scholarly journals Effects of LAs’ Strategic Bidding on Wholesale Electricity Market Equilibrium

Author(s):  
Iman Taheri ◽  
Hossein Askarian Abyaneh ◽  
Seyed Hossein Hosseinian ◽  
Alireza Bakhshai

This paper proposes a game-theoretic framework for quantifying effects of strategic bidding behavior of load aggregators (LAs) on wholesale electricity market equilibrium. The independent system operator (ISO) employs double-sided auction design to settle transactions in the wholesale electricity market. Generating companies (GENCOs) and LAs submit their bids to the ISO in the economic model of supply function equilibrium. Under the smart grid paradigm, a LA participates in the electricity market on behalf of end-consumers to minimize their total payment for purchasing electricity. In this paper, bi-level programming (BLP) method is employed to determine optimal bidding strategy of self-interested market participants. In the upper level, the profit of intended market participant is maximized and in the lower level, the ISO clears the market via a bid-based security constrained economic dispatch (SCED). Also, competition of GENCOs and LAs is modeled as a non-cooperative game. To examine the effects of strategic bidding behavior of LAs on market equilibrium, the proposed model is applied to the IEEE 9-bus and the IEEE 30-bus test systems. According to numerical results, to allow the LAs to behave strategically along with the GENCOs makes the former better off and the latter worse off, while the net effect of this on total social welfare turns out to be case-contingent.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
L.A. Vega de la Mora ◽  
◽  
C. Angeles-Camacho ◽  
A. Y. Melchor Quinto

Changes in the Mexican electricity market is accompanied by large challenges in the country's economic sector. In the first instance, the need to create a financial market where agents participate of said sector, establishing financing mechanisms and clear rules of action, as well as institutions that safeguard the realization and compliance of operations between them. As in traditional financial markets, market participants will seek to maximize their returns, trying to limit the risks to which they are exposed, related to their operation itself and with the inherent characteristics of the good traded, electricity. The generation of electricity with renewable sources, the correct operation of the electricity market and greater use of electric vehicles, will achieve in Mexico a successful energy transition, where less hydrocarbons are used pollutants to use more clean energy, inheriting future generations a better world.


Energies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 3296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nur Mohammad ◽  
Yateendra Mishra

This paper presents an interactive trading decision between an electricity market operator, generation companies (GenCos), and the aggregators having demand response (DR) capable loads. Decisions are made hierarchically. At the upper-level, an electricity market operator (EMO) aims to minimise generation supply cost considering a DR transaction cost, which is essentially the cost of load curtailment. A DR exchange operator aims to minimise this transaction cost upon receiving the DR offer from the multiple aggregators at the lower level. The solution at this level determines the optimal DR amount and the load curtailment price. The DR considers the end-user’s willingness to reduce demand. Lagrangian duality theory is used to solve the bi-level optimisation. The usefulness of the proposed market model is demonstrated on interconnection of the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) 5-Bus benchmark power system model under several plausible cases. It is found that the peak electricity price and grid-wise operation expenses under this DR trading scheme are reduced.


Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 880 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktorija Bobinaite ◽  
Marialaura Di Somma ◽  
Giorgio Graditi ◽  
Irina Oleinikova

This paper investigates the regulatory rules of market transparency which could be applied within the wholesale electricity market and market for frequency and voltage control in the Web-of-Cells (WoC) decentralized power control architecture, which has been developed in the ELECTRA Project to respond the challenges and needs of the future power system (2030+). In this decentralized functional architecture for frequency and voltage control, the European Union (EU) power grid is divided into grid control areas, i.e., cells, which are defined as portions of the grid having adequate monitoring infrastructure and local reserves capacity, allowing voltage and balancing (frequency) problems to be solved at cell level, under the responsibility of a Cell System Operator (CSO) (present Distribution System Operator (DSO)/Transmission System Operator (TSO)). In order to foster the practical realization of the WoC-based architecture, the related wholesale electricity market and market for frequency and voltage control are proposed considering the competitive market principles, including transparency. The critical review of the existing EU regulations dealing with this issue suggests respecting the valid provisions on market transparency while tailoring them into the WoC-based architecture. Moreover, in order to take into account the WoC peculiarities, a set of integrations to the current regulatory rules is also proposed, addressing: (1) disclosure of information in respect to attributes of emerging technologies such as renewable energy sources (RES), distributed energy resources (DER), storage; (2) provision of generation and load forecast information; (3) process of procurement of flexibilities; (4) retail market transparency; (5) disclosure of privacy-sensitive household attributes; and (6) disclosure of information on market for frequency and voltage control.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 57-79
Author(s):  
C. Cuta Durán ◽  
J. González-Bueno

This paper aims to diagnose the current situation of the Colombian wholesale electricity market in relation to the markets of Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. The analysis has been carried out from the point of view of existing supply and demand in the market, of the market participants, of the types of market that have been able to be constituted depending on the regulatory transformations that have taken place, and of the institutional structure on which they are based. This analysis will make it possible to identify whether the Colombian market lags behind the region or whether, on the contrary, it can be considered a benchmark for the other countries in the region.


Author(s):  
Emre Çelebi ◽  
Vanessa Krebs ◽  
Martin Schmidt

AbstractWe consider uncertain robust electricity market equilibrium problems including transmission and generation investments. Electricity market equilibrium modeling has a long tradition but is, in most of the cases, applied in a deterministic setting in which all data of the model are known. Whereas there exist some literature on stochastic equilibrium problems, the field of robust equilibrium models is still in its infancy. We contribute to this new field of research by considering $$\Gamma $$ Γ -robust electricity market equilibrium models on lossless DC networks with transmission and generation investments. We state the nominal market equilibrium problem as a mixed complementarity problem as well as its variational inequality and welfare optimization counterparts. For the latter, we then derive a $$\Gamma $$ Γ -robust formulation and show that it is indeed the counterpart of a market equilibrium problem with robustified player problems. Finally, we present two case studies to gain insights into the general effects of robustification on electricity market models. In particular, our case studies reveal that the transmission system operator tends to act more risk-neutral in the robust setting, whereas generating firms clearly behave more risk-averse.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document