scholarly journals A RELAÇÃO ÉTICA COMO RELIGIÃO EM EMMANUEL LÉVINAS

2010 ◽  
Vol 37 (119) ◽  
pp. 383
Author(s):  
Márcio Antônio de Paiva ◽  
José Geraldo Estevam
Keyword(s):  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ethical Relation ◽  
Original Meaning ◽  
The Face

O texto apresenta o sentido original da religião desvelado pela relação ética na qual o rosto do outro manifesta o vestígio de Deus que vem à ideia sem que esta consiga tematizá-lo ou conhecê-lo. Nessa perspectiva, a filosofia deve ser desdita constantemente por um dizer ético, conforme o propõe Lévinas.Abstract: The paper presents the original meaning of religion unveiled by the ethical relation in which the face of the other expresses the trace of God that emerges without, however, making it possible to thematize or to know Him. From this perspective, and as it is proposed by Levinas, philosophy must constantly be unsaid by an ethical saying.

Emmanuel Levinas: Um estudo sobre a ética da alteridade

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abimael Francisco do Nascimento
Keyword(s):  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
New Thought ◽  
Philosophical Criticism ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Theoretical Foundations ◽  
First Philosophy

The general objective of this study is to analyze the postulate of the ethics of otherness as the first philosophy, presented by Emmanuel Levinas. It is a proposal that runs through Levinas' thinking from his theoretical foundations, to his philosophical criticism. Levinas' thought presents itself as a new thought, as a critique of ontology and transcendental philosophy. For him, the concern with knowledge and with being made the other to be forgotten, placing the other in totality. Levinas proposes the ethics of otherness as sensitivity to the other. The subject says here I am, making myself responsible for the other in an infinite way, in a transcendence without return to myself, becoming hostage to the other, as an irrefutable responsibility. The idea of the infinite, present in the face of the other, points to a responsibility whoever more assumes himself, the more one is responsible, until the substitution by other.

scholarly journals The Law Challenged and the Critique of Identity with Emmanuel Levinas

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Petrilli
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
Object Relation ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ethical Orientation ◽  
New Humanism ◽  
Present Essay ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Subject

AbstractIdentity as traditionally conceived in mainstream Western thought is focused on theory, representation, knowledge, subjectivity and is centrally important in the works of Emmanuel Levinas. His critique of Western culture and corresponding notion of identity at its foundations typically raises the question of the other. Alterity in Levinas indicates existence of something on its own account, in itself independently of the subject’s will or consciousness. The objectivity of alterity tells of the impossible evasion of signs from their destiny, which is the other. The implications involved in reading the signs of the other have contributed to reorienting semiotics in the direction of semioethics. In Levinas, the I-other relation is not reducible to abstract cognitive terms, to intellectual synthesis, to the subject-object relation, but rather tells of involvement among singularities whose distinctive feature is alterity, absolute alterity. Humanism of the other is a pivotal concept in Levinas overturning the sense of Western reason. It asserts human duties over human rights. Humanism of alterity privileges encounter with the other, responsibility for the other, over tendencies of the centripetal and egocentric orders that instead exclude the other. Responsibility allows for neither rest nor peace. The “properly human” is given in the capacity for absolute otherness, unlimited responsibility, dialogical intercorporeity among differences non-indifferent to each other, it tells of the condition of vulnerability before the other, exposition to the other. The State and its laws limit responsibility for the other. Levinas signals an essential contradiction between the primordial ethical orientation and the legal order. Justice involves comparing incomparables, comparison among singularities outside identity. Consequently, justice places limitations on responsibility, on unlimited responsibility which at the same time it presupposes as its very condition of possibility. The present essay is structured around the following themes: (1) Premiss; (2) Justice, uniqueness, and love; (3) Sign and language; (4) Dialogue and alterity; (5) Semiotic materiality; (6) Globalization and the trap of identity; (7) Human rights and rights of the other: for a new humanism; (8) Ethics; (9) The World; (10) Outside the subject; (11) Responsibility and Substitution; (12) The face; (13) Fear of the other; (14) Alterity and justice; (15) Justice and proximity; (16) Literary writing; (17) Unjust justice; (18) Caring for the other.

scholarly journals Against "the European Notion of Man": Levinas, Freedom, and the Responsible Body

PhaenEx ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 76-99
Author(s):  
KATHY J. KILOH
Keyword(s):  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Ethical Relation ◽  
Bodily Experience ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Racist Ideology ◽  
Early Essay ◽  
Clear Description

Emmanuel Levinas’ early essay “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” provides us with a clear description what Levinas’ conception of subjectivity as a lived, bodily experience rejects: “the European notion of man” (7). This paper traces the argument Levinas presents in “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” providing links between this early essay and Levinas’ later, major works: Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. The political interrogation of liberalism at the heart of Levinas’ depiction of the subject as creaturely and his discussion of subjectivity as substitution is revealed by orienting the later works towards “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism.” Levinas’ description of the ethical relation between myself and all the others locates both my freedom and my responsibility to the other in the inseparable unity of body and spirit. As creatures, and as subjects in substitution, we experience our own freedom as dependent upon our responsibility for the others; unlike the subject of liberalism, the Levinasian subject cannot conform to the racist ideology promoted by the philosophy of Hiterlism without renouncing its own freedom.

Levinas in therapy

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-297
Author(s):  
Bob Plant
Keyword(s):  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
The Other ◽  
Potential Significance ◽  
Therapeutic Practice ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
Critical Questions ◽  
Conceptual Apparatus ◽  
The Face ◽  
Short Explanation ◽  
The Way

Emmanuel Levinas’ semi-phenomenological analyses of the “face-to-face” encounter with “the other” are frequently alluded to in the therapeutic literature. Indeed, for some therapists, Levinas provides the conceptual apparatus to reconfigure traditional therapeutic practice. While acknowledging the importance of his work, in this article I raise critical questions about the way Levinas’ ideas are often used by psychotherapists. The discussion is divided into five sections: First, I provide a short explanation of the motivations for writing this paper. Second, I offer an overview of some prominent themes therapists typically draw from Levinas’ writings. Next, I present my own reconstruction of the face-to-face encounter. Then, drawing on the previous reconstruction, I outline the main questions Levinas-inspired therapists need to address. Finally, I reconsider the potential significance of Levinas’ work for therapists.

Face to Face, Hand to Hand: Relations of Exchange in Hamlet

2019 ◽  
pp. 109-131
Author(s):  
Emily Shortslef
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ethical Relation ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
Mutual Awareness ◽  
The Face ◽  
Sense And Respond ◽  
The Way

In this essay, Emily Shortslef reads three linked encounters between Hamlet and Laertes in Act 5 of Hamlet—their fight at Ophelia’s grave, Hamlet’s recollection of this event in his subsequent expression of remorse, and their fatal duel before Claudius—in relationship to Levinas’s conceptualization of the face-to-face encounter as the ethical relation. She shows how Levinas’s notion of the self as constituted through the encounter with irreducible and unknowable alterity makes these scenes visible as moments in which the self is called into question by the other. At the same time, in contrast to Levinas’s famously asymmetrical concept of relationality and responsibility, the relationality that emerges in these scenes—one generated by the risk inherent in fighting on stage—necessitates mutual awareness of the other’s presence, careful attunement to movement, and reciprocal gestures of provocation and response. Each character discloses himself through the way that their facing bodies sense and respond to the other’s motion. In these antagonistic but collaborative encounters between Hamlet and Laertes, Shakespeare stages a relation of exchange that at the end of the play will also enable an exchange of forgiveness.

scholarly journals The Other, Shame, and Politics: Levinas, Justice, and Feeling Responsible

Religions ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 381
Author(s):  
Steve Larocco
Keyword(s):  
Public Sphere ◽  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Sphere ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Public Sphere ◽  
Political Realm

Adi Ophir has suggested that the political realm is an order of evils, producing and managing regular forms of suffering and violence rather than eliminating them. Thus, the political is always to some extent a corrupted order of justice. Emmanuel Levinas’ work presents in its focus on the face-to-face relationship a means of rethinking how to make the political more open to compassionate justice. Though Levinas himself doesn’t sufficiently take on this question, I argue that his work facilitates a way of thinking about commiserative shame that provides a means to connect the face-to-face to its potential effects in the political sphere. If such shame isn’t ignored or bypassed, it produces an unsettling relation to the other that in its adversity motivates a kind of responsibility and care for the other that can alter the public sphere.

Like Bread from One's Mouth: Emmanuel Levinas and Reading Scripture with the Other

2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-306
Author(s):  
Jonathan Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
The Other ◽  
Dietrich Bonhoeffer ◽  
Biblical Hermeneutics ◽  
Miroslav Volf ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Church

Discussions of alterity in biblical hermeneutics wrestle with paradox. While attempts to “speak for” the other frequently reduce to the same, interpretive approaches safeguarding difference are often unable to respond to concrete needs of actual others. Emmanuel Levinas's efforts to negotiate this paradox serve biblical hermeneutics well, challenging interpreters to recognise the call to responsibility encountered in the face of the other. Levinas himself is not without his others, and conversation with christology and Eucharistic ecclesiology (represented here by Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Miroslav Volf, and John Zizioulas) challenges him toward more coherent accounts of transcendence in the human other, and of the communal obligations of the church toward the other. With these cautions in view, this article commends Levinas as a guide for breaking the bread of Scripture with others, even — and especially — when this demands “the bread from one's mouth”.

scholarly journals Levinas, Simmel, and the Ethical Significance of Money

Religions ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 3
Author(s):  
Christopher Buckman
Keyword(s):  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
Phenomenological Approach ◽  
Georg Simmel ◽  
Dyadic Relationship ◽  
Ethical Relation ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Stranger ◽  
Ethical Significance

An examination of Emmanuel Levinas’ writings on money reveals his distance from—and indebtedness to—a philosophical predecessor, Georg Simmel. Levinas and Simmel share a phenomenological approach to analyses of the proximity of the stranger, the importance of the face, and the interruption of the dyadic relationship by the third. Money is closely linked to the conception of totality because money is the medium that compares heterogeneous values. Levinas goes beyond Simmel in positing an ethical relation to money permitting transcendence.

Not Only What or How, but Who? Subjectivity, Obligation, and the Call to Teach

2006 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clarence W. Joldersma
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
Teaching Method ◽  
The Other ◽  
The People ◽  
Asymmetric Relation ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Subject ◽  
God's Call ◽  
The One

THIS PAPER ARGUES that the call to teach ought to be conceptualized not so much in terms of subject matter (‘what’) or teaching method (‘how’) but with respect to the subjectivity of the people involved – that is, of the one who teaches and of the one who is taught. Building explicitly on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, the essay develops the idea of a responsible subject as the condition that makes visible the distinctiveness about the call to teach, suggesting that God's call to teach manifests itself through the face of the student, in the asymmetric relation between the teacher and the student as the other. In doing so, the teacher becomes a responsible subject for and to the student, instead of merely for the subject matter and the methods of teaching. Familiar tensions in teaching illustrate this call to responsibility.

scholarly journals A Levinasian Ethics of Attention

Phainomenon ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 18-19 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-40
Author(s):  
Michael Marder
Keyword(s):  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ethical Relation ◽  
Ethical Foundation ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Political Structures ◽  
The One

Abstract In his rather fragmentary theory of attention, Emmanuel Levinas draws inspiration from phenomenology, while endeavoring to furnish it with an ethical foundation. On ·the one hand, he assigns to attention a crucial role coextensive with intentionality (the idea that, in each case, consciousness is consdous of, or directed toward, something). On the other hand, he mobilizes the methodology of reduction for the purpose of uncovering an ethical substratum of experience in the relation to the Other, which is deeper still than the life of consciousness it animates. Husserlian reduction is not radical enough for Levinas’s philosophical taste, since it fails to recognize. that this life comes into being thanks to the appeal emanating from the Other, whose calling out to me forces me to pay attention, even when it seems that I am attending only to inanimate things. The ethical relation to the Other lies not only at the bottom of all social and political structures, but also at the source of consciousness and of its attentive directedness to that of which it is conscious. Before I am able to intend or to attend to anything whatsoever, I am targeted by the Other, who reverses the movement of intentionality and, at once, breaches and founds my psychic interiority.

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