scholarly journals ¿Surgimiento de órdenes jurídicos sin normas independientes? El caso de las secesiones acordadas = Can Legal Orders Emerge Without Independent Norms? The Case of the Consensual Secession

Author(s):  
Jorge Baquerizo Minuche

Resumen: Según algunas elaboraciones conceptuales muy conocidas dentro de la teoría del derecho, todo orden jurídico se origina a través de la producción de normas «independientes», esto es, normas que carecen de algún fundamento de validez identificable en normas jurídicas. No obstante, hay autores que consideran que lo anterior no constituye condición necesaria ni suficiente para el surgimiento de un nuevo orden jurídico: en los casos de secesión acordada, por ejemplo, un nuevo orden jurídico estatal emergería sin necesidad de que se hayan dictado normas no autorizadas jurídicamente. En el presente trabajo analizaré y criticaré esta última idea y concluiré que, incluso ante la posibilidad de una exitosa secesión acordada, de ello no se sigue, per se, la existencia de un nuevo orden jurídico (lo que sólo puede ocurrir bajo una condición necesaria: producir normas «independientes»).Palabras clave: Orden jurídico, orden estatal, normas independientes, poder constituyente, secesión.Abstract: According to some well-known conceptual elaborations within the theory of law, every legal order emerges through the production of «independent» norms, i.e., norms that lack any identifiable basis of validity in legal norms. However, some authors consider that this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the emergence of a new legal order: in cases of consensual secession, for instance, a new legal order would emerge without unauthorized norms. In this paper I will analyze and criticize this last idea and conclude that, even with the possibility of a successful consensual secession, the existence of a new legal order does not follow per se. This can only occur under a necessary condition: to produce «independent» norms.Keywords: Legal order, state order, independent norms, constituent power, secession.

1966 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Kelsen

The Pure Theory of Law is a theory of positive law, not of a definite legal order, but of the law in general. It is a general theory of law. As such it is the most consistent version of that school of jurisprudence which is called legal positivism because it considers as “law” only positive law and refuses to recognize as law any other normative social order even if, in the usage of language, it is called “law”, as e.g. so-called “natural law”.Law is—according to the Pure Theory of Law—by its very nature a definite type of norm. As a “norm” the law is the specific meaning of an act of will directed at a definite human behavior. This meaning is: that men ought to behave in a certain way. Hence an essential presupposition of the Pure Theory of Law as a positivistic theory is the recognition of the fundamental difference between the “ought” and the “is”, between norms and assertions. Assertions describe a certain object; they are true or false; norms are not describing, but prescribing; they are neither true nor false; they are valid or non-valid. Hence it is necessary to distinguish as clearly as possible between legal norms established by the legal authority, and assertions of the science of law about legal norms, the sentences by which this science describes its object.


2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (7) ◽  
pp. 624-638
Author(s):  
J. de Vicente

We study the separability of bipartite quantum systems in arbitrary dimensions using the Bloch representation of their density matrix. This approach enables us to find an alternative characterization of the separability problem, from which we derive a necessary condition and sufficient conditions for separability. For a certain class of states the necessary condition and a sufficient condition turn out to be equivalent, therefore yielding a necessary and sufficient condition. The proofs of the sufficient conditions are constructive, thus providing decompositions in pure product states for the states that satisfy them. We provide examples that show the ability of these conditions to detect entanglement. In particular, the necessary condition is proved to be strong enough to detect bound entangled states.


Author(s):  
Eswaran Sridharan

This chapter analyses India’s prospects as a rising power by asking what kind of power India has the potential to be, given its military, economic, and institutional capacities and the economic and geostrategic constraints it faces. It argues that while sustained high growth is a necessary condition it is not a sufficient condition since economic growth does not necessarily convert smoothly into greater power. Due to such conversion problems India, like some other powers, might not be able to exercise commensurate regional, extra-regional, and global influence as might appear to follow from the revival of sustained high growth and increased economic weight. The more achievable and likely alternative is that of a coalitional or bridging power that can play the role of an effective partner in the security and other spheres to a range of powers, principally to the United States and in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 227
Author(s):  
Mohammad Imam Utoyo ◽  
Basuki Widodo ◽  
Toto Nusantara ◽  
Suhariningsih Suhariningsih

This script was aimed to determine the necessary conditions for boundedness of Riesz potential in the classical Morrey space. If these results are combined with previous research results will be obtained the necessary and sufficient condition for boundedness of Riesz potential. This necessary condition is obtained through the use of characteristic function as one member of the classical Morrey space.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Díaz ◽  
Elena R. Álvarez-Buylla

AbstractThe qualitative model presented in this work recovers the onset of the four fields that correspond to those of each floral organ whorl of Arabidopsis flower, suggesting a mechanism for the generation of the positional information required for the differential expression of the A, B and C identity genes according to the ABC model for organ determination during early stages of flower development. Our model integrates a previous model for the emergence of WUS pattern in the apical meristem, and shows that this pre-pattern is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the posterior information of the four fields predicted by the ABC model. Furthermore, our model predicts that LFY diffusion along the L1 layer of cells is not a necessary condition for the patterning of the floral meristem.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 91
Author(s):  
Bartosz Lewandowski

FRANTIŠEK WEYR (1879-1951): A FORGOTTEN NORMATIVIST Summary František Weyr (1879-1951) was one of the most outstanding adherents of the normative theory of legal science during the inter-war period. His scholarly activity was focused on the basic issues important for normativism, on which he embarked shortly before Hans Kelsen’s, and with no influence from Kelsen (Weyr published his earliest book in 1908). Weyr was one of the founders and the main representative of the Czechoslovak Neo-Kantian Law School, which was composed of his former students, members of the Faculty of Law at the Tomáš Masaryk University in Brno. Members of the Czechoslovak Neo-Kantian Law School engaged in numerous polemics on key normativist issues (e.g. the nature of legal norms). F. Weyr’s work in the philosophy of law made a salient contribution to the turbulent history of Czechoslovakia, exerting an influence from the auspicious years of the independent Second Republic (1918-1938), through the period of the Czech and Moravian Protectorate under Nazi German occupation during the Second World War, to the postwar period under the Communist regime and its miserable demise in 1990. Weyr is appreciated in Czech scholarship for his achievements in the theory of law. Although he was one of the key figures associated with normativism, often compared with his colleague H. Kelsen, his work in scholarship is not well known in the Polish theory of law.


Author(s):  
Yanyan Wang

In this paper, we consider the generalized approximate boundary synchronization for a coupled system of wave equations with Dirichlet boundary controls. We analyse the relationship between the generalized approximate boundary synchronization and the generalized exact boundary synchronization, give a sufficient condition to realize the generalized approximate boundary synchronization and a necessary condition in terms of Kalman’s matrix, and show the meaning of the number of total controls. Besides, by the generalized synchronization decomposition, we define the generalized approximately synchronizable state, and obtain its properties and a sufficient condition for it to be independent of applied boundary controls.


2012 ◽  
Vol 22 (06) ◽  
pp. 1250052 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALI AKHAVI ◽  
INES KLIMANN ◽  
SYLVAIN LOMBARDY ◽  
JEAN MAIRESSE ◽  
MATTHIEU PICANTIN

This paper addresses a decision problem highlighted by Grigorchuk, Nekrashevich, and Sushchanskiĭ, namely the finiteness problem for automaton (semi)groups. For semigroups, we give an effective sufficient but not necessary condition for finiteness and, for groups, an effective necessary but not sufficient condition. The efficiency of the new criteria is demonstrated by testing all Mealy automata with small stateset and alphabet. Finally, for groups, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition that does not directly lead to a decision procedure.


1975 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-69
Author(s):  
Karl Ameriks

The primary objective of this paper is to improve the defense of the thesis that(1) bodily continuity is the primary criterion of personal identity.This is to be done by establishing (in Parts Ill and IV) that there is a unique sense in which(2) bodily continuity is a necessary condition of personal identity.A secondary objective of the paper is to illustrate (in Part I) the way in which the value and validity of (2) has been obscured in recent defenses and criticisms of (1), which inappropriately interpret it in terms of the claim that(3) bodily continuity is a sufficient condition of personal identity.Since the truth of (3) will be denied, the defense of (1) will also involve arguing (in Part II) that the traditional alternative to the bodily criterion, namely the criterion of memory and psychological characteristics, not only is not a necessary condition of personal identity but also is not a sufficient condition.


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