Behaviour-based Pricing in the Green Product Supply Chain

Author(s):  
Kanying Liu ◽  
Wei Li ◽  
Erbao Cao ◽  
Yong Lan

Abstract We study the pricing strategies of supply chains of green products under behaviour-based pricing. Considering consumer preferences for green product functional attributes and environmental attributes, we construct a two-stage supply chain. The optimal behaviour pricing of green products is solved, and the effects of green sensitivity and the cost coefficient on the optimal price are analysed. We find that when consumers are less sensitive to the greenness, with the increase in the market share of green products, green product retailers will increase the loyalty price. An increase in greenness sensitivity and a decrease in the greenness cost coefficient will increase the wholesale prices and retail prices of green products. Consumer attention to the greenness and a decrease in the initial market share of green products will be conducive to promoting the greenness and improving the environment. Consumers' emphasis on the greenness of their products will lead to higher profits for the manufacturers and retailers of green products.

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 274-297
Author(s):  
Robin M. Back ◽  
Xinyang Liu ◽  
Britta Niklas ◽  
Karl Storchmann ◽  
Nick Vink

AbstractIn this paper, we analyze profit margins and markups of Fair Trade (FT) wines sold in the United States. We are particularly interested in whether and to what extent the FT cost impulse in production is passed along to the supply chain. We draw on a limited sample of about 470 South African wines sold in Connecticut and New Jersey in the fall of 2016; about 90 of them are certified FT. For these wines we have free on board export prices, wholesale prices, and retail prices, which allows us to compute wholesale and retail margins and analyze the FT treatment effect. We run OLS, 2SLS, and propensity score matching models and find evidence of asymmetrical pricing behavior. While wholesalers seem to fully pass-through the FT cost effect, retailers appear to amplify the cost effect. As a result, at the retail level, FT wines yield significantly higher margins than their non-FT counterparts. (JEL Classifications: L11, L31, L43, L81, Q17)


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Qingfeng Meng ◽  
Mengwan Li ◽  
Zhen Li ◽  
Jing Zhu

This paper fully considers the complexity characteristics of the consumer group, such as the heterogeneity of consumer environmental preferences and consumption levels and constructs a two-stage price decision model of green supply chain composed of the manufacturer and retailers. Under the four different scenarios, no government subsidies, government subsidies are given to the manufacturer, government subsidies are given to the green product retailer, and government subsidies are given to green product consumers, the impact of government subsidies on green supply chain member price decisions is analyzed, and the validity of the model is verified by an example. The results show that compared with the no government subsidies, government subsidies to the manufacturer will reduce the wholesale and sales prices of green products, and subsidies to the green product retailer will lead to higher wholesale prices and lower sales prices of green products, and subsidies to green product consumers will increase the wholesale and sales prices of green products. No matter which object is subsidized by the government, the wholesale price of general products will not change and the sales price will decrease. Government subsidies will facilitate the sales of green products, thereby expanding the market share of green products.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (16) ◽  
pp. 8725
Author(s):  
Jian Wang ◽  
Wenxuan Shao

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of one manufacturer and one supplier is considered. The capacity of the manufacturer is limited, the manufacturer can increase capacity by investing in capacity, and there are different cooperation contracts among the supply chain members. This paper pushes collecting activities upstream, assumes that the collecting activity can be completed by the supplier, and accepts that there is cooperation between the members, which increases supplier involvement. Dynamic game models among CLSC members are formulated. The optimal decisions of pricing, capacity investment, and collecting channels of the CLSC members are obtained, and the impacts of some important factors, for example, the capacity investment cost coefficient and the cost-sharing factors, on optimal decisions are investigated. The results reveal that the supplier collecting mode performs better in some scenarios; therefore, the management enlightenment desired by the supplier can be obtained. Additionally, the coordination between the manufacturer and the supplier sometimes fails to increase the closed-loop supply chain’s sustainability, which is a finding quite different from some current research results.


Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Yan Yin ◽  
Fengcai Liu

Due to the increasingly serious energy crisis and environmental pollution, new energy vehicle (NEV) as a environmentally-friendly travel tool has been vigorously developed by various countries. However, in 2020, China officially enters the “postsubsidy era” in which the carbon trading scheme will replace the current fiscal and taxation system, affecting the implementation of NEV. Under the carbon trading policy, it has gradually become a major issue how NEV companies achieve production revenue coordination and carbon emission optimization decisions. This study focuses on building a multilevel supply chain for NEV production, sales, and component recycling. In addition, this study establishes a Stackelberg game model dominated by NEV manufacturers and uses contracts to coordinate the model. Results are as follows: (1) With the increasing maturity and perfection of enterprises’ carbon emission reduction technology, consumers’ demand for new energy vehicles will increase, and the effect will be more obvious when the system centralized decision-making. (2) Since the centralized decision is aimed at the total profit of the system and has the advantage of optimal order quantity, the total benefit of the supply chain is higher than that of the decentralized decision. Moreover, if the cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction is small, the total benefit of the supply chain under the centralized decision will be more obvious. (3) From the perspective of each member of the supply chain, the profit change of the manufacturer is more sensitive to the change of order quantity compared with the cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction. When the cost of carbon emission reduction technology is too high, manufacturers may not have much incentive to carry out technological research and development and innovation, resulting in failure to achieve system optimization. (4) This study designed a revenue-cost-sharing contract coordination mechanism; that is, the retailer will provide part of the revenue to the manufacturer, and the manufacturer will provide recovery compensation to the recycler.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 4162
Author(s):  
Junbin Wang ◽  
Xuan Gao ◽  
Zhiguo Wang

Motivated by the industrial observation that the e-commerce platform marketplaces (e.g., Amazon) are increasingly launching sustainable strategies, this study aims to build an analytical framework to guide managers on making sustainable decisions. This study builds a stylized game-theoretical model in the sustainable supply chain context, where the competitive traditional product manufacturers sell their products through the platform’s marketplace, while the platform decides whether to introduce the green products and the pricing strategy. We find that, when the evaluation difference for the green product is sufficiently low, the introduction of the green product by the platform benefits the manufacturers (or third-party sellers). Interestingly, a higher platform fee makes a higher likelihood of a win-win situation between the platform and manufacturers. Moreover, when consumers value green products sufficiently higher than traditional products, the traditional products’ manufacturers can also benefit from the green product entry.


Author(s):  
Xiaoxi Zhu ◽  
Guangdong Wu

With the continuous deterioration of the environment and the improvement of consumer green awareness, more and more producers began to launch green products. For example, many automobile companies began to produce new energy vehicles.  However, whether a new product can be successfully introduced to the market depends not only on the product's quality improvement, but also on its sales channels. In this paper, we model a supply chain composed of a manufacturer and two asymmetric retailers to analyze how the retailers' strategic decisions affect the introduction of a newer green product. Backward induction is adopted to survey the dynamic decisions of the supply chain members. Given the leading retailer's product choice, the follower-up retailer's product choices and decision optimums are defined by specific thresholds of consumer green valuation and production costs. Results show that the follower-up retailer would make completely different responses within a same threshold range when the leading retailer takes different product decisions. In other words, even if the leading retailer chooses green new products, the follower will not necessarily imitate the choice of green products, and it could be more advantageous to choose the old generation products (for price competition). Furthermore, results show that green product introduction does not necessarily bring Pareto improvement to both the two retailers. Finally, we derive the specific intervals in which green products can be successfully introduced into the market.Our modelling work and results provide instructive managerial insights on green product introduction in a retailer led supply chain.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Zhihong Ai

With the advent of the 5G era, the mobile network group buying community dominated by focusing on social relations shows great development potential. However, in the mobile network group buying community, the mixed information makes the information environment of the community more complex. Information asymmetry will lead to “mistakes” in consumers’ choice, making it impossible for some important markets to be fully developed. Considering the gains and losses of three interest subjects—governments, enterprises, and consumers in the green product market under information symmetry, in this paper, an evolutionary game model involving governments, enterprises, and consumers was built. Numerical experiments and simulation were performed using SciPy, a scientific computing library of Python, to study the main factors influencing the healthy development of the green product market. The research results showed under information symmetry, when the governments’ benefit from increased government credibility was higher than the cost of governments for screening the information of enterprises’ products and identifying the green products, the expected fine of enterprises for producing high carbon products was higher than the difference between the actual cost increment and the actual income increment of enterprises for producing green products, and the utility perception of consumers from purchasing green products was higher than the cost of consumers for purchasing green products, the three-party game would evolve to a socially ideal stable state. The above conclusions provide useful policy suggestions for governments to vigorously develop the green product market.


Author(s):  
Mrs.P.Sathyapriya ◽  
Dr.P.Sekar

A green product is a sustainable product designed to minimize its environmental impacts during its whole life-cycle and even after it's of no use. Green products are usually identified by having two basic goals – reducing waste and maximizing resource efficiency. With growing markets and increasing consumer volumes, the production, as well as consumption patterns are degrading the environment drastically. The government, consumers and producers have realized the worth of this issue. The research and development department of industries are continuously working to develop products that are environment-friendly and cause less environmental destruction. Products which are capable of being recycled, and possess healthy disposal are often termed as green products. The manufacturing, marketing, and consumption of such products are being promoted by the government as well as non-governmental organizations. Environmental sustainability and personal consciousness of consumers are found to be motivating factors while unavailability and unawareness are deemed demotivating factors along with the cost of installation / usage. Consumers are intended to purchase green products irrespective of their demographics. KEY WORDS-Consumer Behaviour, Green Marketing, Green product


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (20) ◽  
pp. 5734 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang ◽  
Hu ◽  
He

This paper focuses on coordination issues related to the green supply chain with capacity constraints and green marketing efforts. We build a two-stage green supply chain, in which the upstream manufacturer has a certain amount of installed capacity to produce green product, yet can expand its capacity through a Cloud Manufacturing (CM) Platform once its existing capacity becomes insufficient, while the downstream retailer expends green marketing effort to promote the green product. In particular, we analyze the interaction between the capacity expansion options of the manufacturer and the green marketing efforts of the retailer. Aiming to mitigate the inefficiency under a decentralized green supply chain, we design a contract that combines cost-sharing and revenue-sharing in green marketing in order to coordinate the supply chain. The results show that: (1) when the manufacturer’s existing capacity falls below a certain threshold, it will choose to expand its capacity. The threshold is related to existing capacity, capacity expansion cost coefficient, green marketing cost coefficient, and sensitivity coefficient of demand to green marketing. (2) Under low capacity, if the capacity expansion cost coefficient is large, a higher consumer environmental awareness or preference for green products will weaken the retailer’s motivation for expending green effort. (3) A contract for cost-sharing and revenue-sharing in green marketing can fully coordinate the green supply chain, whereby the two share proportions are equal and meet certain constraints.


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