Corporate Governance, Neoliberalism and Transition Economies

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorraine E. Talbot
2002 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saul Estrin

This paper examines the elements of institutional development critical to the enhancement of company performance in transition economies. This includes initial conditions, forms of privatization, institutional frameworks and the competitiveness of markets. Comparing empirical evidence, the paper concludes that there is a clear distinction in effectiveness of policies followed and their impact between Central Europe and CIS countries. This divergence is attributed to fundamentally different political attitudes toward reform, the need of CIS governments to gain political support for reform and as a consequence of the desire of Central European countries to join European Union.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 41-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morten Huse

The objective of this paper is to explore important contingencies for boards and governance designs. The paper is made in a setting where governance in SMEs in transition economies is to be developed, and knowledge from advanced market economies constitutes the framework to be built on. The core of the paper is the presentation of six groups of important contextual variables that must be analyzed and understood when corporate governance systems shall be developed. The framework presented in the paper includes understanding the perspectives of both internal and external actors in the corporate governance process, and that the design of a governance system will include issues related the board working style as well as thee board members.


2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-348
Author(s):  
Miroslav Mateev

This paper examines the corporate governance problem in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and the major implications of highly concentrated ownership in these countries on their economic development. Our main message is that ownership and control in transition economies will remain highly concentrated in short-term aspect, and regulatory intervention should focus on protecting minority shareholder interests while maintaining the incentives for entrepreneurship and large shareholder monitoring. We also argue that the corporate governance system in transition economies will have to rely on active involvement and monitoring by large shareholders, even after the emergence of a class of professional managers. Moreover, our empirical results support Berglöf and Pajuste (2003) findings that controlling shareholders (strategic investors) are critical to the successful restructuring of privatized firms; minority protection is also important to attract outside capital, but it may reduce the disciplinary role of the market for corporate control


2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 61-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Galina G. Preobragenskaya ◽  
Robert W. McGee

Corporate governance has become a popular topic in recent years. Although much attention has been given to corporate governance in the United States and other Western countries as a result of recent scandals, and in Japan and other East Asian countries because of the financial crisis that occurred there a few years ago, much has also been going on in Russia and other transition economies in the area of corporate governance. This paper discusses recent developments in corporate governance in Russia and includes information gathered during interviews conducted in Russia during the summer of 2003.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document