Strategic Responses to Used-Goods Markets: Airbus and Boeing Since 1997

Author(s):  
Myongjin Kim

Author(s):  
Loren K. Smith

Abstract Because of linkages between markets for new and used durable goods, economic policies that target new durable good markets, such as tax incentives or antitrust legislation, are likely to affect used goods markets as well. I use a simple theoretical model to illustrate how an exogenous shock to prices of new durable goods affects prices and trade frequencies of corresponding used goods. The model predicts that if prices of new durable goods increase, then prices of used goods will also increase. In addition, if the distribution of consumer preferences for quality are relatively concentrated among those with a high preference for quality, then trade in used good markets will slow. The predictions of the model are supported by an empirical analysis of the market for new and used wide-body commercial aircraft following a major change in effective aircraft prices caused by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The Act effectively increased prices of new aircraft by an average of $6.5 million. At the same time, used aircraft prices increased by an average of $2.9 million to $7.7 million and used aircraft sales fell between 23 to 36 percent. These results suggest that policies that affect new durable good markets can have significant effects on used markets as well.



2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 540-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuya Yin ◽  
Saibal Ray ◽  
Haresh Gurnani ◽  
Animesh Animesh




2005 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
pp. e71-e88
Author(s):  
Pascal Chantelat ◽  
Bénédicte Vignal


1999 ◽  
Vol 89 (5) ◽  
pp. 1097-1115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igal Hendel ◽  
Alessandro Lizzeri

We present a dynamic model of adverse selection to examine the interactions between new and used goods markets. We find that the used market never shuts down, the volume of trade can be large, and distortions are lower than previously thought. New cars prices can be higher under adverse selection than in its absence. An extension to several brands that differ in reliability leads to testable predictions of the effects of adverse selection. Unreliable brands have steeper price declines and lower volumes of trade. We contrast these predictions with those of a model where brands physically depreciate at different rates. (JEL D82, L15)



2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (4) ◽  
pp. 1535-1546 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Lewis

Since Akerlof (1970), economists have understood the adverse selection problem that information asymmetries can create in used goods markets. The remarkable growth in online used goods auctions thus poses a puzzle. Part of the solution is that sellers voluntarily disclose their private information on the auction web page. This defines a precise contract -- to deliver the car shown for the closing price -- which helps protect the buyer from adverse selection. I test this theory using data from eBay Motors, finding that online disclosures are important price determinants, and that disclosure costs impact both the level of disclosure and prices. (JEL D44, D82, L81)



2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Lent ◽  
Lawrence H. Gerstein
Keyword(s):  


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alwi Musa Muzaiyin

Trade is a form of business that is run by many people around the world, ranging from trading various kinds of daily necessities or primary needs, to selling the need for luxury goods for human satisfaction. For that, to overcome the many needs of life, they try to outsmart them buy products that are useful, economical and efficient. One of the markets they aim at is the second-hand market or the so-called trashy market. As for a trader at a trashy market, they aim to sell in the used goods market with a variety of reasons. These reasons include; first, because it is indeed to fulfill their needs. Second, the capital needed to trade at trashy markets is much smaller than opening a business where the products come from new goods. Third, used goods are easily available and easily sold to buyer. Here the researcher will discuss the behavior of Muslim traders in a review of Islamic business ethics (the case in the Jagalan Kediri Trashy Market). Kediri Jagalan Trashy Market is central to the sale of used goods in the city of Kediri. Where every day there are more than 300 used merchants who trade in the market. The focus of this research is how the behavior of Muslim traders in the Jagalan Kediri Trashy Market in general. Then, from the large number of traders, of course not all traders have behavior in accordance with Islamic business ethics, as well as traders who are in accordance with the rules of Islamic business ethics. This study aims to determine how the behavior of Muslim traders in the Jagalan Kediri Trashy Market in buying and selling transactions and to find out how the behavior of Muslim traders in the Jagalan Kediri Trashy Market in reviewing Islamic business ethics. Key Words: Trade, loak market, Islamic business



2021 ◽  
pp. 016344372097290
Author(s):  
Alessandro D’Arma ◽  
Tim Raats ◽  
Jeanette Steemers

Netflix and other transnational online video streaming services are disrupting long-established arrangements in national television systems around the world. In this paper we analyse how public service media (PSM) organisations (key purveyors of societal goals in broadcasting) are responding to the fast-growing popularity of these new services. Drawing on Philip Napoli’s framework for analysing strategic responses by established media to threats of competitive displacement by new media, we find that the three PSM organisations in our study exhibit commonalities. Their responses have tended to follow a particular evolution starting with different levels of complacency and resistance before settling into more coherent strategies revolving around efforts to differentiate PSM offerings, while also diversifying into activities, primarily across new platforms, that mimic SVoD approaches and probe production collaborations. Beyond these similarities, however, we also find that a range of contextual factors (including path-dependency, the role and status of PSM in each country, the degree of additional government support, cultural factors and market size) help explain nuances in strategic responses between our three cases.



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