its form and at the level of the dynamics of its concrete activity within certain temporal and spatial limits (functions of the state), and on the other – it intensifies the multi-vector processes and even the tendencies of development of both individual constituents of the form of the state (for example, the form of the state administrative-and-territorial system) and the functions of the state, in particular, economic and social. Keywords: state, globalization, form of the state, functions of the state, political regime, democracy, state power


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 126-139
Author(s):  
Novan Mahendra Pratama

The Constitutional Court's decision does not necessarily lead to the restoration of constitutional rights. This will be interesting to be examined because the state, in this case represented by the Constitutional Court, can only recover the constitutional losses suffered by citizens if it issues a decision. However, there are also citizens who still feel that their losses have not been recovered by the issuance of this decision. Then how can the Constitutional Court recover such constitutional losses by still referring to the constitution and laws and regulations? This research method uses normative research methods. The results of this study indicate that the Constitutional Court decisions do not always lead to the restoration of the constitutional rights of the injured citizens. Then what are the other ways to recover the constitutional losses still experienced by citizens. This constitutional loss really needs to be restored because its existence is guaranteed in the constitution and all branches of state power are obliged to respect it by not committing violations even to the point of loss


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (5) ◽  
pp. 949-967 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaffa Truelove

State quantifications of Delhi’s water supply proclaim some of the highest levels of access in urban South Asia. However, accompanying such representations are a number of discrepancies and ambiguities, suggesting an appearance of legibility is produced in the absence of data and key calculations. This paper examines the co-production of both knowledge and ignorance with regard to the city’s water, showing how their entanglement serves to powerfully shape both urban biopolitics and diffuse modalities of state power. First, I demonstrate that the appearance of legibility is maintained through fragmented measurement and bureaucratic practices that build material ambiguity into the system. Secondly, I examine the political, discursive and material effects of such illegibility, which include outcomes that are both arbitrary in nature (inadvertently allotting more water to one area versus another) and well as more deliberate (attributing blame for water wastage and loss to the very populations and urban spaces most excluded from the grid). Rather than a lack of intelligibility diminishing the powers of the state, the material ambiguity of Delhi’s waters furthers an everyday water politics of diffuse state power by which water is politicized at the local level while larger (infra)structural fixes are left off the table.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document