scholarly journals Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Lewis
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Ebay Motors

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

Asymmetric information, adverse selection, and the pricing of CMBS☆

2011 ◽  
Vol 100 (2) ◽  
pp. 304-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xudong An ◽  
Yongheng Deng ◽  
Stuart A. Gabriel
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Adverse Selection

scholarly journals How does corporate voluntary disclosure affect asymmetric information and adverse selection?

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 413-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amal Hamrouni ◽  
Anthony Miloudi ◽  
Ramzi Benkraiem
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Strategic Information ◽  
Information Measures ◽  
Adverse Selection Costs ◽  
Bid Ask Spreads

This paper investigates whether the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure mitigates asymmetric information and adverse selection in the Euronext Paris stock exchange. We apply a disclosure index as a proxy for the extent of voluntary disclosure and use different spread measures to estimate both asymmetric information and adverse selection. Our findings show a negative relationship between the disclosure index and asymmetric information and adverse selection proxies. An analysis of sub-indexes provides additional mixed results. Several asymmetric information measures are negatively related to the volume of financial, non-financial and voluntary governance information in corporate annual reports. Nevertheless, the effect of strategic information volume is statistically significant only for effective bid-ask spreads. On the whole, these results are consistent with the view that high corporate voluntary disclosure is associated with narrow spreads and low adverse selection costs

Supplier Selection Model Based on Two Stage Signal Game and Reputation Mechanism

2011 ◽  
Vol 214 ◽  
pp. 50-54
Author(s):  
Xin Ma
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Supplier Selection ◽  
Information Economics ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Reputation Model ◽  
Selection Signal ◽  
Optimal Signal

Asymmetric information will lead to adverse selection in the supplier selection in the supply. One the basis of game theory and information economics theories, a two stage supplier selection signal game reputation model is presented. The optimal price signal and utility of supplier are derived under symmetric and asymmetric information. The optimal signal of supplier will be strengthen and the utility at the second stage will also be increased if the supplier sets up reputation at the first stage, and it also shown that more utilities can be achieved when a supplier uses reputation.

scholarly journals Issue of Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Market in Assam

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 1917-1920
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Health Status ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Poor People ◽  
Insurance Company ◽  
Insurance Policies ◽  
Health Insurance Market

Health insurance acts as an important support system, which protects the health as well as the wealth of people. But health insurance is hardly present in developing countries and in many countries it is totally absent. Presence of asymmetric information among the buyers and sellers makes the insurance market more complicated. Due to which insurance companies finds it is difficult to enter into the insurance market and eventually leads to market failure. To get rid of this problem insurance company increased the price of insurance policies. This has more impact on the poor people as they cannot meet their medical expenses. Adverse selection is the one of issues related to asymmetric information. This paper tries to examine the presence of adverse selection in health insurance market in Assam and about the various factors that influence on decision to buy an insurance policy. Based on primary survey this study used a probit model to analyses the presence of adverse selection in health insurance market. Findings of the study shows that adverse selection is absent in health insurance market but income is found to be an important determinant of insurance coverage. About one third of the population in Assam is living below poverty line and the cost of medical is too higher for the people. So health insurance is necessary in recent time to improve the health status of people in Assam. Therefore government should provide health insurance policies for poor people to improve their health status.

Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information

2001 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fredrik Andersson
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Adverse Selection

Improving Trustworthiness in E-Market Using Attack Resilient Reputation Modeling

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 57-82
Author(s):  
Neeraj Kumar Sharma ◽  
Vibha Gaur ◽  
Punam Bedi
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Reputation Systems ◽  
Trust And Reputation ◽  
Reputation Mechanisms ◽  
Reputation Building ◽  
Building Parameters

Asymmetric information is a major problem in e-commerce transactions as it gives rise to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Reputation mechanisms provide a solution to this problem by discouraging fraudulent behavior and encouraging honest behavior of participants in the uncertain and un-trusted environment of e-market. This paper discusses trust and reputation relationships, and highlights the importance of key reputation building parameters to enhance trustworthiness of participants. Finally, it proposes reputation metrics that guard reputation systems from various attacks by malicious participants to improve the quality of e-market and presents a working prototype.

scholarly journals Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets

2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (7) ◽  
pp. 1659-1701 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory S. Crawford ◽  
Nicola Pavanini ◽  
Fabiano Schivardi
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Imperfect Competition ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Credit Supply ◽  
Lines Of Credit ◽  
Credit Demand ◽  
Firm Default

We study the effects of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the market for small business lines of credit. We estimate a structural model of credit demand, loan use, pricing, and firm default using matched firm-bank data from Italy. We find evidence of adverse selection in the form of a positive correlation between the unobserved determinants of demand for credit and default. Our counterfactual experiments show that while increases in adverse selection increase prices and defaults on average, reducing credit supply, banks’ market power can mitigate these negative effects. (JEL D22, D82, G21, G32, L13, L25)

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