Euroscepticism: New Factor of European Politics

Author(s):  
G. Vainshtein

The phenomenon of Euroscepticism, not long ago a marginal part of the European political landscape, increasingly moves forward to the political foreground. This article explores the meaning of the notion of Euroscepticism, analyzes current peculiarities of this phenomenon, its scale and main sources, as well as differentiation of anti-integrationist political actors. While the very phenomenon existed in European politics throughout the implementation of the European project, a new characteristic of the socio-political situation in the EU is the ongoing broadening of this phenomenon's scale, the growth of its electoral support and the radicalization of its articulation forms. The strengthening of critical public attitudes towards realities of the European integration which is a feature of the contemporary socio-political climate in Europe not only has weakened the traditional pro-integrationist consensus of the political establishment, but has also led to a substantial reinforcement of more or less radical opponents of the European project within the European party-political space. This development seems to be an indicator of the European political mainstream “qualitative renewal”. Though the current growth of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties is to a great extent induced by the global financial and economic crisis, economic factor is not the main driving force of the Euroscepticism. At present, a wide range of diverse political and cultural factors increasingly determine commitment of European citizens to the EU. In some cases, these factors are crucial to the development of Euroscepticism. This fact is of significant importance, with regard to assessing the prospects for the given phenomenon, since political and socio-cultural motives of public Euroscepticism build much more sustainable basis for the Eurosceptical trend than economic ones. Issues relating to the prospects of Euroscepticism are of particular relevance, in connection with high performance of Eurosceptic politicians at the 2014 European Parliament elections. The elections result is not only strengthening of the "soft Eurosceptics'" positions, but also a sensational electoral “breakthrough” of “hard Eurosceptics” (Europhobes). While ability of Eurosceptics' direct influence on the decision-making process in the EP seems insignificant, much more important is their capacity to influence the agenda of the mainstream pro-European parties both in Europe and at home. Ultimately, the rise of the Euroscepticism makes the future of the European project more uncertain. Today (and probably, in the foreseeable future), the real purpose of European political elites may only be countering the trends of national sovereignty restoration, and maintenance of an integration process at its current level rather than its extension.

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johann W. Unger

The Scots language plays a key role in the political and cultural landscape of contemporary Scotland. From a discourse-historical perspective, this article explores how language ideologies about the Scots language are realized linguistically in a so-called ‘languages strategy’ drafted by the Scottish Executive, and in focus groups consisting of Scottish people. This article shows that although the decline of Scots is said to be a ‘tragedy’, focus group participants seem to reject the notion of Scots as a viable, contemporary language that can be used across a wide range of registers. The policy document also seems to construct Scots in very positive terms, but is shown to be unhelpful or potentially even damaging in the process of changing public attitudes to Scots.


Author(s):  
Simon Bulmer

The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was a founder member of the European integration process, namely the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) created in 1952. However, the circumstances were very different from the 2010s. Germany was a divided and defeated state until 1990. Integration provided important political and economic support to West Germany. From the 1970s, it strengthened the FRG’s foreign policy reach, for the new state was constrained by Cold War politics as well as other legacies, notably the Holocaust. European integration provided a framework for building trust with western neighbors, particularly France. The collapse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1989 and its absorption into the FRG through unification in 1990 brought about significant change to Germany’s relationship to European integration. The unified Germany became the largest member state. Initial concerns about German power in Europe were allayed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl pursuing deeper integration to bind the unified Germany further to integration: through creating the European Union (EU) itself and setting a course toward monetary union. Specific concerns about German power only really emerged in the 2010s, as the EU was bedeviled by several crises. In seeking to offer a comprehensive understanding of Germany’s relationship with the EU, coverage is organized around four broad themes: the historical dimension of the relationship; the substance of Germany’s European policy; the sources of Germany’s European policy; and Germany’s role and power in the EU. The historical dimension of Germany’s relationship with European integration is important as a first theme. It is no exaggeration to suggest that European integration helped emancipate the FRG from the historical legacy of turbulent relations with France, Nazi tyranny, and the opprobrium of the Holocaust. European integration afforded a complementary framework for Germany’s political and economic order. The importance of embedding German unification in a context of European integration should not be underestimated. Germany’s European policy has displayed considerable consistency up to the contemporary era. Support for further integration, for enlargement, the market order, and the development of an EU “civilian power” have been key components. These policies are important contributors to understanding Germany’s role in the EU: the second theme. The political and economic system of the FRG forms an important backdrop to understanding Germany’s policy and role in the EU: the third theme. From the 1960s until the 2010s, EU membership was subject to cross-party consensus and permissive public support. These circumstances allowed the federal government autonomy in pursuing its European policy. However, the political climate of European policy has become much more contested in the 2010s. Germany’s role was placed in the spotlight by the succession of crises that have emerged within the EU and in its neighborhood in the 2010s, particularly the eurozone and migration crises. The fourth theme explores how the question of German power re-emerged. These four themes are important to understanding Germany’s role in the EU, especially given Berlin’s centrality to its development.


2005 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 631-660 ◽  
Author(s):  
YU-KANG LEE

The Third Way started as an Anglo-American ideological and political venture. It was soon followed by major European leaders, among other worldwide government heads of state, who sought to emulate the result of a high command of electoral support and a resolution to the consequences of globalisation. Despite criticism by academics and commentators for having lack of content and substance, the Third Way appeared to be rather successful in recruiting allies, especially among Western democracies. Unlike other nations in East Asia, Taiwan is involved with this arguably prominent political project of the 21st century.The New Middle Way is not only the political idea that seemingly pushed Chen Shui-bian into office, but also appears to be the ideological foundation of his governance. This paper focuses on the political language of Chen in order to analyse and comprehend the implications of the New Taiwan Middle Way. One way to understand Chen's New Middle Way is to look into the language of the DPP, particularly of Chen. To get behind the rhetoric and decode the factual meanings of the discourse, a wide range of political speeches and texts are examined. By examining the New Taiwan Middle Way, we not only gain a different perspective on Chen's bid for the presidency, but also capture valuable insights into his governing approach.The paper argues that the effect of the New Taiwan Middle Way before the presidential election was to achieve the political objective of Chen Shui-bian. Though the DPP did not hold the majority of the seats in the Legislative Yuan prior to the December 2001 election, the New Middle Way may have served as symbolic means to an end to resolve the deadlock within the legislature. In these ways, the significance of the New Middle Way for Taiwan is to be concluded.


2020 ◽  
pp. 175048132098215
Author(s):  
Petre Breazu ◽  
Göran Eriksson

The lifting of work restrictions for Romanian and Bulgarian citizens in the EU, in January 2014, encountered much resistance both in European political discourse and the media, as these migrants became demonised and presented as social and economic threats. In this article, we show how the Romanian press dealt with such discriminatory discourses against the Romanian migrants. We conduct a thorough Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA) of news items published in Romanian press, prior to the lifting of work restrictions, and we argue that the Roma emerged as the perfect scapegoats that could explain the deviant and unruly behaviours ascribed by some western media to ‘Romanians’. We also show how racism toward the Roma, referred here as Romaphobia, invokes non-racial practices and instead builds on a reverse victimhood narrative. Such discourses relate in a broader sense to well-established discursive practices in Romanian context but also to the political climate across Europe which is marked by increased intolerance toward the Roma. It is the mixture of stereotypical discourses and populist rhetoric that makes racism towards the Roma appear naturalised and increasingly more difficult to challenge.


Author(s):  
Eva A. Duda-Mikulin

The fourth chapter focuses on Brexit – the UK’s exit from the EU with key point being around disrupted livelihoods of EU migrant workers. First, the context of neopopulism is brought to the fore. Here, I explore the criminalisation of migrants and refer to the writings of Zygmunt Bauman (2016). Second, a brief history of the European Economic Community and the EU is provided. Third, the political complexity behind the decision to hold the referendum is explored. The wider context and political climate worldwide is analysed with particular focus on the rise of distrust, disillusion and identity politics. The context of the new populism as the prevalent ideology is put against the political situation in the UK with David Cameron starting talks on the need for the people to have their say in the run up to General Election 2015. The results of the referendum are analysed and critically discussed taking into account voters and their demographic characteristics correlated with the socio-economic situation in the country. The chapter culminates in a series of case studies with the aim to illustrate pre- and post-Brexit-vote reality for those who exercised their Treaty rights and came to work in the UK.


Author(s):  
Anna Gryzmala-Busse

Historical institutionalist approaches have been critical (if unacknowledged) in the study of religion and politics in two ways. First, a particular set of ideas—religious doctrine—profoundly shaped preferences both over secular institutional forms and the strategies of religious and secular actors. Second, the historical relationship between state, nation, and religion continues to shape the political context in which churches operate and institutions arise. Several developments, such as the rise of secular education and welfare states, the rise of Christian Democratic parties, the founding of the EU, and contemporary patterns of religiosity are historically grounded in earlier episodes of church-state relations and religious doctrine.


Author(s):  
Janine Larmon Peterson

This book investigates regional saints whose holiness was contested. It scrutinizes the papacy's toleration of unofficial saints' cults and its response when their devotees challenged church authority about a cult's merits or the saint's orthodoxy. As the book demonstrates, communities that venerated saints increasingly clashed with popes and inquisitors determined to erode any local claims of religious authority. Local and unsanctioned saints were spiritual and social fixtures in the towns of northern and central Italy in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In some cases, popes allowed these saints' cults; in others, church officials condemned the saint and/or their followers as heretics. Using a wide range of secular and clerical sources, the book explores who these unofficial saints were, how the phenomenon of disputed sanctity arose, and why communities would be willing to risk punishment by continuing to venerate a local holy man or woman. It argues that the Church increasingly restricted sanctification in the later Middle Ages, which precipitated new debates over who had the authority to recognize sainthood and what evidence should be used to identify holiness and heterodoxy. The case studies presented detail how the political climate of the Italian peninsula allowed Italian communities to use saints' cults as a tool to negotiate religious and political autonomy in opposition to growing papal bureaucratization.


2018 ◽  
pp. 7-10
Author(s):  
Ignacio Ybáñez Rubio

The necessity of an exchange of views between representatives of academic and scientific centers from many countries on a wide range of issues relating to Iberoamerican region can not be overemphasized. At this difficult historical moment, it is important to understand clearly all the risks and opportunities  of international dialogue that can prevent a rollback from cooperation to the times of the cold war. Spain, acting within the EU, strives for to reduce tensions, wishing to build a Spanish-Russian relationship on a mutually beneficial basis, since both sides suffer from the growth of distrust and the restriction of exchanges. Clear prospects for cooperation between Russia and Spain exist in the struggle against common threats: terrorism and international crime, which are grieving for both countries. The problems that exist between countries should be resolved through dialogue, implementation of agreements, reached with the participation of all interested parties.


MaRBLe ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecilia Ivardi Ganapini ◽  
Johanna Rick

Scandals concerning wrongdoings of multinational corporations and governments are inescapable in the news. “Blowing the whistle” on these is often constrained out of fear of retaliation, which is why in April 2018, a Directive to assure protection to whistleblowers was proposed. Tracing the origins of the process is complicated because there are several actors operating in a multilevel polity. Hence, Kingdon’s multiple-streams model is applied to legislative texts and several news outlets, and inferences are drawn to describe the facets of the rise of whistleblowers protection on the EU agenda. This paper finds that the Greens Parliamentary group became a policy initiator after being urged by Transparency International to act. The Greens justified the need to act with old arguments, which however acquired momentum only when the political climate soothed after the scandals of LuxLeaks and Panama Papers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-305
Author(s):  
David Alenga

Abstract From the fissures of Brexit and the recent results of pan-national European Union (EU) elections, insurgent political parties are becoming a force to be reckoned with. For all their disparate centers of gravity, nearly all of them converge on the question of Euroscepticism and the liberal international order. The primary consternation, it is routinely said, is not so much their dogged populism, but that most of them are unwittingly setting themselves up to do Moscow’s bidding in Europe. Drawing on Cold War historiography, this article sets out to critique how this thesis evolved along a consistent prism of ideological meta-narratives. Its key focus is highlighting how missing links in some of the seminal moments in the history of Soviet-Western relations continue to filter into explaining contemporary political developments in the EU. This article thus makes two basic conclusions. First, that there is something to be said of the insurgent political movements as committed players in the competition for the balance of power in the political berth of Europe. And in that regard, their rhetorical association with Moscow’s positions is a pragmatic step in the grand strategy of national and pan-European politics. Second, Moscow, contrary to being the adversarial vector of liberal Europe, has historically identified its best interest with cooperating, if not outrightly, aligning with the Western-led postwar international liberal order.


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