scholarly journals An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 407-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serena Guarnaschelli ◽  
Richard D. McKelvey ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Large Fraction ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Unanimity Rule ◽  
Group Data ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Jury Decision

We present experimental results on groups facing a decision problem analogous to that faced by a jury. We consider three treatment variables: group size (three or six), number of votes needed for conviction (majority or unanimity), and pre-vote deliberation. We find evidence of strategic voting under the unanimity rule: A large fraction of our subjects vote for a decision analogous to conviction even when their private information indicates a state analogous to innocence. This is roughly consistent with the game theoretic predictions of Feddersen and Pesendorfer. Although individual behavior is explained well by the game theoretic model, there are discrepancies at the level of the group decision. Contrary to Feddersen and Pesendorfer, in our experiments there are fewer outcomes analogous to incorrect convictions under unanimity rule than under majority rule. In the case of no deliberation, we simultaneously account for the individual and group data using quantal response equilibrium.

Explaining the Schwarzenegger Phenomenon: Local Frontrunners in Climate Policy

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 82-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Urpelainen
Keyword(s):  
Climate Policy ◽  
Private Information ◽  
The United States ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Local Policy ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Local Climate ◽  
National Regulation ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government

The surge of local climate policy is a puzzling political-economic phenomenon. Why have local policy-makers, incapable of mitigating global warming through individual emissions reductions, adopted ambitious policies while national governments refrain from action? I construct a game-theoretic model of two-level climate policy with incomplete information over political benefits. In equilibrium, the government selects a lax national regulation, and local policy-makers with private information on high local benefits choose more ambitious policies despite incentives to free ride. The analysis also suggests that even though local policy-makers prefer not to reveal information to the government, they must do so to pursue short-term political gains. Counterintuitively, new information can lead to more ambitious national regulation even if the government learns that the local political benefits are likely lower than expected. As an empirical application, I study the evolution of climate policies in the United States.

scholarly journals International Organizations as Policy Advisors

2012 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 537-569 ◽  
Author(s):  
Songying Fang ◽  
Randall W. Stone
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Policy Position ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Policy Recommendations ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Moderate Policy

AbstractHow can international organizations persuade governments to adopt policy recommendations that are based on private information when their interests conflict? We develop a game-theoretic model of persuasion that applies regardless of regime type and does not rely on the existence of domestic constituency constraints. In the model, an international organization (IO) and a domestic expert have private information about a crisis, but their preferences diverge from those of the government, which must choose whether to delegate decision making to the expert. Persuasion can take place if the international institution is able to send a credible signal. We find that this can take place only if the preferences of the IO and the domestic expert diverge and the institution holds the more moderate policy position. This result contrasts with conventional wisdom, which holds that the necessary condition for IOs to exert influence is support from a domestic constituency with aligned preferences. Our model suggests that, far from being an obstacle to international cooperation, polarized domestic politics may be a necessary condition for IOs to exert effective influence.

scholarly journals A Game-Theoretic Framework to Preserve Location Information Privacy in Location-based Service Applications

Sensors ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (7) ◽  
pp. 1581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mulugeta Kassaw Tefera ◽  
Xiaolong Yang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Privacy Protection ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Information Leakage ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Location Based Service ◽  
Selfish Behavior ◽  
Game Theoretic

Recently, the growing ubiquity of location-based service (LBS) technology has increased the likelihood of users’ privacy breaches due to the exposure of their real-life information to untrusted third parties. Extensive use of such LBS applications allows untrusted third-party adversarial entities to collect large quantities of information regarding users’ locations over time, along with their identities. Due to the high risk of private information leakage using resource-constrained smart mobile devices, most LBS users may not be adequately encouraged to access all LBS applications. In this paper, we study the use of game theory to protect users against private information leakage in LBSs due to malicious or selfish behavior of third-party observers. In this study, we model a scenario of privacy protection gameplay between a privacy protector and an outside visitor and then derive the situation of the prisoner’s dilemma game to analyze the traditional privacy protection problems. Based on the analysis, we determine the corresponding benefits to both players using a point of view that allows the visitor to access a certain amount of information and denies further access to the user’s private information when exposure of privacy is forthcoming. Our proposed model uses the collection of private information about historical access data and current LBS access scenario to effectively determine the probability that the visitor’s access is an honest one. Moreover, we present the procedures involved in the privacy protection model and framework design, using game theory for decision-making. Finally, by employing a comparison analysis, we perform some experiments to assess the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed game-theoretic model over the traditional solutions.

scholarly journals Voting Rules in Sequential Search by Committees: Theory and Experiments

2019 ◽  
Vol 65 (9) ◽  
pp. 4349-4364
Author(s):  
Vincent Mak ◽  
Darryl A. Seale ◽  
Amnon Rapoport ◽  
Eyran J. Gisches
Keyword(s):  
Decision Makers ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Secretary Problem ◽  
Sequential Search ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Unanimity Rule ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Voting Rule ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Individual

We propose a committee extension of the individual sequential search model called the “secretary problem,” where collective decisions on when to stop the search are reached via a prespecified voting rule. We offer a game-theoretic analysis of our model and then report two experiments on three-person committees with either uncorrelated or perfectly correlated preferences under three different voting rules followed by a third experiment on single decision makers. Relative to equilibrium predictions, committees with uncorrelated preferences oversearched under minority and majority voting rules but, otherwise, undersearched or approximated equilibrium play. Individually, committee members were often less strategic when their preferences were uncorrelated than when they were perfectly correlated. Collectively, committees’ decisions were more strategic than single decision makers’ only under the unanimity rule, although still not significantly better in terms of the decision makers’ welfare. Finally, across our experiments that involved committee search, the unanimity rule always optimized committee welfare. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics.

Optimal Information-Sharing Behaviors among Hotels: Game-Theoretical Approach

2020 ◽  
pp. 109634802093635
Author(s):  
Sungsoo Kim ◽  
Steven M. Slutsky ◽  
Brijesh Thapa
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Competition Model ◽  
Lodging Industry ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretical Approach ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Optimal Information ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Hotel Managers

The lodging industry uses diverse pricing strategies to maximize revenues. Given the uncertain nature of decision parameters (demand conditions), sharing information among competitors can dramatically affect hotels’ profits. This study examines the decisions of hotels to share or not to share private information with competitors to maximize profits via a game-theoretic model. In a two-stage model, hotels decide whether to share information in the first stage, and then, in the second stage, they compete in setting prices along the lines of a standard price competition model. Results include that hotels share demand information with their competitors if there is a low demand signal but conceal information if the demand signal is high. This study provides a standard price competition model that can assist hotel managers in decision making on revenue management, including room pricing strategy.

scholarly journals Allocating Limited Resources to Protect a Massive Number of Targets Using a Game Theoretic Model

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xu Liu ◽  
Xiaoqiang Di ◽  
Jinqing Li ◽  
Huan Wang ◽  
Jianping Zhao ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Limited Resources ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Comparison Results ◽  
Massive Number ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Resource Allocation Strategy ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Resource allocation is the process of optimizing the rare resources. In the area of security, how to allocate limited resources to protect a massive number of targets is especially challenging. This paper addresses this resource allocation issue by constructing a game theoretic model. A defender and an attacker are players and the interaction is formulated as a trade-off between protecting targets and consuming resources. The action cost which is a necessary role of consuming resource is considered in the proposed model. Additionally, a bounded rational behavior model (quantal response: QR), which simulates a human attacker of the adversarial nature, is introduced to improve the proposed model. To validate the proposed model, we compare the different utility functions and resource allocation strategies. The comparison results suggest that the proposed resource allocation strategy performs better than others in the perspective of utility and resource effectiveness.

Applications to Game Theory

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Feedback Effects ◽  
Symmetric Game ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The World ◽  
Game Theoretic

This chapter explores several applications of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to specific games in order to illustrate and expand on the wide range of game-theoretic principles and phenomena associated with QRE that have been highlighted in the previous chapters. The first application considered belongs to the class of continuous games. With a continuum of decisions, QRE predicts a choice distribution that is not merely a (possibly asymmetric) spread to each side of a Nash equilibrium, since “feedback effects” from deviations by one player alter others' expected payoff profiles, which would induce further changes. The second application is a symmetric game with binary actions where players have continuously distributed private information about an unknown state of the world that affects both players' payoffs. The remainder of the chapter looks at three applications to extensive-form games, all of which are games of incomplete information.

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document