The Justiciability of Socioeconomic Rights, European Solidarity, and the Role of the Court of Justice of the EU

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver H. Gerstenberg
2021 ◽  
pp. 91-106
Author(s):  
Anna Magdalena Kosińska

The analyzed ruling is the first judgement which the Court of Justice passed in order to provide interpretationfor the new Student Directive (2016/801 of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence ofthird-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemesor educational projects and au pairing). Due to its judiciary activism, the Court was able to find a connectionbetween the case pending before a national court and EU law in the case of M.A. In the end, the Court finallydecided that in the case at issue, regarding the rights of a foreign national to apply for a residence permit for thepurpose of enrolling in second-cycle studies programme in Poland, the procedure of applying for a long-stay visaon the grounds of national law must be safeguarded by the guarantees under Article 47 of the Charter of FundamentalRights. The guarantees apply to the actual states in which EU law is applicable – in this case the “StudentDirective.” It seems that the ruling in the case of M.A. will play a crucial role in facilitating students’ – TCNs’ – entryinto the territory of the Republic of Poland, while the Polish legislator, in all probability, will be obliged to changethe provisions of the national law in such a way as to make it possible for future students to access a full array oflegal remedies against the negative decisions of consuls.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1343-1374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Martinico

Recently, scholars have argued of the necessity of going beyond “judicial dialogues” and “conflict-and-power” approaches to the analysis of the role of national Constitutional Courts in the Union. On the one hand, there are risks connected to a “too welcoming an approach by national constitutional courts to EU law”; on the other hand, it is possible to criticize both the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and some national Constitutional Courts for other, less cooperative, decisions. I share this cautious approach for many reasons, and primarily because the preliminary ruling mechanism does not exhaust all the possible means of communication between constitutional courts and the CJEU. For instance, what Komárek calls “parallel references” can serve, in some circumstances, as a technique of alternative (or hidden) dialogue, that has favored a sort of “remote dialogue” over the years. My sole point of disagreement with this scholarly position is over the role of conflicts in this scenario. Whilst Komárek seems to confine conflicts to phenomena of mere resistance or to “‘cold’ strategic considerations,” in this work I am going to adopt a much broader idea of conflict, which goes beyond mere “conflicts and power games.”


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 883-906 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Reichel

One of the reasons for introducing a “Union” citizenship in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty was to provide a direct channel between the citizens of the Member States and the EU. In contrast to many other international organizations, the role of the individual has been central to the European project since its inception. In its famous 1962 judgment given inVan Gend en Loos,1 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) underscored the importance of the “vigilance of individuals concerned” seeking to protect their European rights in the new legal order through judicial control.2 The right to directly vote on the representatives of the European Parliament had already been introduced in the 1970s. The citizens of the Member States were thus equipped with two classic forms of political participation even prior to the introduction of Union citizenship: law making and the legal adjudication of individual cases. Nonetheless, whether these channels are sufficient to guarantee the citizens effective democratic means to influence legislation and exercise control of EU institutions in the rather complex multilevel legal system of the EU has been continuously debated.


2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claude Cahn

The judgment of 16 July 2015 is ecj’s first substantive ruling in a case concerning racial discrimination against Roma. This is noteworthy, given the centrality of Roma to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in the area of discrimination (on the European Court of Human Rights, Roma and racial discrimination, see C. Cahn (2015), ‘Triple Helix: The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, Roma and Racial Discrimination’, in: Claude Cahn, Human Rights, State Sovereignty and Medical Ethics, Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, pp. 106–148.). The ecj ruling in the chez case is important for a number of reasons, including for recognizing that the ban on discrimination by association applies also to cases of indirect discrimination. Its most significant contribution however is its reflections on the role of stigma in driving discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin. Also of note is its rejection of a number of approaches used in national law – in Bulgaria and elsewhere – as incompatible with European Union anti-discrimination law. The judgment is among the most important ecj rulings to date on discrimination. The current article discusses some of the noteworthy aspects of the case.


ERA Forum ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-183
Author(s):  
Florence Hartmann-Vareilles ◽  
Michele Messina
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 53-71
Author(s):  
Samuel Boutruche Zarevac

Abstract ‘That assessment of the extent of the risk [of persecution] must, in all cases, be carried out with vigilance and care, since what are at issue are issues relating to the integrity of the person and to individual liberties, issues which relate to the fundamental values of the Union.’ The case law of the Court of Justice of the EU concerning the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is still limited. Nonetheless, even this limited case law already offers interesting insights into analysing the potential role of the Court of Justice of the EU in the development of the CEAS, and this jurisprudence is in any event likely to grow significantly, due to the fact that the provisions of the CEAS are the result of a political compromise and so lack clarity. This chapter examines the ruling delivered by the Court in the case of Elgafaji, which contains certain elements which address the interpretative difficulties raised by Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, and goes on to consider, through a discussion of the recent ruling in Abdulla, the extent to which the Court’s interpretation of those provisions of the CEAS which replicate the wording of the 1951 Convention will influence the interpretation of this international instrument, and the difficulties presented in this context. The extent of this influence remains to be seen, but it is clear in any event that the Court of Justice is likely to play a major role in the development of the CEAS. One amendment which may prove necessary is the modification of the Court of Justice’s procedural rules such that it can take into account the views of third-party organisations with a special expertise in this field.


2019 ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
Roberto Reyes Izquierdo

The aim of this paper is to analyse how the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been a fundamental factor in the integration process of the European Union, in spite of the obstacles posed by the intergovernmental dynamics that have traditionally hindered the construction of a stronger, cohesive and more integrated Europe. Important principles such as direct effect or supremacy of EU law have been developed through ECJ rulings and case law, even when such principles were not literally foreseen in the foundational Treaties. Therefore, this paper argues that the role and power of the Court as an “indirect law-maker” have been essential for the construction of the European Union, and this has been possible due to the complexities and weaknesses of the legislative process involving the three main decision-makers: the Commission, the Council of the EU, and the European Parliament.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-68
Author(s):  
Orlando Scarcello

This paper will examine the recent preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice issued by the Italian Court of Cassation in the Randstad case, aimed at rearranging the internal constitutional separation between ordinary and administrative courts (article 111(8) of the Constitution). I will first provide some context on both the relations between Italian and EU courts (2.1) and on the confrontation between the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court in interpreting article 111 (2.2). I will then specifically examine the referring order to the Court of Justice of the EU (3), focusing on the role of general clauses of EU law as articles 4(3) and 19 TEU and 47 of the Charter in it. Finally, I will consider the instrumental use of EU law made by the Cassation to overcome an unpleasant constitutional arrangement. This aligns Randstad with previous cases such as Melki or A v. B and may foster constitutional conflict in the future. 


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