scholarly journals The Law Challenged and the Critique of Identity with Emmanuel Levinas

Author(s):  
Susan Petrilli

AbstractIdentity as traditionally conceived in mainstream Western thought is focused on theory, representation, knowledge, subjectivity and is centrally important in the works of Emmanuel Levinas. His critique of Western culture and corresponding notion of identity at its foundations typically raises the question of the other. Alterity in Levinas indicates existence of something on its own account, in itself independently of the subject’s will or consciousness. The objectivity of alterity tells of the impossible evasion of signs from their destiny, which is the other. The implications involved in reading the signs of the other have contributed to reorienting semiotics in the direction of semioethics. In Levinas, the I-other relation is not reducible to abstract cognitive terms, to intellectual synthesis, to the subject-object relation, but rather tells of involvement among singularities whose distinctive feature is alterity, absolute alterity. Humanism of the other is a pivotal concept in Levinas overturning the sense of Western reason. It asserts human duties over human rights. Humanism of alterity privileges encounter with the other, responsibility for the other, over tendencies of the centripetal and egocentric orders that instead exclude the other. Responsibility allows for neither rest nor peace. The “properly human” is given in the capacity for absolute otherness, unlimited responsibility, dialogical intercorporeity among differences non-indifferent to each other, it tells of the condition of vulnerability before the other, exposition to the other. The State and its laws limit responsibility for the other. Levinas signals an essential contradiction between the primordial ethical orientation and the legal order. Justice involves comparing incomparables, comparison among singularities outside identity. Consequently, justice places limitations on responsibility, on unlimited responsibility which at the same time it presupposes as its very condition of possibility. The present essay is structured around the following themes: (1) Premiss; (2) Justice, uniqueness, and love; (3) Sign and language; (4) Dialogue and alterity; (5) Semiotic materiality; (6) Globalization and the trap of identity; (7) Human rights and rights of the other: for a new humanism; (8) Ethics; (9) The World; (10) Outside the subject; (11) Responsibility and Substitution; (12) The face; (13) Fear of the other; (14) Alterity and justice; (15) Justice and proximity; (16) Literary writing; (17) Unjust justice; (18) Caring for the other.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abimael Francisco do Nascimento

The general objective of this study is to analyze the postulate of the ethics of otherness as the first philosophy, presented by Emmanuel Levinas. It is a proposal that runs through Levinas' thinking from his theoretical foundations, to his philosophical criticism. Levinas' thought presents itself as a new thought, as a critique of ontology and transcendental philosophy. For him, the concern with knowledge and with being made the other to be forgotten, placing the other in totality. Levinas proposes the ethics of otherness as sensitivity to the other. The subject says here I am, making myself responsible for the other in an infinite way, in a transcendence without return to myself, becoming hostage to the other, as an irrefutable responsibility. The idea of the infinite, present in the face of the other, points to a responsibility whoever more assumes himself, the more one is responsible, until the substitution by other.


2006 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clarence W. Joldersma

THIS PAPER ARGUES that the call to teach ought to be conceptualized not so much in terms of subject matter (‘what’) or teaching method (‘how’) but with respect to the subjectivity of the people involved – that is, of the one who teaches and of the one who is taught. Building explicitly on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, the essay develops the idea of a responsible subject as the condition that makes visible the distinctiveness about the call to teach, suggesting that God's call to teach manifests itself through the face of the student, in the asymmetric relation between the teacher and the student as the other. In doing so, the teacher becomes a responsible subject for and to the student, instead of merely for the subject matter and the methods of teaching. Familiar tensions in teaching illustrate this call to responsibility.


2021 ◽  
pp. 000332862110238
Author(s):  
Armand E Larive

Rather than a general theory of gratitude, the paper focuses on gratitude as a human dynamic in appreciative recognition of others. The phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas’ face-to-face ethics is discussed as the subject’s call to responsibility for an Other. Following Jacques Derrida’s criticism of how this responsibility binds the subject into a hostage position regarding the Other, Paul Ricoeur repairs the working value of Levinas’ ethics by loosening the face-to-face obligation of the Other into one of reconnaissance, or thankful recognition. Without losing the face-to-face dynamic, the expression of reconnaissance is then investigated through J. L. Austin’s theory of performatives where gratitude is expressed as a speech act, or with the help of Judith Butler, where performativity is an activity expressing a reconnaissance between people over time. Three examples are given at the end.


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-291
Author(s):  
Manuel A. Vasquez ◽  
Anna L. Peterson

In this article, we explore the debates surrounding the proposed canonization of Archbishop Oscar Romero, an outspoken defender of human rights and the poor during the civil war in El Salvador, who was assassinated in March 1980 by paramilitary death squads while saying Mass. More specifically, we examine the tension between, on the one hand, local and popular understandings of Romero’s life and legacy and, on the other hand, transnational and institutional interpretations. We argue that the reluctance of the Vatican to advance Romero’s canonization process has to do with the need to domesticate and “privatize” his image. This depoliticization of Romero’s work and teachings is a part of a larger agenda of neo-Romanization, an attempt by the Holy See to redeploy a post-colonial and transnational Catholic regime in the face of the crisis of modernity and the advent of postmodern relativism. This redeployment is based on the control of local religious expressions, particularly those that advocate for a more participatory church, which have proliferated with contemporary globalization


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-135
Author(s):  
Alexandre Silva Guerreiro

O conceito de humanismo passou por transformações ao longo do tempo. Desde a Grécia Antiga até a contemporaneidade, formou-se um caleidoscópio humanista que abarca significados diversos e, até mesmo, antagônicos. Este artigo propõe uma investigação sobre o humanismo, tendo como objetivo a formulação do humanismo ético para, em seguida, conectá-lo aos direitos humanos. Para isso, considera-se a contribuição de Emmanuel Lévinas (1993, 2008) no que concerne à responsabilidade pelo Outro, bem como a formulação da ética como relacional de acordo com Olinto Pegoraro (2005). A partir disso, buscamos aproximar humanismo ético e direitos humanos. No entanto, é preciso entender os direitos humanos dentro de uma perspectiva polissêmica que também marca o humanismo, trazendo para essa relação a noção de direitos humanos contra-hegemônicos, conforme proposta por Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014). Humanismo ético e direitos humanos encontram-se no desejo de transformação da realidade a partir da reflexão e da ação. Assim, concluímos que os direitos humanos, em sua translação contra-hegemônica, com sua pulsão pela positivação de direitos e pela valorização das diferenças e da diversidade, são atravessados por um humanismo ético que está profundamente conectado com o desejo de mudança social e de responsabilidade pelo Outro, numa perspectiva levinaseana.   Del humanismo ético a los derechos humanos El concepto de humanismo ha experimentado transformaciones a lo largo del tiempo. Desde la Antigua Grecia hasta la época contemporánea, se formó un caleidoscopio humanista que engloba significados diferentes o incluso antagónicos. Este estudio propone una investigación sobre el humanismo con el objetivo de formular el humanismo ético y luego conectarlo con los derechos humanos. Para eso, consideramos la contribución de Emmanuel Lévinas (1993, 2008) con respecto a la responsabilidad para con el Otro, así como la formulación de la ética como relacional según Olinto Pegoraro (2005). A partir de esto, buscamos aunar el humanismo ético y los derechos humanos. Sin embargo, es necesario entender los derechos humanos desde una perspectiva polisémica que también marca el humanismo, trayendo a esta relación la noción de derechos humanos contrahegemónicos, como propone Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014). El humanismo ético y los derechos humanos se encuentran en el deseo de transformar la realidad a través de la reflexión y la acción. Así, concluimos que los derechos humanos, en su traducción contrahegemónica, con su afán por la positivación de los derechos y por valorar las diferencias y la diversidad, están atravesados por un humanismo ético que está profundamente conectado con el deseo de cambio social y con la responsabilidad por el Otro, en un perspectiva levinaseana. Palabras clave: Humanismo. Ética. Lévinas. Derechos humanos.   From ethical humanism to human rights The concept of humanism has undergone transformations over time. From ancient Greece to contemporary times, a humanistic kaleidoscope was formed that encompasses different and even antagonistic meanings. This article proposes an investigation on humanism, aiming at the formulation of ethical humanism and then connecting it with human rights. For this, we consider Emmanuel Lévinas contributions (1993, 2008) regarding responsibility for the Other, as well as the notion of ethics as relational according to Olinto Pegoraro (2005). Also, we seek to bring together ethical humanism and human rights. However, it is necessary to understand human rights within a polysemic perspective that also marks humanism, bringing to this relation the notion of counter-hegemonic human rights, as proposed by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014). Ethical humanism and human rights come together with the desire to transform reality through reflection and action. Thus, we conclude that human rights, in their counter-hegemonic translation with their drive for positivation of rights and differences and diversity valorization are crossed by an ethical humanism that is deeply connected with the desire for social change and responsibility for the Other, in a Levinasean perspective. Keywords: Humanism. Ethic. Lévinas. Human Rights.


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margunn Rommetveit ◽  
Anita Tollefsen

<p align="left"><strong><span style="font-size: medium;">Focusing at the use of coercion and force against people with intellectual disability </span></strong></p><em><em></em></em><p>The use of coercion and force against people with intellectual disability has been regulated by law in Norway since 1999. Each episode of coercion is challenging the human rights and has the potential to be an act of violation. The requirements for proceedings, ethical considerations and the requirements for professional competences, is special in Norway comparing to the other Scandinavian Countries. The article examines the notifications of coercion and the claim form from the staff working in communities with people with intellectual disability. The notifications of coercion have different approach. The attitude and the way of behavior are strongly related to the approach. The language in the notifications is strongly different. We talk about a subject-subject-relation and a subject-object-relation. It seems like there can be less use of coercion and force, if the staff involved, has the knowledge of how important the relation affect on the good interaction. The staffs own role, in preventing the need of using coercion and force, can be better recognized and improved.</p><em></em>


Author(s):  
António Pedro Mesquita ◽  

Predication is a complex entity in Aristotelian thought. The aim of the present essay is to account for this complexity, making explicit the diverse forms it assumes. To this end, we tum to a crucial chapter of the Posterior Analytics (1 22), where, in the most complete and developed manner within the corpus, Aristotle proceeds to systematize this topic. From the analysis, it will become apparent that predication can assume, generically, five forms: 1) the predication of essence (τὸ αύτᾢ εἶναι κατηγορεἲσθαι), that is of the genus and the specific difference; 2) essential predication (τὸ αύτᾢ εἶναι κατηγορεἲσθαι), that is either of the genus or of the differences (or their genera); 3) the predication of accidents per se 4) and of simple accidents (ώς συμβεβηκότα κατηγορεἲσθαι); and 5) accidental predication (κατἁ συμβεβηκός κατηγορεἲσθαι). However, only types 2-4 are forms of strict predication (άπλὢς). In effect, the “predication” of essence is not a genuine predication, but a formula for identity, constituting, technically, the statement of the essence of the subject (or its definition). On the other hand, accidental “predication” can only be conceived of as such equivocally, since it results from a linguistic accident through which the ontological subject of the attribution suffers a displacement to the syntactic position of the predicate, which is not, by nature, its own. In neither case does the phrase bring about any legitimate predication. The study concludes with a discussion of Aristotle’s thesis according to which no substance can be a predicate, which is implied by its notion of accidental predication, a thesis which has been - and in our opinion wrongly so - challenged in modem times.


Author(s):  
Daniela Thurnherr

This chapter discusses the reception of the ECHR in Austria and Switzerland. Topics covered include the accession and ratification of the ECHR in both countries, the status of the ECHR in national law, an overview of the activity of the European Court of Human Rights, and the ECtHR's case law and its effects on the national legal order. Although both countries joined the ECHR at a relatively early stage, this starting position led to different outcomes. The main reason is because the common denominators of neutrality and federalism in these two countries are actually rather small: as Austria follows a very different concept of neutrality, it did not face any (political) difficulties before and during the ratification process. Switzerland, on the other hand, was very reluctant to join the Council of Europe and careful to avoid any concessions with regard to neutrality.


Horizons ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-84
Author(s):  
Marie L. Baird

AbstractJohann Baptist Metz has exhorted Christian theologians to discard “system concepts” in favor of “subject concepts” in their theologizing. This revisioning of Christian theology recovers the primacy of the uniqueness and irreplaceability of the individual from totalizing doctrinal formulations and systems that function, for Metz, without reference to the subject. In short, a revisionist Christian theology in light of the Holocaust recovers the preeminence of the inviolability of individual human life.How can such a revisioning be accomplished in the realm of Christian spirituality? This article will utilize the thought of Emmanuel Levinas to assert the primacy of ethics as “first philosophy” replacing ontology, and by implication the ontological foundations undergirding Christian spirituality, with the ethical relation. Such a relation is the basis for a new Christian spirituality that posits the primacy of merciful and compasionate action in the face of conditions of life in extremity.


Semiotica ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (209) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Augusto Ponzio

AbstractIt is not with the State that personal responsibility arises towards the other. According to Emmanuel Levinas, the other is every single human being I am responsible for, and I am this responsibility for him. The other, my fellow, is the first comer. But I do not live in a world with just one single “first comer”; there is always another other, a third, who is also my other, my fellow. Otherness, beginning with this third, is a plurality. Proximity as responsibility is a plurality. There is a need for justice. There is the obligation to compare unique and incomparable others. This is what is hidden, unsaid, implied in legal discourse. But recourse to comparison among that which cannot be compared, among that which is incomparable is justified by love of justice for the other. It is this justification that confers a sense to law, which is always dura lex, and to the statement that citizens are equal before the law. From this point of view, State justice is always imperfect with respect to human rights understood as the rights of the other, of every other in his absolute difference, in his incomparable otherness.


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