scholarly journals Against "the European Notion of Man": Levinas, Freedom, and the Responsible Body

PhaenEx ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 76-99
Author(s):  
KATHY J. KILOH

Emmanuel Levinas’ early essay “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” provides us with a clear description what Levinas’ conception of subjectivity as a lived, bodily experience rejects: “the European notion of man” (7). This paper traces the argument Levinas presents in “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” providing links between this early essay and Levinas’ later, major works: Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. The political interrogation of liberalism at the heart of Levinas’ depiction of the subject as creaturely and his discussion of subjectivity as substitution is revealed by orienting the later works towards “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism.” Levinas’ description of the ethical relation between myself and all the others locates both my freedom and my responsibility to the other in the inseparable unity of body and spirit. As creatures, and as subjects in substitution, we experience our own freedom as dependent upon our responsibility for the others; unlike the subject of liberalism, the Levinasian subject cannot conform to the racist ideology promoted by the philosophy of Hiterlism without renouncing its own freedom.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abimael Francisco do Nascimento

The general objective of this study is to analyze the postulate of the ethics of otherness as the first philosophy, presented by Emmanuel Levinas. It is a proposal that runs through Levinas' thinking from his theoretical foundations, to his philosophical criticism. Levinas' thought presents itself as a new thought, as a critique of ontology and transcendental philosophy. For him, the concern with knowledge and with being made the other to be forgotten, placing the other in totality. Levinas proposes the ethics of otherness as sensitivity to the other. The subject says here I am, making myself responsible for the other in an infinite way, in a transcendence without return to myself, becoming hostage to the other, as an irrefutable responsibility. The idea of the infinite, present in the face of the other, points to a responsibility whoever more assumes himself, the more one is responsible, until the substitution by other.


Author(s):  
Susan Petrilli

AbstractIdentity as traditionally conceived in mainstream Western thought is focused on theory, representation, knowledge, subjectivity and is centrally important in the works of Emmanuel Levinas. His critique of Western culture and corresponding notion of identity at its foundations typically raises the question of the other. Alterity in Levinas indicates existence of something on its own account, in itself independently of the subject’s will or consciousness. The objectivity of alterity tells of the impossible evasion of signs from their destiny, which is the other. The implications involved in reading the signs of the other have contributed to reorienting semiotics in the direction of semioethics. In Levinas, the I-other relation is not reducible to abstract cognitive terms, to intellectual synthesis, to the subject-object relation, but rather tells of involvement among singularities whose distinctive feature is alterity, absolute alterity. Humanism of the other is a pivotal concept in Levinas overturning the sense of Western reason. It asserts human duties over human rights. Humanism of alterity privileges encounter with the other, responsibility for the other, over tendencies of the centripetal and egocentric orders that instead exclude the other. Responsibility allows for neither rest nor peace. The “properly human” is given in the capacity for absolute otherness, unlimited responsibility, dialogical intercorporeity among differences non-indifferent to each other, it tells of the condition of vulnerability before the other, exposition to the other. The State and its laws limit responsibility for the other. Levinas signals an essential contradiction between the primordial ethical orientation and the legal order. Justice involves comparing incomparables, comparison among singularities outside identity. Consequently, justice places limitations on responsibility, on unlimited responsibility which at the same time it presupposes as its very condition of possibility. The present essay is structured around the following themes: (1) Premiss; (2) Justice, uniqueness, and love; (3) Sign and language; (4) Dialogue and alterity; (5) Semiotic materiality; (6) Globalization and the trap of identity; (7) Human rights and rights of the other: for a new humanism; (8) Ethics; (9) The World; (10) Outside the subject; (11) Responsibility and Substitution; (12) The face; (13) Fear of the other; (14) Alterity and justice; (15) Justice and proximity; (16) Literary writing; (17) Unjust justice; (18) Caring for the other.


2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-120
Author(s):  
Jan-Jasper Persijn

Alain Badiou’s elaboration of a subject faithful to an event is commonly known today in the academic world and beyond. However, his first systematic account of the subject ( Théorie du Sujet) was already published in 1982 and did not mention the ‘event’ at all. Therefore, this article aims at tracing back both the structural and the historical conditions that directed Badiou’s elaboration of the subject in the early work up until the publication of L’Être et l’Événément in 1988. On the one hand, it investigates to what extent the (early) Badiouan subject can be considered an exceptional product of the formalist project of the Cahiers pour l’Analyse as instigated by psychoanalytical discourse (Lacan) and a certain Marxist discourse (Althusser) insofar as both were centered upon a theory of the subject. On the other hand, this article examines the radical political implications of this subject insofar as Badiou has directed his philosophical aims towards the political field as a direct consequence of the events of May ’68.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 91-110
Author(s):  
Dariusz Dąbrowski

The main goal of the article is to present the possibilities and methods of research on the Rurikid’s matrimonial policy in the Middle Ages on the example of a selected group of princes. As the subject of studies were chosen Mstislav Vladimirovich and his children. In total, 12 matrimonial relationships were included. The analysis of the source material revealed very unfavorable phenomena from the perspective of the topic under study. The Rus’ primary sources gave information on the conclusion of just four marriages out of twelve. The next four matrimonial arrangement inform foreign sources (Scandinavian and Norman). It should be emphasized particularly strongly that – save for two exceptions of Scandinavian provenance – the sources convey no information whatsoever as regards the political aims behind this or that marriage agreement. It appears, then, that the chroniclers of the period and cultural sphere in question did not regard details concerning marriages (such as their circumstances or the reasons behind them) as “information notable enough to be worth preserving”. Truth be told, even the very fact of the marriage did not always belong to this category. Due to the state of preservation of primary sources the basic question arises as to whether it is possible to study the Rurikids’ matrimonial policy? In spite of the mercilessly sparse source material, it is by all means possible to conduct feasible research on the Rurikids’ marriage policy. One must know how to do it right, however. Thus, such studies must on the one hand be rooted in a deep knowledge of the relevant sources (not only of Rus’ provenance) as well as the ability to subject them to astute analysis; on the other hand, they must adhere to the specially developed methodology, presented in the first part of the article.


Author(s):  
Antonio Hermosa Andújar

In this work the author holds the thesis that with Maquiavelo, in accordance with Tucidides, the complete humanization of history and human life arose. Man has become the complete owner of his destiny when conquering fortune by virtù, that is, the entirety of social forces, concrete or diffuse, that oppose to the exercise of his will. It is only nature that remains as a region still inaccessible to human will. This is the reason why in Maquiavelo the concepts which should organize the explanation of human behavior are not, as considered until now, virtù/fortune but virtù/nature. Even though, there are two antagonic limits to the emancipatory virtuos action: on the one hand, its still nondemocratic condition, since only the Prince is capable of such virtù. On the other, the political liberty, something that in principle appears external to the subject, but once known he won´t forget ever, that is, political liberty becomes a constitutive feature of the human being at which every virtuos action of the Prince directed to extirpate it, fails.


Author(s):  
Vladimir N. Belov ◽  

The article presents an attempt by one of the most interesting modern thinkers, the Austrian scientist Gerhard Oberhammer, to substantiate the possibility of a transcendental experience of meeting with God and the philosophical-hermeneutic objectification of this experience. Based on the traditions of Kant’s transcendental philosophy and its hermeneutical interpretation by Karl-Otto Apel, Oberhammer also draws on the productive intentions of Karl Jaspers’ con­cept of the “ciphers of the transcendent”, experience as a person’s being captured by Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas’ hypostase. The article deals with a heuristic interpretation of these concepts for Oberhammer’s explanation of the possibility of a transcendent experience as an experience of an absolute meeting of man with God. According to the Austrian philosopher and Indologist, the place of transcendent experience is the inner world of the subject, which is characterized by two main properties: depth and openness. The latter allows us to hope for the possibility of meeting with the other, but again, not outside the subject, but inside it, realizing the hidden structures of the inner world, as a world correlated with what is outside it. That is, according to Gerhard Ober­hammer, the transcendent experience of the subject can be comprehended in its two interdependent moments related to the subject’s situation, namely, the mo­ment of its self-explanation and the moment of its correlation. The Austrian philosopher represents the religious subject as being in a constant self-overcom­ing of its limited isolation and finding its true essence, which implicitly contains both its depth and its correlation with the other, as its ability to accept this other into itself. The article substantiates the idea that the Austrian scientist builds his concept of religious and philosophical hermeneutics with a firm belief in its pro­ductivity and the possibility of using it for the analysis of any religion, since he focuses on universal transformations and events that occur in the life of a be­liever, regardless of the religious tradition to which he belongs.


1971 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. C. C. Law

This paper examines the internal disputes which the Ọyọ kingdom suffered during the eighteenth century, and which had as their ultimate issue a coup d'état in ca. 1796 which is traditionally held to mark the beginning of the disintegration of the kingdom. The troubles began with a conflict within the capital of the kingdom, between the Alafin (king) and the Ọyọ Mesi, a group of non-royal chiefs led by the Baṣọrun, and the first phase of the troubles culminated in 1754 in a seizure of power by the Baṣọrun. It is suggested that this struggle between the Alafin and his chiefs had its origins in competition for control of the new sources of wealth derived from the expansion of the kingdom. In 1774 the Alafin overthrew the Baṣọrun and recovered power in the capital by calling in the assistance of the subject towns of the kingdom. It is argued that this action proved fatal to the Ọyọ kingdom, by involving the rulers of the provincial towns in the political disputes of the capital and revealing the military impotence of the divided capital. In ca. 1796 the provincial rulers intervened at the capital on the other side, assisting the Baṣọrun to overthrow the Alafin. But the coalition of dissident metropolitan chiefs and dissident provincial chiefs immediately broke up, and many of the latter began to disregard the divided capital and make themselves independent.


2019 ◽  
Vol XV ◽  
pp. 125-140
Author(s):  
Maciej Rogulski

Rituals are of great importance in politics at every level. Rituals bind society and strengthen their identity. Besides rituals strengthen attach-ment to culture, land and state power. On the other hand state power increases legitimacy by performing respected rituals. There are many interesting ways to classify rituals in the literature on the subject. For the purpose of showing rituals in the political space of the city of Ustka, it seems appropriate to distinguish above all the rituals of a national char-acter and those of a local dimension. In the case concept of the ritual, however, there are no final divisions, and the boundaries that divide them are certainly not impassable.


Religions ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 381
Author(s):  
Steve Larocco

Adi Ophir has suggested that the political realm is an order of evils, producing and managing regular forms of suffering and violence rather than eliminating them. Thus, the political is always to some extent a corrupted order of justice. Emmanuel Levinas’ work presents in its focus on the face-to-face relationship a means of rethinking how to make the political more open to compassionate justice. Though Levinas himself doesn’t sufficiently take on this question, I argue that his work facilitates a way of thinking about commiserative shame that provides a means to connect the face-to-face to its potential effects in the political sphere. If such shame isn’t ignored or bypassed, it produces an unsettling relation to the other that in its adversity motivates a kind of responsibility and care for the other that can alter the public sphere.


1980 ◽  
Vol 15 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 427-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bertrand de Jouvenel

SINCE FIRST I BEGAN TO THINK ABOUT THE SUBJECT OF WHAT I called ‘pure politics’ twenty years ago, it has, sad to say, become more immediate. This is because of something I emphasized at the time: the effectiveness of a dedicated group of activists. Although few in number, the group's intensity of will gives it a formidable strength. It is like a projectile which can easily penetrate the soft body of society. It is the generator of the unforeseen, and ushers drama on to the political stage. In my book De la Souveraineté (1955), I contrasted two pictures familiar to us since childhood: Bonaparte on the bridge at Arcola and Saint Louis under the oak tree at Vincennes. The first is standing erect, calling on his men to charge; the other is seated, serene, welcoming the various plaintiffs who press towards him and sending them away content. On one side of the diptych we see a leader who exalts, and on the other side an umpire who corrects and conciliates – an agent of momentum and an agent of equilibrium. Bonaparte points to a direction and the narrowness of the bridge is a symbol of the one-way narrow track, the precise intention. In contrast, the oak tree is the centre of a circumference, from every point of which the plaintiffs or suitors could approach, so that the king's attention was called from all sides: he needed the eyes of Argus.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document